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PREFACE
I started working on this book in the spring of 2000. At that time, the political
atmosphere in Israel seemed calm. My biggest concern was about the possible
results of an evacuation of Jewish settlements from Judea, Samaria and the Gaza
Strip as part of a possible progress in the peace process between Israel and the
Palestinians. I was worried that the ideological rift between the different seg-
ments of Israeli society would manifest itself again in a violent way and that the
events of 1994–95, which led to the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin
could repeat themselves. Furthermore, I hoped that this time the Israeli State
would use in its response to the growing wave of extremism measures that
would not only be effective but would comply with the democratic nature of the
State.
During the months in which I was doing the research for this book, two
things happened simultaneously. First, the political reality in Israel, and later in
other parts of the world, shifted dramatically and the question of how democ-
racies should respond to challenges of extremism and violence became less of a
theoretical issue and much more of an acute problem for policy-makers. Second,
the more I studied the ‘defending democracy’ concept the better I understood
that this term is much broader and more diversified than I first imagined. In light
of the issues involved, I sincerely hope that this book will contribute not only to
the theoretical understanding of the means by which democracies can respond
to extremist and violent challenges and still adhere to democratic principles. I
hope that it will also encourage policy-makers to take into consideration the dif-
ferent aspects and possible consequences of their policies and help them choose
the ‘immunised’ route. Though this route requires more time and effort than
the ‘militant’ one, it holds the potential for finding the ‘golden path’ in the
defence of democracy from its challengers as well as from itself.
The completion of this book would not have been possible without the gen-
erous support of the Yitzhak Rabin Centre for Israel Studies as well as the Centre
for the Study of National Security at the University of Haifa. I would like to
thank both institutions for their generosity and for believing in the importance
of this study. I owe a big debt of gratitude to three wonderful friends and col-
leagues. Professor Yael Yishai, my mentor, who not only shared her ‘civil society’
data with me but read large parts of the manuscript and gave me some won-
derfully helpful words of advice. I will always cherish her guidance and friend-
ship. Professor Gabi Ben-dor, my teacher and friend, who is always there for me
with his endless wisdom. I thank him for doing everything he could to help me
at every step of the way. Last, but not least, my dear and beloved friend Profes-
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sor Avraham Brichta, who spent so many precious hours talking to me, lifting
my spirits and supporting my research. Thank you.
I also thank those colleagues who offered me a shoulder to lean on over the
last few years, and who helped me put my ideas together: Dr Bruce Hoffman, Dr
Magnus Ranstorp, Dr Cas Mudde, Dr Giovanni Capoccia, Dr Raphael Cohen-
Almagor and Professor Michael Minkenberg. A special word of gratitude to my
friends in the Department of Political Science, at the University of Nevada, Pro-
fessor Leonard Weinberg and Professor William Eubank, who made me feel at
home during my stay in Reno and supported me through the last stages of com-
pleting the manuscript. I wish to express my appreciation to my friends at the
University of Haifa: Dr Yair Zalmanovitch, Professor Aaron Cohen, Dr Andre
Eshet, Ms Daphna Canetti, Mr Badi Hasisi and the dean of the Faculty of Social
Sciences, Professor Arye Rattner. A special word of gratitude to two young
friends and promising scholars: Mr Arie Perliger, my current research student,
and Mr Eran Zaidise, a friend and former student, whose devotion to this project
helped the book become a reality. I also thank Dani Shlossberg and Olga Sagi,
who edited the manuscript.
Special gratitude goes to Tony Mason, Richard Delahunty and Marilyn
Cresswell at Manchester University Press for the helpful way in which they
treated both the manuscript and me.
Finally, a loving word of gratitude to my family. My parents, Ruth and Max
Pedahzur, who taught me so much but left me before I could give something in
return, and my own family: Galit, Rotem, Shahar and Doron. You are my world.
Everything I do is thanks to your endless love and support. I love you.
Ami Pedahzur
Reno, Nevada
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Introduction: 
the ‘defending democracy’ in Israel – 
a framework of analysis
The trip  to Jerusalem on Monday morning, 6 November 1995, wasuncomfortable, to put it mildly. The bus, provided by the Egged publictransportation system, for citizens who wanted to take part in the funeral
of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was more than filled to capacity. Many of the
travellers, mostly the younger ones, were teary-eyed. Others simply did not hold
back, and their sobbing could be heard throughout the bus. I looked out of the
window at the arid landscape of the hot Israeli autumn and tried to collect my
thoughts. From within the deep sorrow that engulfed me something else was
preying on my mind, yet, at that consequential moment, I found it hard to pin
down. It was only a few days later that the picture began to become clear in my 
mind.
For a period of forty-seven years, from the day of its establishment to the
day of the Prime Minister’s assassination, the State of Israel has been fighting
on many fronts – including the ‘home front’ – in order to stabilise its govern-
mental system and try to fashion it after the exemplar of the democratic tradi-
tion. I, and many like me, often had strong misgivings over the malleable
interpretation of the concept of a defending democracy held by the people of this
country. I had grave doubts especially over the restrictions imposed upon those
citizens, whether Arabs or Jews, secular or religious, left-wing or right-wing,
who aspired to realise their basic rights within a democratic governmental
system and who struggled to organise their cause into political action. The
leaders of this country are accustomed to explain that the high price paid by a
democracy which more than occasionally limits the freedom of expression of its
citizens is ultimately justified. As they see it, enforcing the powers at the gov-
ernment’s disposal against radicals and antagonists is the inevitable price which
the democratic polity has to pay in order to maintain stability.
All through the days of mourning the prime minister the sense of frustra-
tion was unrelenting. The political murder itself, and the ominous process of
delegitimation the Government of Israel had gone through prior to the murder,
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only proved that the forceful approach assumed by the country toward internal
threats – and which exacted such a high price in terms of the quality of Israeli
democracy – had helped little in terms of its stabilisation.
The key question that continued to perplex me in face of this reality was
why had Israel become so entrapped in the snares along the way? The plural is
used because I am speaking of more than one simple failing. On the one hand,
the State was incapable of eradicating the political extremism and violence
threatening it and, on the other, in trying to defeat these phenomena, it had
caused grave harm to the democratic foundations on which it was based.
The near undoing of the State of Israel in this regard leads us to the essen-
tial theoretical discussion of one of the paradoxes which has been debated in
democratic thought for many years. It focuses on the question: to what extent
is it conceivable for a democratic polity to grant all its citizens – including those
intent on undermining it – full liberty of action and thus, in effect, expedite 
their efforts in bringing about the possible demise of that same democracy? 
This quandary, otherwise christened the ‘paradox of tolerance’ by Karl Popper,
embodies a further and inverse paradox which can be called the ‘paradox of the
defending democracy’. This paradox raises the question: to what degree does a
democratic polity have the mandate to suppress or overpower extremist ele-
ments germinating from within its borders – elements which often seek to chal-
lenge its stability and core values? For a heavy-handed response might lead to
an erosion of those very same principles upon which the democracy is struc-
tured. Erosion of these foundations might well lead to a predicament where the
boundaries between the methods used by the struggling democracy and those
extremist threats aspiring to undermine it are rendered indistinct. An operative
perspective deriving from this paradox focuses on the effectiveness of counter-
action policy and especially on the question of whether a severe response ini-
tiated by the democracy – which evidently carries a high ethical price – does 
in fact eradicate extremism and violence and consequently uphold the polity’s 
stability.
These convoluted problems and their derivatives have occupied philoso-
phers and scholars for many years. Among them were John Stuart Mill, who
lengthily contemplated the notion of freedom of expression,1 Karl Popper, who
explored the question of tolerance toward the intolerant,2 and John Rawls, 
who studied the scope and limitations of the individual’s action in a democra-
tic state.3 In effect, the core of the argument addressing the tension between the
defence of the democracy and the guaranteed protection of its basic liberties 
has for a long time been restricted to the philosophical playing field or the 
‘theoretical–normative level’, to use a term made popular by Ignazi.4
As time passed, and particularly in the 1950s–1960s, this discourse was
supplemented with another level of analysis – the political–institutional level.
Close scrutiny of the argument involving this term indicates two principal lines
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of research. The first type, i.e. the legal–judicial, which finds its roots in works
penned by Loewenstein in the late 1930s, focuses on the judicial statutes and
verdicts handed down against extremist parties and violent organisations.5
The second course, the military–operative, places its emphasis on military–
intelligence–policing strategies and tactics in the battle against subversion, polit-
ical violence and terror in democratic systems.
Although discussions couched in the terminology of theoretical–normative
level were generally distinct from those on a political–constitutional scale,
mention should be made of theorists such as Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Peter
Chalk, Ronald Crelinsten, Alex Schmid and, more recently, Giovanni Capoccia,6
who were successful in bridging between these two levels of analysis. Works by
these scholars were helpful in presenting a more inclusive theory regarding the
democratic response to extremism, subversion and political violence. At the
same time, their research still suffered from the lack of a comprehensive model
which could account for additional levels of analysis and, in particular, the
social level of analysis.
In this book – whose goal is the academic discussion and analysis of the
Israeli democracy’s response to the various challenges facing it – other than
coping with the ethical aspect of this concern, an attempt is made to suspend,
to some extent, the theoretical–normative aspect and instead to place the 
political–institutional frame, as well as the social frame of analysis, at centre
stage. The combination of these two latter frameworks carries the potential to
take us a step further toward understanding whether the ‘golden path’ does in
fact exist – whether there is a course enabling democratic systems of govern-
ment to effectively protect themselves without crossing the legal and ethical
boundaries on which they are founded.
The defending democracy: the search for a definition
In the attempt to address dilemmas encountered in the democratic response to
extremism and violence, scholars, and particularly those affiliated with judicial
schools of thought as well as judges and policy-makers, have searched for a 
terminology that would accurately describe democratic polities caught up in 
the struggle against powerful extremist elements. The first term of note is the
militant democracy prescribed by Loewenstein to indicate certain polities which
held sway in the period between the two world wars. This designation carried
normative implications and was intended to define the legal measures deemed
worthy of use by European democracies in order to deal with the growth of
fascism.7 Another term meriting attention is wehr-hafte Demokratie, associated
with the democratic constitution adopted by Germany in the wake of the Second
World War. In English, the term indicates a ‘defensive’, ‘protective’ or ‘watchful’
democracy. The statutory–judicial interpretation of this construct in Germany
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was: ‘wehr-hafte Demokratie is one that dos not open its doors to acts of sub-
version under the cover of legitimate parliamentary activity’.8
This brief definition leaves the student of political science who wishes to put
it to academic use somewhat at a loss. Do subversive elements, which in fact
pose a threat to democracy, take on the guise solely of parliamentary organisa-
tions, to wit, political parties? Furthermore, what is the genuine intention
behind keeping the doors of democracy shut in the face of the same subversive
groups? Does the wehr-hafte Demokratie disbar these organisations from taking
part in elections? Or, even more stringently, does it outlaw them and imprison
their members?
These questions, for the greater part, are left unanswered despite the efforts
of Carlo Schmid, chairman of the committee in charge of consolidating the
German constitution following the Second World War, to invest the construct
with more meaning:
It is not part of the concept of democracy that it creates the preconditions of its own
destruction. I would even like to go further. I would like to say: democracy is more
than a product of utilitarian considerations only in those places where the courage
exists to believe it as something indispensable for the dignity of man. If this courage
exists, we should also have the courage to be intolerant towards those who wish to
use a democratic system in order to kill it off.9
These words are indicative of the conventional approach assumed by demo-
cratic forms of government according to which a democracy has an absolute
justification to protect itself from insurgents, whoever they may be. Still, the 
key question remains: using what kinds of methods? Are all ways and means 
legitimate in a democratic state’s struggle for its existence?
In the effort to find resolution to this question, I have elected to appropriate
a second term – the defending democracy. This notion is also a derivative of the
judicial school of thought and is associated with the State of Israel and its deci-
sion, in the mid-1960s, to prevent the Arab Socialist List from taking part in
parliamentary elections. The ‘defending democracy’, according to the Israeli
court of law, is defined as: ‘the state [that] possesses an implied power, similar
to self-defence, to fight against subversive attempts designed to destroy it’.10
Prima facie, this definition is a significantly softer rendition than is the
German wehr-hafte Demokratie. Yet review of the statements issued by Israeli
Justice Zusman, who made broad use of the term ‘defending democracy’, shows
that the difference between the two concepts is minimal. According to Justice
Zusman:
Just as a man does not have to agree to be killed, so a state too does not have to agree
to be destroyed and erased from the map. Its judges are not allowed to sit back idly
and to despair from the absence of a positive rule of law when a plaintiff asks them
for assistance in order to bring an end to the state. Likewise, no other state author-
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ity should serve as an instrument in the hands of those whose, perhaps sole, aim is
the annihilation of the State.11
Regardless of the fact that his conclusions are not very useful in bringing
sharper relief to the definition, Zusman’s assertions do provide an answer of
sorts to the question regarding the measures which the democracy is entitled to
use in its efforts at defending itself. Zusman clearly states that in a ‘war like any
war’, the democratic polity has the right to exercise its power, even in the
absence of empowering legislation, if that power is applied in self-defence.
Surprisingly, the appropriation of the ‘defending democracy’ concept from
the judiciary and its application to the sociological realm by two of the leading
political sociologists in Israel, Dan Horowitz and Moshe Lissak, has neither
assisted in developing the various dimensions of the concept nor relieved us of
its ambiguity. The defending democracy is defined by Horowitz and Lissak as 
‘a democracy which excludes from the democratic game groups whose aims 
or actions may endanger the state, its political regime or its basic national 
consensus’.12
This formulation indicates that these two social scientists chose to pursue
the same path laid down by legalists while expanding it on two counts. First, as
Horowitz and Lissak see it, a democracy has the right to exclude all dangerous
groups from the political system, that is, they do not limit a democracy’s juris-
diction of defensive action only to political parties. Second, groups that may 
be excluded from the democratic process are not only those allegedly endanger-
ing a state or a polity’s stability, but also those that threaten its basic national
consensus.
From the above, it appears that a majority of scholars agree that demo-
cratic systems of government have the right to exclude from the political arena
those organisations, and especially political parties, whose ideology or actions
may endanger, first and foremost, the actual democracy and, in certain cases,
also the system of principles forming its basis of legitimisation.
An attempt to apply the construct of the ‘defending democracy’ in its present
form for the analytic purpose of inquiring into democracies’ responses to extrem-
ism, subversion and violence will apparently not yield the anticipated result.
Accordingly, the term must be elucidated, the elements which comprise it must be
underscored, and the distinctions among them highlighted. For this purpose, 
I submit a theoretical framework based on both the political–institutional 
level and the social level which spells out the guiding principles and tools used by
democratic countries in their struggle against perceived adversaries.
The defending democracy: a framework of analysis
Before introducing the framework employed in this analysis, a methodological
reservation in regard to the use of the term ‘defending democracy’ is in place.
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The coupling of the word ‘defending’ with the word ‘democracy’ may in fact be
misleading because it produces an idiom the reader may think is a type of democ-
racy along the lines of the ‘liberal democracy’ or ‘consensus democracy’ – and
this is not the case. ‘Defending democracy’ and its various derivatives do not
indicate a form of governmental system but rather the course chosen by a
democracy in its efforts to protect itself. Assuredly, this does not disallow the pos-
sibility that the nature of the democracy may in fact dictate the nature of its
response to provocation (often, certain courses of counteraction are identified
with certain types of democracy); however, for the sake of clarity and to avoid
confusion, modes of response should not be treated as part of the definition of
the political system. Therefore, it is to be assumed that all democratic systems
endeavouring to protect themselves in the face of radical and violent elements
do indeed fulfil the requirements of the general framework of the defending
democracy. Having said that, it should be stressed that this term alone does not
suffice toward understanding the various types and degrees of response. Hence,
I propose that the notion of the ‘defending democracy’ in effect represents 
a continuum extending from a more belligerent, that is ‘militant’, approach to
the other extreme, the ‘immunised’ approach. Of course, these two exemplary
approaches signify ideal types,13 which are not necessarily empirically proven
concepts but, at the same time, they represent a continuum along which can 
be found the responses of the majority of democratic polities facing serious 
challenges.
The basis for the operative definitions of the ‘militant’ and the ‘immunised’
routes of counteraction draws principally on the various theoretical references
to barriers or controls used by a democracy against antagonists, but it also
derives from an inductive review of the practices of Western countries against
elements constituting a threat to their regime. In the light of this, four principal
categories of controls are offered that will later on serve as the basis for the 
definition of the various orientations:
Legal and judicial controls
Legal and judicial controls include measures at the disposal of democratic 
countries implemented in their struggle against extremist insurgents, whether
speaking of political parties, social movements or individuals. This network of
controls includes, inter alia, constitutions or statutes stipulating under what
conditions partisan political activity can be restricted, as well as laws estab-
lishing which tools are legitimate and which are not, in instances of anti-
governmental protestation such as incitement or subversive action. Included in
this category are also those legal barriers regulating the relations among the dif-
ferent groups in society and, in particular, controls intending to restrict racist
or other expressions which may offend various social groups. The notable aspect
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of these barriers is that they are most often predicated on constitutional or legal
frameworks and are subject to continuous judicial review. Barriers of this type
carry the potential for suppressing challenges posed by anti-governmental
extremist factions, but at the same time they have the power to check and
restrain the governmental response to those same extremist elements, thus pre-
venting the undermining of the democracy’s ethical foundations.
Administrative and intelligence controls
Contrary to legal and judicial barriers, which are distinguished by a complete
adherence to the frame of the ‘rule of law’,14 there are other more flexible mea-
sures often extending beyond the limits of state laws, in fact occasionally disre-
garding the basic liberties inherent to the democratic idea, such as civil liberty,
the freedom of expression and the freedom of assembly. Despite the sharp con-
tradiction between these orientations and the liberal democratic paradigm, there
is abundant testimony of their use, particularly when the polity senses its stabil-
ity is in significant jeopardy.15 Under extreme circumstances, these measures
may include the use of army forces against seditious elements, although in many
cases the security services or secret police are assigned the responsibility for
dealing with them. Unlike the police forces, whose actions are bound by strict
codes regarding all aspects of the nature and the range of its operations, the
secret services, in democratic countries as well, enjoy a broader field of operation
and in many cases also have access to ‘grey’ means of control at variance with
the tools at the police’s disposal.16 Additional evidence of controls of this nature
can be found in those cases where the state devises a broader ‘semi-legal’ infra-
structure with the intent of paving the way for a more forceful policy of response
to seditious events. This infrastructure may include emergency legislation, the
use of administrative regulations, modifications to the legal process in order to
facilitate a smoother conviction of extremist elements and occasionally, in fact,
the creation of special courts of law whose specific role is to preside over concerns
related to subversive violence and, principally, terrorists.
Educational controls
This area is of considerable significance because, by exercising educational
means, the state is able to contend with the challenges of extremism a good
while earlier than their materialisation into political alternatives. To be specific,
with the aid of the education system and particularly, but not exclusively, civic
studies, the future citizens of a state can be introduced to the key notions fun-
damental to the democratic system of governance. Moreover, in many democ-
racies, civics’ pedagogy consists of a diversified curricula based on instruction
in basic democratic rights such as freedom of expression and assembly, freedom
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of religious expression, freedom of property, the right to own property, the right
to privacy and to take political action. In addition, most pupils are exposed to
the formal aspect of the governmental process, i.e. the constitutional and statu-
tory processes that form the basic structure of the liberal state, as well as to the
social aspect, i.e. the complex of groups comprising society, the rights of these
groups, the prominent cleavages dividing society and the major political con-
cerns of the day. In this fashion, pupils become acquainted with the guiding
principles of the polity in which they live, its basic essentials, the problems con-
fronting it and the political modus operandi of its country.
Social controls
Another social domain historically absent from the discourse on the ‘defending
democracy’, yet one that in recent years has maintained a high profile in the
discussion of the factors contributing to the normal functioning of democratic
polities, is the ‘civil society’. In the view put forward here, and as noted in the
past,17 together with the other functions filled by the ‘civil society’ in the demo-
cratic system, it holds a central role in the protection of democracy. The regu-
lating mechanism formed by the ‘civil society’ is manifested in the actions of
social organisations which are non-governmental yet concerned about the
expansion of extremism in society and the flagrant acts of provocation against
the democratic foundations of the governing state. ‘Civil society’ organisations
can operate in either political or community frameworks by employing educa-
tional and informational campaigns; or they may publicly respond to acts of
extremism. In certain cases, they may mobilise efforts to influence governmen-
tal authorities. In these aspects, we find an additional contribution to the forti-
tude of the democratic government. The ‘civil society’ enjoys both worlds – it is
able to voice objection to provocateurs and, alternatively, it may form a system
of accountability aimed at restraining over-aggressive governmental counter-
action by mobilising public opinion and/or going to law against undemocratic
activities in the name of upholding democracy. The goals of these organisations
and the tactics employed by them may tend to vary, yet the emergent pro-
democratic social controls positioned in-between the state and subversive fac-
tions may, on the one hand, carry significant potential in reducing the threats
confronting the state, and, on the other, may limit countering governmental
action to a more democratically tolerable standard.
The defending democracy: 
in between the ‘militant’ and the ‘immunised’ route
In order to classify these numerous controls and measures and help elucidate
the ideal types of response, they are categorised according to two criteria: scope
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and intensity. Scope indicates the democracy’s range of responses, that is,
whether the state limits its response to extremist elements alone or whether it
extends policy to the social level as well? Intensity denotes the types of mecha-
nism utilised by the state. That is, does a particular democracy choose to respond
to extremist challenges by using the more moderate means of countermeasure,
such as education, expanding civil society activity, and imposing minimal statu-
tory restrictions on antagonistic elements? Or, on the contrary, does it find that
more drastic steps must be taken which may entail stretching the idea of the
‘rule of law’? An arrangement of the controls and methods of action employed
by democracies trying to protect their dominion brings into prominence the two
polarities, the ‘militant’ and the ‘immunised’ routes, which democratic systems
may choose in their struggle against subversive elements. Between these two
axes, there is a broad continuum along which it is possible to pinpoint the major-
ity of democratic countries and estimate, in this fashion, the extent of their ‘mil-
itancy’ or ‘immunisation’. Furthermore, this continuum enables a diachronic
analysis of isolated cases and, principally, an estimation of the movement of
single countries along the axis of time from one type of response to another. The
following chart represents in more detail the features of the routes of response.
The chart demonstrates that at one end of the continuum the ‘militant’
route is to be found. Borrowing from the definitions presented above, this
denotes a political system whose goals are very narrow and one that is princi-
pally restricted to defending the state from manifestations of political extrem-
Figure I.1 The defending democracy and its different routes
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ism, incitement and violence. At the other end we find the ‘immunised’ route.
The state adopting this route in effect seeks to shore up its governmental system
against subversive acts of defiance, and if and when these provocations in fact
are realised it deploys defensive means which form a more comprehensive treat-
ment of those elements. At the same time, it still accounts for the liberal princi-
ples of freedom of expression and action, and the ‘rule of law’.
In order to help draw comparisons among the guiding principles of either
model, a medical metaphor is proposed. The ‘militant route’ adopts methods of
treatment targeting the symptoms of the ‘illness of extremism’. These symptoms
are principally political parties, radical movements and manifestations of incite-
ment, sedition and political violence. Particularly strong medication must be
prescribed by the ‘militant route’ for these same symptoms, with the result that
the patient – that is, the polity itself – will most likely suffer from severe side-
and after-effects. This medicinal plan includes a list of unconventional measures
which circumvent standard legal and judicial processes.
The ‘immunised route’, on the other hand, assumes a more holistic view by
treating both the symptoms and the illness’s aetiology. This orientation focuses
primarily on preventive medicine whose goal is to maintain a steady stream of
antibodies against the spreading of disease, mostly by the inculcation of demo-
cratic values and tolerance, and by providing the opportunity for the ‘civil
society’ to take an active role in the political theatre. Nevertheless, the holistic
approach does not neglect the treatment of the symptoms of the illness in the
event that, after all the preventive measures have been taken, extremism and
violence still break out. However, in that case, since we are speaking of a more
immunised body, the medical measures applied are more conventional; that 
is, they are within legal limits and do not threaten to subsequently weaken the
body.
With regard to its policy towards radical parties, the ‘immunised route’
underscores the legal–judicial aspect. In other words, the state employs consti-
tutional and statutory measures which benefit from a broad consensus and the
essential principles of the ‘rule of law’ in its deliberations regarding a party’s
disqualification or the prevention of its registration. As for extra-parliamentary
movements, the ‘immunised route’ renounces the approach based on an exten-
sive use of administrative procedures, i.e. the enforcement of regulations and
injunctions outlawing these movements, their definition as terrorist organisa-
tions and also the restriction of their members’ freedom of movement regard-
less of the conventions of state criminal law. The democracy that chooses the
‘immunised route’ will act against subversive movements using the same prac-
tices mandated by criminal law while also maintaining a meticulous and invari-
able scrutiny of the judicial authority.
Summing up the distinctions drawn between the two routes, it is argued
here that although in the short run the ‘militant’ course may be more effective
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in dealing with various manifestations of extremism and violence, the ‘im-
munised’ route is still the more effective in the longer term. This assumption is
listed primarily in the ‘immunised’ model’s strong connection to the public and
is based on the perception that in order to successfully fight extremism its roots
must first be detected. Next, two flaws inherent to the ‘militant route’ impair its
effectiveness in the longer run. The first shortcoming is related to the afore-
mentioned paradox, that the more a democracy adopts the more ‘militant’ mode
of distinction, the more it undermines its own liberal principles, a fact that may
eventually lead it to become an authoritarian regime under the name of democ-
racy. The second drawback pertaining to the ‘militant’ strategy becomes clear
when the ethical perspective is replaced by the practical–tactical perspective.
Examination of the ‘militant route’ from this perspective, together with the test
of consequences, demonstrates that the effectiveness of this route is indeed
questionable. A case in point is Germany,18 where labelling a particular politi-
cal movement ‘illegal’ may lead to a ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’. That is to say, the
same movement that has so far operated in full view is now forced ‘under-
ground’ and will radicalise its operations in order for its goals to remain on the
public agenda. On the other hand, in the absence of persistent enforcement, 
outlawing the movement can be just minimally effective because parties and
movements have the ability to adapt and adjust themselves to changing cir-
cumstances. A movement which has been legally banned can occasionally
assume various other guises by changing its name or the composition of its key
activists, and, in the long run, can make things more difficult for the democracy.
In sum, using the theoretical constructs elaborated above, an attempt is
made in this book to illustrate the changes in the response of the State of Israel
to its internal adversaries in the last fifty-three years. This treatise will focus on
the transition from a heavy-handed and often, in democratic terms, problematic
policy of counteraction which marked the State in the first decades of its exis-
tence to a more moderate response whose confinement to democratic and even,
at times, liberal boundaries, characterises it with the advent of the present
decade. Each chapter attends to a different domain of the State’s reaction and
explicates the changes in its reaction, including the forces accelerating or decel-
erating it. The ultimate goal is to present the construct of the ‘defending democ-
racy’ to the reader as a broad, holistic and operational framework, embodying
a number of different levels of analysis found in constant interaction among
themselves, and enabling the transference of the construct to the scrutiny of
other nations and states as well as comparative research.
The Israeli political context
In order to evaluate the changes in the Israeli response to Jewish extremism and
violence, I begin by presenting the discussion of those particular political char-
RJEIN  8/15/02  11:14 AM  Page 11
Jewish extremism and violence
12
acteristics of the State of Israel which have, to a significant degree, shaped it as
a ‘defending democracy’. Concurrently, the depiction of the extremist and
violent events the State has had to contend with are also presented.
Israel: a non-liberal democracy
The first topic to be addressed regarding Israel’s status as a ‘defending democ-
racy’ is the non-liberal character of the Israeli State’s system of governance or,
in other words, the democratic status of Israel in the procedural more than bona
fide sense of the term.19 The reason for this is that while the formal foundations
of a democratic system – free and fair elections, inter-partisan competition, peri-
odic governmental rotation, etc. – are maintained, other essential components
of the democratic epitome, such as the protection of fundamental rights, includ-
ing the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom of religious
expression, are all, to varying extents, flawed.
Like Yoav Peled, Uri Ben-Eliezer and Yael Yishai, I too find the construct of
the ‘non-liberal democracy’ to be the terminological frame most suited to defin-
ing the political reality that has emerged since Israel’s inauguration.20 In con-
trast to the liberal democracy, whose first priority is the individual and his/her
rights, the ‘non-liberal democracy’ puts a strong emphasis on the collective or
the community. Democracies of this type stress uniformity at the expense of
diversity, and unity over pluralism. This reflects a type of collective regime,
where the principles of equality and harmony are predominant among those
who belong to a certain group and aspire to its common goals. State offices do
not exist in order to form an institutional safeguard of the individual’s privacy,
but rather as means for furthering the ‘general good’ of the people. In ‘non-
liberal democracies’, not all voices have an equal opportunity to be heard, and
not everyone is equally encouraged to enter the political arena. Participation is
more a privilege than a basic right and is therefore reserved for those who act
in the collective interest. This type of participation is not a potential vehicle for
challenging the ‘powers-that-be’ but is rather a means of processing and enforc-
ing the general will of a country.21 From this definition, it can be concluded that
there are two principal aspects inherent in the Israeli ‘non-liberal democracy’:
its values and operative implications. The operative aspect indicates the active
and centralised character of the state. One expression of this aspect in Israel is
evident in the fact that, for many years, the powerful state apparatus has pre-
vented the development of an effective autonomous ‘civil society’. In terms of
values, the non-liberal democracy concentrates on the ideological–national
foundations of the state and, in the case of Israel, on the Jewish nature of the
country.
An interesting point is that the majority of social scientists currently
engaged in the study of Israeli politics tend to direct the bulk of their efforts on
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the values’ aspect (and its resultant practices) typical of the non-liberal nature
of the democracy. Among these researchers, there is general agreement that
Israel is still a far cry from the Western liberal democratic model, but there is a
lack of consensus regarding the precise nature of Israel’s form of government.
Neuberger, for example, argues that Israel is a ‘blemished’ liberal democracy.22
Others, going one step further, contend that by virtue of the asymmetrical rela-
tions between the Jewish majority (82 per cent of the population) and the Arab
minority, Israel should be classified as a (Jewish) ‘ethnocracy’23 or in fact a ‘non-
democratic ethnic state’.24
Between these polarities of ethnocracy and ‘blemished liberal democracy’,
there lies an intermediate position maintaining that, in terms of its values, the
Israeli ‘non-liberal democracy’ should be defined as an ‘ethnic democracy’, as
suggested by Sammy Smooha. According to Smooha, the ethnic democracy
is a democratic system of government wherein rights are granted to all citizens
while, concurrently, a favoured status is conferred upon the majority. It is predicated
upon two conflicting principles: democracy for all and the majority’s structural sub-
ordination of the minority. The establishment of the state on these two opposing
principles occasions irresolvable conflicts and dilemmas. According to democratic
principles, the state belongs to the majority and this by inference does not include
all of its citizens. For the [in the case of Israel, Jewish] majority, the state is a means
for furthering its interests and national goals while the [in Israel, Arab] minority is
faced with the inevitable predicament of being disloyal to the country, for it cannot
attain full equality and national identity. At the same time, the democratic system
allows the minority to ardently campaign and struggle to better its conditions
without fear of governmental crackdown or oppression by the majority. However,
the state imposes a variety of restrictions and a general regulation of the minority
in order to prevent disorder, instability and subversion.25
Indeed, the non-liberal and ethnic characteristics of the State of Israel have held
sway over the formation of almost all the social realms of life in this country. In
terms of the present analysis, these characteristics are inseparable from the
notion of the ‘defending democracy’. The ( Jewish) ethnic character of the
country has engendered, as noted by Smooha, an extensive system of regula-
tory measures for controlling the Arab populace, which, furthermore, is looked
upon with suspicion and has been defined as a ‘hostile minority’ or the ‘fifth
column’.26 Although the present work does not deal with the response to Arab
extremism, it is worth noting that procedures enforced by the State against
Jewish extremists tend to have been of a significantly more moderate nature
than those to which Arabs have been subjected. One cannot avoid the fact that
these same political, judicial and security factors were appointed by the State to
deal with acts of provocation perpetrated by both populations. Apparently this
led, in the nature of things, to the same ideas and measures used against Israeli
Arabs being used also in the State’s struggle with Jewish extremism.
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However, there is more to the role of the State’s ethnic character in the
‘defending democracy’. In effect, there is an inherent tension between the prin-
ciples of the ‘non-liberal democracy’ and the notion of the ‘defending democ-
racy’. This tension is mainly due to the fact that the institutionalised preference
of one ethnic group over another – typical of the non-liberal ‘ethnic democracy’
– provides fertile grounds for the flourishing of ethnocentric, ultra-national and
in fact xenophobic manifestations. These circumstances are strikingly apparent
in the field of education, which has been deeply affected by the ethnic charac-
ter of the Israeli democracy and, in my opinion, may still prove to be the prin-
cipal control for the State’s aspiration to curb extremism in Israeli society. Both
prior to the State’s establishment and in the years following, the Hebrew edu-
cation system has served as a pawn in the hands of the Zionist national move-
ment which, like other national movements, worked to instil among its future
citizens a (Jewish) national worldview. The values and principles of the Israeli
‘ethnic democracy’ are intended to perpetuate the Jewish community’s unique-
ness, its legitimate control over the country and its role as a centralised state in
charge of the education system and its various sectors. This approach laid the
grounds for reinforcing Jewish identity among most pupils of the State’s schools
and creating the affinity between the Jewish and Israeli national identity. The
country’s efforts to inculcate among its pupils a strong national and ethnic iden-
tity stood in stark contradiction to Western liberal democratic views. This fact
was not overlooked by the designers of Israel’s education system, who chose to
minimise, and at times completely exclude, liberal discourse from the State edu-
cation system in Israel.27
The last domain where the effect of the non-liberal Israeli democracy is sig-
nificantly felt on its status as a ‘defending democracy’ is related to the existence
– or, more correctly, the non-existence – of the ‘civil society’ in Israel. Gidron
puts forward the view that, in the pre-State era, a period when the British
Mandate avoided becoming involved in the internal affairs of the Jewish 
population, ‘civil society’ organisations did exist, and in fact flourished. They
provided the population with social services as well as cultural, educational,
sports, health and occupational services. Yet, with the establishment of the
State, and especially in the early 1950s, an expedited construction of state 
institutions was put into effect, the intention of which was to replace the vol-
untary networks. The sovereignty, or ‘statehood’, orientation took root in this
country. Its leading proponent was Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, who 
subscribed to the view that the satisfactory absorption of ‘Israelis’ immigrating 
from the numerous and varied countries of the Diaspora required a coalescence
of the different sectors and the cultivation of a political–sovereign perception.
According to this view, the State’s interests stand above all organisational inter-
ests or groups making up these bodies.28 In operational terms, the ‘statehood’
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idea found expression in the suppression of initiatives to establish organisational
frameworks not associated with the government or political parties. Even 
the more institutionalised ‘civil society’ structures which nevertheless managed
to survive the ‘statehood’ era were assimilated by the government by making
them dependent on the State budget, subsequently turning them into State 
affiliates.29 Galnoor’s remarks on the State’s position in regard to the ‘civil
society’ are even more trenchant. He depicted it as outright government hostil-
ity toward the autonomous participation of non-institutionalised groups of
citizens.30
The first signs of the renewed growth of the ‘civil society’ in Israel became
evident in the late 1960s. At first, this prompted resistance on behalf of the State
which fought the challenges posed by the evolving ‘civil society’, though by the
early 1980s the picture began to change. From that stage on, according to
Yishai, the Israeli political apparatus began to retreat from its involvement in
the ‘civil society’ and instead sought to preserve a fragile co-existence with this
non-political sphere.31 Yishai’s portrait is highly relevant to the relationship
between the ‘civil society’ and the ‘defending democracy’. Despite its potential,
the role of the ‘civil society’ in the protection of the Israeli democracy from
internal adversaries was, until the 1980s, completely marginal. However, the
beginning of that decade ushered in a significant awakening of civil organisa-
tions that set their goals on shoring up the status of democracy in Israel in
various ways.
Jewish political extremism and violence in Israel
Unlike many countries which have undergone manifestations of political radi-
calism and ideological insurgence, Israel’s nature as an ‘ethnic democracy’ and
the Jewish public’s sweeping consolidation around the Jewish national senti-
ment also shaped and delimited, to a certain degree, the features of Jewish polit-
ical extremism and violence in the country. Even in the early days following the
establishing of the State, and despite profound ideological differences, it was
clear that all political currents fighting for the State’s independence were united
in the belief that the Jewish State must be sustained and empowered. Therefore,
the main arguments revolved around the ways in which this should be accom-
plished. The passage of time saw the entrenchment of what may be called con-
structive radicalism. This type of radicalism implies a radical and occasionally
violent political stance that is not interested in disrupting the status quo but
rather seeks to reinforce it. There were some isolated incidents, mostly linked to
anti-Zionist factions in ultra-orthodox society or the radical left wing (periph-
eral elements, both in terms of size and operational capacities). Apart from
these, all Jewish extremism and violence in Israel has resulted from the desire 
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to reinforce and establish the Jewish character of the State and to expand its
boundaries.
Ehud Sprinzak, the political scientist who charted the features of political
extremism and violence in Israeli society, submitted three principal axes respon-
sible for the bulk of these phenomena. The first is the political–ideological axis,
and the second centres on the conflict between the ultra-orthodox and the
secular. The third axis pertains to the ethnic–social issue, principally, the anti-
establishment struggle of Jews from Mediterranean and North African coun-
tries, consequent to persistent ethnic–socioeconomic divisions and the ensuing
feelings of discrimination.32 An additional axis complementing Sprinzak’s model
pertains to the professional–economic conflicts that occasionally took on a
violent character in the wake of the increasing extremism of professional union
activities.
For the purposes of the present thesis, this discussion primarily addresses
the first and second axes. In its early days, the State did in fact respond 
with severity to events stemming from social motives, such as in the violent 
suppression of the Seamen’s Revolt in 1951, which began as a professional 
disagreement that spilled over into the political arena. Another example was 
the 1959 riots waged by Jews of North African descent in Wadi Salib, Haifa,
which were forcibly put down by the police. However, over the course of time, a
novel orientation took hold among the heads of State, implying that violent
expressions stemming from social or economic hardship do not pose a signifi-
cant threat to the State and therefore do not require new or special coping 
strategies.
According to the originator of the security services in Israel, Isser Harel, the
key factor perceived by the State’s rulers to be a danger to its stability goes back
to its earliest days, to the severe ideological disputes among the various political
currents and, principally, the rift between right and left.33 This is exactly the
same factor plaguing those responsible for state security five decades later. In the
view put forward by Carmi Gillon, who was the Shabak (General Security Service
– GSS) chief during the time of the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin, heads of state and the security services estimate that the factors threat-
ening internal security near the end of the 1990s remained the dispute between
right and left while, over the years, messianic religious threats have been added
to the picture. The combination of religious messianism and, in the wake of the
Six-Day War, an increasingly entrenched ideological cleavage between hawks
and doves,34 appeared to security functionaries as the greatest danger posed by
the Jewish public to the State.35 In view of these assertions, chapter 1 attempts
to elaborate upon the features of the ideological and religious axes, and empha-
sis is put on the growing convergence over the years of these two dimensions to
a point of almost complete congruence.
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Extremism and violence and the ideological cleavage between right and left
Political extremism and violence, the source of which is the ideological cleavage
between right and left in Israel, has earned much academic attention, and not
without reason. Despite the fact that most of the research on this topic concen-
trates on the period following the Six-Day War, the roots of the ideological clash
between these two wings date as far back as the pre-State era, residing princi-
pally in the rivalry between the Labour Movement’s camp and the right-wing
underground movements of Etzel (National Military Organisation, also known
as the Irgun) and Lehi (Israeli Freedom Fighters, also known as the ‘Stern Gang’).
The peak of pre-State contention became evident in the ‘Sezon affair’, when
members of right-wing underground movements were detained and a number
of them were in fact handed over to the authorities of the British Mandate.
Shortly after the State’s inception, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion’s command
to sink the Etzel’s ship Altalena, and eliminate rightist underground movements,
was even more striking testimony to the struggle among the various ideological
factions.
Sprinzak argues that in the years following the State’s establishment the
tension between right and left subsided, at least in terms of extremist and par-
ticularly violent manifestations. In those years, the ideological cleavage more
often could be felt in the parliamentary forum. Still, amid the expressions of
protest and violence, which nevertheless did crop up in the 1950s, mention
should be made of the underground movement Brit Hakanaim (Covenant of the
Zealots), which incorporated radical Jewish ultra-orthodox elements combined
with an extreme right-wing heritage bequeathed by Lehi. In addition, there was
the Zrifin Underground (also known as the ‘Kingdom of Israel’), which operated
under the inspiration of the writings of Dr Israel Eldad, one of the leaders of the
Lehi, and the fierce demonstrations mounted by Etzel veterans against Ben-
Gurion’s plan to accept compensation from Germany in place of Jewish prop-
erty seized by the Nazis. Finally, there was the assassination of Dr Rudolph
(Israel) Käsztner, a prominent leader of Hungarian Jewry at the time of the
Holocaust. He was accused of befriending Nazis and turning in many members
of his community in exchange for rescuing other Jews from their deadly grasp.36
Käsztner’s murder was in effect the final chord in the violent confrontation
between right and left during the State’s earlier years.
The resurgence of the sharp division between right and left came in direct
consequence of the Six-Day War and was chiefly due to the fact that during the
brief course of battle the Israeli army conquered many Jewish holy sites includ-
ing, foremost, the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. Prior to the Six-Day War the
dispute between proponents of the Greater Land of Israel and territorial com-
promisers remained theoretical. Then, the consequences of this war presented
the Israeli public with a new reality pierced by the deep conflict regarding the
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future of the territories occupied in the war. In the past, the left-wing camp and,
primarily, the Labour Movement had always enjoyed an easy majority among
the Jewish public. However, in the years subsequent to the Six-Day War Jewish
society in Israel became split and the yawning gap between the hawkish right
and the dovish left in effect became the force responsible for shaping the politi-
cal programme in Israel for the ensuing decades.
The acts of extremism and violence relating to the future of the territories
are associated primarily with those to the right of the political map who intro-
duced the struggle into the halls of Parliament as well as the extra-parliamen-
tary arena. However, while parliamentary factions representing the notion of
the ‘Greater Land of Israel’ were slow in getting organised, and in effect began
to flourish only in the 1980s, with the appearance of parties such as Tehiyah
(Renaissance), Tsomet (Crossroads), Moledet (Homeland) and the radicalised
National Religious Party (or Mafdal, the Hebrew abbreviation), in terms of extra-
parliamentary politics the issue of the future of Judea, Samaria and Gaza
became a pivotal concern as early as the 1970s.37 The beginning of the momen-
tum in the active entrenchment of Israeli control over the lands of Judea,
Samaria and Gaza can be marked by the launching of the Gush Emunim (Bloc
of the Faithful) movement in 1974. This movement, which signified a close affil-
iation between territorial maximalism and religious, and in fact messianic,
notions, adopted an illicit programme whose main expression was the struggle
with the State’s law authorities over the right to settle the conquered territo-
ries.38 By the same token, Gush Emunim, which in due course gave rise to the
Jewish terrorist organisation (subsequently known as the ‘Jewish Under-
ground’), represented the most prominent example of loyalty to the State and
to the premiss of radical Jewish constructivism. Leaders of the movement and
their supporters held the belief that their intentions and actions were aimed at
empowering the State and not to cause it harm. And, indeed, despite the fact
that in its first years of operation Gush Emunim’s activities were marked by
severe confrontations with the government, activists of this movement never
theologically questioned its legality or authority. The movement indeed hon-
oured the Israeli sovereign institutions of the Knesset, the government and,
above all, the army and security system.39
As the years passed, various elements within the movement underwent
additional degrees of radicalisation, primarily manifested in the terror perpe-
trated against Palestinians by the Jewish Underground. This, in effect, signified
the fall of Gush Emunim when, following the detection of the Jewish Under-
ground, it became subject to a deep ideological crisis, indicating the downfall of
the radical constructivist perspective. The void left by the decline of Gush
Emunim was quickly filled by even more extreme hawkish elements which, at
the time of the peace process spearheaded by the second Rabin administration,
cast serious doubt on the government’s legitimacy and launched a campaign of
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de-legitimisation against the incumbent leader of that administration. Surpris-
ingly, both these movements, and even Yigal Amir, the prime minister’s assas-
sin, believed their actions would lead to the salvation of the people of Israel. Of
course, at the time the question of accepting a democratically elected and
secular government’s authority was not yet a concern.
Extremism and violence and the cleavage between secular and religious
As already noted, to sharply distinguish between the ideological rift and the
secular–religious cleavage in the Israel of the third millennium would be quite
unfeasible. This problem was not so prominent in the State’s early days. Reli-
gious extremism in those days was mostly allied with the ultra-orthodox public
and, in particular, the Natorei Karta (Guardians of the City) movement, which
fundamentally rejected a Zionist government and, in practice, voiced outright
protest and cut itself off from it.40 Still, it became evident, already at that time,
that not all ultra-orthodox factions tended toward isolationism, and this was
prominently expressed in the activity of the ‘Covenant of the Zealots’ under-
ground, which, as noted previously, drew its inspiration from the fervently
Zionist Lehi.
Generally speaking, the cleavage between secular and religious in the
Jewish population of Israel is interesting due to the absence of a dichotomous
component. That is to say, a great part of the Jewish population can be found
in-between secularity and religiosity, and in fact defines itself as traditional. The
conventional solution for those studying the political as well as the violent facets
of the cleavage is to focus on three distinct groupings: ultra-orthodox; national
religious; and secular.41 Traditionally, the acts of extremism and violence com-
mitted by the Haredi (ultra-orthodox) public were portrayed as a direct outcome
of the State–religion controversy, whereas the extremist and violent actions per-
petrated by the fringes of the national religious public were linked to the strug-
gle over the control of the hawkish agenda.
Among large sections of Haredi society, and contrary to other groups in the
population likely to engage in political violence, there is an inherent repudia-
tion of the State of Israel in its present form, anchored in the anticipation of
redemption and the erection of a religious state based on Halakhic rulings.
Indeed, various groups from this subculture continue to pursue the tradition
that evolved with the State’s establishment, which repudiates the legitimacy of
the Israeli government and its various authorities and instead answers solely to
the Halakhic law based on the fundamental premiss of dinah demalkhuta dinah
(Aramaic, meaning ‘the law of the government is the law’). The implication of
the above is that these religious orders regard the State of Israel and its institu-
tions as a foreign government analogous to the governing bodies of other foreign
countries around the world where Jews live.42 This position has its roots in the
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assumption that the Jewish People is ‘separate from history’, that it is under the
sole protection of divine providence, and no secular national movement, such
as the Zionist movement, will be the one to redeem it.43 That said, there has been
recent concurrence among most researchers that the Haredi society consists of
a variety of groups and while a small part in fact holds radical attitudes toward
the State, among the Haredi mainstream the prevailing disposition is more prag-
matic. This novel perspective, which has gradually taken root over the years,
considers, for example, that participation in the parliamentary arena is a legit-
imate means of accessing resources.44
However, taking part in Israeli society and politics in order to procure
resources has its consequences. Beginning in the early 1990s, the academic lit-
erature reports of the appearance of Hardal (abbreviation for Haredi together
with the initials of ‘religious nationalism’), or the national ultra-orthodox,45 a new
bloc in ultra-orthodox society in Israel consisting of two tendencies. On the one
hand, there is evidence of a Haredisation of various religious Zionist groups. On
the other hand, there is the adoption of a national if not ultra-nationalist iden-
tity among some Haredi elements, and this has led to an increasing convergence
of the Haredi and hawkish publics in terms of their attitudes as well as in oper-
ative joint-efforts.46 Research conducted towards the end of the 1990s demon-
strates that the most hawkish population among all the Jews in Israel is the
ultra-orthodox population.47
These developments found political representation already in the mid-
1980s in the crystallisation of parliamentary alliances, such as the Morasha
(Heritage Party), which integrated hawkish elements descending from the reli-
gious Zionist school of thought together with Haredi factions. At the start of the
1990s this tendency grew as the ultra-orthodox Habad movement took an active
role in the events organised by the political right in protest at the Oslo Accords.
Eventually, the affiliation between the Haredi sector and the hawkish political
camp grew so close that the distinctions between them became no longer 
discernible.
Incidental to the discussion of extremist and violent manifestations related
to the religious–secular division, it is important to note the case of Rabbi Meir
Kahane and the Kahanism which took root in the State of Israel in the early
1970s, proving retrospectively to be the most blatantly racist and anti-
democratic phenomenon Israel has ever known. Remarking on this phenome-
non in the same breath as the secular–religious cleavage is apposite because, to
a great extent, Kahanism constituted a singular and purified instance of the
fusion of Haredi radicalism and the messianic right-wing extremism of Gush
Emunim. The lifestyle of Kahane closely resembled that of the Haredi and, like
them, he demonstrated great hostility towards the secular leadership of the
State and toward the Western lifestyle of the bulk of the Israeli population.
However, as did the members of Gush Emunim, Kahane saw divine intervention
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in the founding of the State of Israel and more so in the triumphant results of
the Six-Day War, which symbolised both for him and for the followers of Gush
Emunim the beginning of the salvation of the People of Israel.48
All in all, this book posits that the political camp which evolved in the wake
of the Six-Day War – whose boundaries were indeed unclear but whose feelings
and actions showed distinctive elements of religious and ideological zeal – con-
stitutes the most prominent threat to Israeli democracy in the last decades, both
from the perspective of scientists studying Israeli political violence as well as
from that of statesmen responsible for the security of the country. This same
alliance of religion, territorial expansionism and enmity towards Arabs char-
acterised the most fanatical and violent of the right-wing parties, Kach, as well
as Gush Emunim, the Jewish Underground, and Yigal Amir, the assassin of Israeli
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. It also accounted for several violent movements
and isolated incidents which have surfaced in recent decades. Moreover, other
threats confronting Israeli democracy deserve mention, including political
incitement on behalf of the radical left, and the appearance of groups and indi-
viduals who engaged in violence of different degrees stemming from ethnic or
messianic motivations, not necessarily related to the hawkish–dovish cleavage.
The most significant of these groups was the sect led by the charismatic Rabbi
Uzi Meshulam. In 1994, the rabbi and his group barricaded themselves in his
house in the city of Yehud in demand for an inquiry into the 1950s’ disappear-
ance of Jewish children of Yemenite descent. The story of that sect as well as of
other groups is recounted in detail in chapter 2.
Outline of book contents
The five chapters which follow expand on the Israeli response to Jewish politi-
cal extremism and violence while employing the construct of ‘defending democ-
racy’ and analysing the State’s movement along the axis from the ‘militant
route’ to the ‘immunised’ route.
Chapter 1 focuses on the historical campaign undertaken by the State of
Israel against extremist parties, beginning with the ‘Socialist List’ in 1965 and
concluding with the Yemin Yisrael (‘Israel’s Right’) party in 1996. A central
object of this discussion is Rabbi Meir Kahane’s party Kach, whose ideology, pro-
posed patterns of action and leader’s rhetoric have played a key role in shaping
the normative legal defensive measures devised by the Israeli democracy. The
principal aim of chapter 1 is to trace the changes in measures taken by Israel in
its struggle with extremist parties and to indicate the gradual transition from a
‘militant’ to an ‘immunised’ model of response.
Chapter 2 puts forward a chronological synopsis of the Israeli response to
extra-parliamentary radical elements, and begins with the weapons’ ship 
Altalena affair, sunk by the IDF close to a month after the declaration of the
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State’s independence. The chapter then deals with the dismantling of Etzel and
Lehi, two principal right-wing underground movements active before the estab-
lishment of the State which constituted, at least from the perspective of the
young State’s leadership, a considerable threat to the nascent regime’s stability.
Following the discussion of the incidents accompanying the State’s earliest days,
the review continues on to the events of the 1950s. Reference is then made to the
1970s, a period marked by a burgeoning of illegal right-wing organisations as
well as several notable acts of leftist sedition, and the changes in the State’s
response to these events. The central part of the chapter is devoted to the Israeli
reaction to those far-right elements which emerged during the 1980s and flour-
ished during the course of the 1990s. The major loci of discussion are the Kach
Movement, the ‘Jewish Underground’, the assassination of Prime Minister
Yitzhak Rabin, and the evolving character of the State’s response towards each
of these phenomena. A considerable part of the chapter is devoted to a review of
the state of emergency that held sway in Israel for many years and to the 
legal infrastructure deriving from this predicament which, in effect, enabled the
State, in its struggle with violent and insurgent elements, to employ means 
that would often deviate from the acceptable rule of law in a democratic state. A
strong emphasis is also placed on the pivotal role filled by the Shabak in the 
battle against insurgency. With this as background, the question is raised as to
why, ironically, an undercover organisation, noted for methods which often
encroached upon basic democratic liberties, was nevertheless allocated the task
of countering extremism in place of the legislation-bound police. As in chapter
1, this chapter also records the general developing tendency – the gradual tran-
sition from ‘militant’ routes of response to ‘immunised’ strategies. However, con-
trary to the development of this type of response to extremist political parties, 
the shift to ‘immunised’ mechanisms with regard to extra-parliamentary organ-
isations is much more piecemeal, problematic and hesitant.
If, until this stage of the book, the degree of intensity of the Israeli response
to extremism and violence is a main motif, then from chapter 3 on the book
begins to discuss the extension of this response to other areas, namely the degree
to which Israel expanded its struggle against extremism and violence to the
social sphere. The focus in chapter 3 is on civics education. By means of a his-
torical and textual analysis of school curricula on the subject of civic studies in
the State of Israel in the first decades of its existence, I try to demonstrate that
the State did not attempt to reinforce its democratic character but in fact took
steps to weaken it. The education system of the newly born State set about the
task of nation-building, to a great extent by means of underscoring particular-
istic nationalist qualities while banishing universalistic liberalist strains to the
margins of the education curricula. In this fashion, the country inculcated
among its future citizens dominant nationalist attitudes, which in many cases
digressed into nationalist ethnocentrism. Then the chapter focuses on the State’s
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response to the incidental ultra-nationalist repercussions of this policy. A short
while after the election of the racist Rabbi Meir Kahane to the Knesset in the
mid-1980s surveys confirmed the prevalence of ethnocentric views among
many Israeli students. In this regard, the State’s leadership and the Ministry of
Education were faced with a quandary for, on the one hand, they desired to rein-
force the democratic structure of the State yet, on the other, they did not want
to forgo the education of Jewish nationalist values. The chapter traces the efforts
made by the State in the late 1980s and during the course of the 1990s to
contend with this convoluted issue. Finally, the reform of the civic education
curricula toward the end of the 1990s is scrutinised and an estimation is given
of its chances of weakening the radical underpinnings of Israeli society and, in
turn, perhaps reinforcing the ‘immunised’ character of the democracy.
Chapter 4, which aims to complete the investigation into the ‘immunised’
potential of the State of Israel, presents the reader with the connection between
‘civil society’ and the ‘immunising’ process of the Israeli democracy. Put forward
in this chapter is the position that the ‘civil society’, because of its state-free
status, carries the potential for playing a central role in the transition to the
‘immunised’ model. As already noted, in recent years, Israel has opened its gates
to the ‘civil society’, allowing it a greater degree of freedom of operation. Among
the associations currently appearing, a large group can be classified under the
heading of the ‘pro-democratic civil society’. These bodies have employed
various modes of operation in the effort to instil democratic values in the
country, foster the tolerance of various populations, promote political debate
within legitimate as well as constitutional limits and encourage constructive
public criticism of the State’s response. Public relations material and newspa-
per items reporting the various accomplishments of the Israeli ‘pro-democratic
civil society’ would not methodologically suffice as the sole source of informa-
tion. Therefore, chapter 4 is also based on findings compiled from a survey 
distributed among the entire group of associations mentioned above. This
project laid the grounds for a general and unprecedented typology of the ‘pro-
democratic civil society’ in Israel. The survey was designed to examine its fea-
tures and strategies of action, and it enabled an investigation of the degree of
its effect on the ‘immunising’ of Israeli society as perceived by its representa-
tives, on the one hand, and surveyed public opinion, on the other. The chapter’s
conclusion underscores the awakening of the ‘pro-democratic civil society’ in
Israel and profiles a number of notable successes which can be chalked up to its
credit. That said, a comparison with Western European countries and, in par-
ticular, the United States, demonstrates that ‘civil society’ in Israel still has a long
way to go before the Israeli democracy can reach that other point on the
compass – the ‘immunised’ model of response.
The final, and summarising, chapter of the book can be divided into three
main sections. The first part presents the reader with the accumulated body of
RJEIN  8/15/02  11:14 AM  Page 23
Jewish extremism and violence
24
facts with regard to the Israeli response to extremist phenomena and political
violence throughout the history of the State of Israel. Beginning with the State’s
establishment and leading up to the advent of the new millennium, it estimates
the degree to which the country has been successful in departing from the ‘mil-
itant’ type of response in favour of the ‘immunised’ course. It queries the con-
ceivability of a ‘golden path’, i.e. protecting democracy from antagonists, on the
one hand, while avoiding the slippery slope into retaliatory strategies that may
easily deviate from the legal and ethical foundations of the democratic state, on
the other. The concluding discussion refers to each level of analysis listed in the
preceding chapters and evaluates, with the help of a more comprehensive per-
spective, whether the shift towards the ‘immunised’ model is relevant to all levels
of analysis, or whether at certain points the Israeli case still adheres to the ‘mil-
itant’ end of the spectrum and which factors either support or restrain this tran-
sition. The second part of the chapter assumes a comparative perspective
between the Israeli response and that of other Western democracies, principally,
the United States and Germany. Placing the Israeli case in a comparative per-
spective exemplifies, first, the potential of the theoretical perspective proposed
in this book, a perspective which in fact makes comparative analysis feasible.
Second, widening the scope beyond the Israeli case study underscores the chal-
lenges which confronted and still confront the society and the State of Israel in
contrast to other societies and makes it possible to estimate the effectiveness of
the tools wielded by the State in comparison to those of other countries. The
third part of the chapter highlights the theoretical developments accompany-
ing the analysis and submits questions which remain unresolved and worthy of
future investigation.
Data sources and methodology
The theoretical extension of the concept of ‘defending democracy’ from philo-
sophical and judicial domains – to which it is generally limited – to other 
disciplines and, in particular, the social sciences requires an adaptation of
the methodological tools employed in its research. Henceforth, data sources 
and methodology can be arranged into two principal categories: qualitative and
quantitative.
The first portions of the book are based primarily on qualitative sources and
tools of analysis, so that, for example, the main sources for the analysis of Israeli
policy regarding political parties were the protocols of Knesset proceedings and
Central Elections Committee hearings as well as official committee and party
registrar correspondence. Additional sources were the verdicts handed down by
the Supreme Court which, in its role as high court of justice either ratified or
rejected resolutions passed by its subordinate bodies. In order to fully under-
stand the factors leading to decisions regarding various parties, in-depth inter-
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views were also conducted with representatives of the parties in question as well
as with members of the bodies responsible for decision-making on this matter.
Another corroborating source was the compiled data regarding the respective
parties on file in the archives of the Central Elections Committee.
The attempt to investigate permutations in the Israeli response to extrem-
ism and violence in the extra-parliamentary realm met with more difficulty due
to the fact that the majority of hearings in reference to these organisations take
place behind the closed doors of various governmental offices and, in particu-
lar, those of the Shabak whose proceedings and recorded minutes are conducted
far from the public eye. Consequently, significant use was made of the writings
of Israel’s policy-makers and executive authority. To augment the picture the
documentation of events in the daily newspapers was reviewed and in addition,
in-depth interviews were conducted with policy-makers as well as with repre-
sentatives of the organisations and movements subject to the State’s enforce-
ment of its varied measures.
The evolving policy on instruction in civics in Israel’s schools was much
easier to investigate because Ministry of Education archives are open to the
general public, thus allowing access to all its protocols and correspondence. An
additional source of information consisted of interviews with politicians who
over the years had devised the civic studies curricula and Ministry of Education
employees who had carried out this policy. Nonetheless, the review and discus-
sion of policy changes in the delivery of citizenship studies in Israel in itself does
not answer the question of whether the inculcation of democratic values does
indeed have an ‘immunising’ effect on Israeli society. In order to address this
question, quantitative tools of research were necessary, specifically a closed-
question survey which was administered to a large sample of secondary-school
pupils in northern Israel. The object of this survey was to answer the question:
to what degree does a relationship exist between the instruction in citizenship
and the ensuing diversity of political attitudes and behaviours indicative of the
internalisation or rejection of democratic values.
The study of the evolution of the ‘pro-democratic civil society’ in Israel was
the most difficult assignment of all, especially because this phenomenon is a
fairly recent development, the literature documenting it is inadequate and the
ability to detect the groups comprising it is limited. In order to identify as many
groups as possible, an extensive comparison of findings from a number of
sources was conducted and a list was drawn up of the associations whose alleged
goal was the empowerment of the democracy in Israel. These organisations were
sent questionnaires designed to get a general impression of the ‘pro-democratic
civil society’, to examine the principal fields in which they were active, and to
attempt an estimate of the degree to which these groups were successful in ful-
filling their goals.
Throughout the book the findings of an additional survey are presented.
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This was a telephone survey conducted during February 2001 which included
approximately 500 adult Israeli citizens. It examined the attitudes of the Israeli
Jewish population in relation to the defence routes implemented by the State as
well as the degree of consensus regarding particular routes. Therefore, the ques-
tionnaire includes reference to each cluster of types of response as they are
demonstrated in the different parts of the book.
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The Israeli response to extremism: 
the parliamentary arena
From the start of the twentieth century, the political party became apivotal institution in politics. The decline of the elite party model andthe ascendance of the mass party model changed the structure of political
procedure in many European countries; it afforded representation to groups 
previously deprived of political power and promoted the democratisation
processes of many systems of contemporary governance.1 However, along 
with the expansion of the mass party model, another type of political party 
took root. The effect on European politics of this new type, and especially on 
the processes of democratisation, turned out to be significantly less construc-
tive. Political scientists called this a devotee party2 and its main features included
mobilisation around extremist ideologies, chiefly communism and fascism, 
and the unconditional commitment of party members to the partisan appara-
tus and often to the leader as well. By means of devotee parties, fascist and com-
munist ideologies succeeded in changing human history in the first half of the
twentieth century, often leading countries far astray from any democratic frame-
work. In consequence, Western countries in the post-Second World War era
became somewhat apprehensive of the party institution and tended to look
upon these extremist parties as a substantial threat to democracy.3 A review of
the German Basic Law drafted in the wake of the war confirms this apprehen-
siveness over the potential threat of radical parties and the democracy’s efforts
to defend itself in the face of this threat. Section 21 of the Basic Law (Political
Parties) states:
1 The political parties shall participate in the forming of the political will of the
people. They may be freely established. Their internal organisation must con-
form to democratic principles. They must publicly account for the sources and
use of their funds and for their assets.
2 Parties which, by reason of their aims or the behaviour of their adherents, seek
to impair or abolish the free democratic basic order or to endanger the existence
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of the Federal Republic of Germany, shall be unconstitutional. The Federal 
Constitutional Court shall decide on the question of unconstitutionality.
3 Details shall be regulated by federal laws.4
This section of the constitution does not leave much room for doubt that the
German democracy chose to keep a close guard on political parties emerging in
post-war Germany. Its intention was to prevent the recurrence or reappearance
of anti-democratic parties that had abused the tools provided by the democra-
tic system in order to undermine those very same foundations.
However, not only were constitutional restrictions imposed on parties –
structural restraints were also used. The electoral system designed at the end of
Second World War clearly indicates a preference for the principle of stability over
that of representation. The likelihood of small parties being able to penetrate the
German Parliament is minimal, due to the required 5 per cent minimum thresh-
old vote of all the valid ballots cast, or, alternatively, a mandatory victory in at
least three of the electorate’s regions. A retrospective glance demonstrates that
the combination of these stringent structural and constitutional barriers has
helped Germany forestall representation of extremist parties at the federal 
Parliament level over the course of years and, in turn, has also helped stabilise
the democratic system.
The socio-political underpinnings of the response to
extremism in Israel
Both prior to the establishment of the State of Israel and in the years following,
the party institution constituted a pivotal factor in the political processes
involved in the nation’s construction. However, the role of the Israeli political
party went far beyond the boundaries of Parliament. Political parties took part
in policy-making and security, in school and youth movement education, reli-
gion and culture, agriculture and settlement, health and welfare,5 and, in this
fashion, in effect held sway over state institutions on the one hand and social
institutions on the other. The significant power held by Israeli parties gave the
State the name parteienstaat (party state).6
Unlike the countries of Western Europe, which were then searching for
ways to defend themselves from certain types of political party, the situation in
Israel in the 1950s and at the beginning of the 1960s was completely different.
Despite the depth of the ideological cleavages dividing the various political fac-
tions, all parties, except Maki (the Communist Party) and the ultra-orthodox
parties, were wholeheartedly committed to the Zionist and ‘statist’ ideal. Fur-
thermore, the predominance of the Mapai (acronym in Hebrew for ‘Party of the
Workers of the Land of Israel’, which eventually became the Labour Party) in
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the first decades of the State’s existence, which had control of Parliament as well
as over the majority of state institutions, did not leave much room for any kind
of genuine challenge by the opposition parties.
However, the Israeli political system was designed in a fashion that in fact
emphasised the principle of representation, thus encouraging small parties to
take part in elections to the Knesset. After the founding of the State, Israel
promptly adopted the ‘proportional’ representation electoral system and placed
the qualifying threshold of entrance to the Knesset (consisting of 120 members)
at only 1 per cent of all the valid ballots.7 As a result, no less than twelve parties
gained representation in the first Knesset, and since then, throughout Israeli
parliamentary history, the number of parties in the House of Legislature has
never dropped below ten, and in certain instances even reached a high of
fifteen.8 The emergent electoral structure in Israel became one of the central
issues on the State’s agenda for a long while and in fact underwent a number of
reforms. True, the fear of extremist parties was not the immediate concern
guiding these reforms, yet some already saw in the emerging electoral condi-
tions a potentially destabilising factor with regard to the democratic polity in
Israel.9
In the view put forward by Doron and Maor, despite the low threshold
required for becoming a member of the Knesset, there were during Israel’s early
years other barriers restricting admittance to Parliament which had a role in
fortifying the polity’s stability. These ‘barriers of de-legitimisation’ prevented
those parties remaining outside the Mapai-galvanised consensus from gaining
access to positions of power. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion took advantage of his
(and his party’s) substantial power in order to dictate the political groundrules.
He determined that all parties were entitled to take part in elections to the
Knesset; however, not all of them were eligible to be partners in a coalition gov-
ernment. In this fashion, Ben-Gurion spearheaded a process of de-legitimisation
which prevented the rightist Herut movement led by Menachem Begin, on the
one hand, and the Communist Party, on the other, from becoming coalition
partners for many years.10 Of course, this was an unofficial rule, which relied
basically on Ben-Gurion’s powerful role as the first prime minister of Israel;
indeed, with the growing institutionalisation of the Israeli political system – a
factor that steadily made inroads into the hegemony of the Labour Movement
elite – the ability of that same movement to install such political barriers became
increasingly undermined.11 Subsequently, in 1965, and only seventeen years
after its declaration of independence, the State of Israel was obliged to confront
the question of depriving a political party of the right to run for office. The case
in point was the rejection of the ‘Socialist List’s’ candidacy for the sixth Knesset
elections.
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Disqualifying the ‘Socialist List’: predominance of the ‘militant route’
The ‘Socialist List’, principally a left-wing Arab list, displayed a programme
based on the premisses of its predecessor Al-Ard, which was dismantled accord-
ing to Section 84 of the Defence Regulations (Emergency), 1945. Although it
did not constitute a substantial threat to Israel’s security, the ‘Socialist List’s’
programme conveyed a message contesting the Jewish character of the State.
This fact provided the chair of the Central Elections Committee, Justice Landau,
with cause for disqualifying the party from running for Parliament, on the
grounds that it seemed inappropriate for a democracy to provide its adversaries
with the means to destroy it.12 The significance of disqualification at that time
was embedded in the fact that Israel had in effect adopted a severe ‘militant’
model which substantially impaired its democratic foundations. This argument
is supported by two considerations.
First, in its decision to disqualify the ‘Socialist List’, Israel was not acting in
the interests of democracy but rather against it: the ‘Socialist List’s’ programme
did not subscribe to the undermining of the country’s democratic foundations.
On the contrary, it petitioned against the Jewish character of the State, although
its chances of being elected to parliament – not to speak of acquiring any politi-
cal thrust – were altogether minimal. In spite of these extenuating circum-
stances, the State chose to block it from taking part in the elections and by this
move essentially thwarted a basic democratic liberty.
The second factor is that the State at that time possessed neither the 
constitutional nor the legislative measures for the disqualification of political
parties. Therefore, the Central Elections Committee (CEC) decision was based on
an extension of the Elections Law and the Knesset Basic Law and mainly on the
ground that these laws held an implied provision according to which an 
association already found to be illegal could be forbidden to stand for elections
to the Knesset.
The CEC resolution on this matter was endorsed by the Supreme Court of
Justice which, by a majority of two justices to one, weighed in favour of ratify-
ing the List’s disqualification. The grounds for this ruling, according to most of
the justices, was that the character of the ‘Socialist List’ stood in stark contrast
to election goals. An interesting point is that Justice Shimon Agranat, president
of the Supreme Court at the time, ruled that the list contested the very existence
of the State. The State’s existence, its continuity and future, in his view, were
closely linked to its Jewish character, thus implying that a list whose programme
embraced a disputation of the State’s Jewish character should not be allowed to
stand for Parliament.13
Surprisingly, it was in fact during the Supreme Court debate on the dis-
qualification of the ‘Socialist List’ that Justice Zusman chose to define the 
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State of Israel as a ‘defending democracy’, thus drawing a comparison with
Germany’s post-Second World War efforts at safeguarding itself from any party
whose programme was in defiance of the democratic nature of the govern-
ment.14 This issue brings into sharper relief the problematic nature of the non-
liberal character of the Israeli democracy and is an indication of how difficult it
is to bridge between the ethno-nationalist and the democratic principles on
which the polity was founded. That said, and despite the ‘militant’ step taken by
Israel with regard to the ‘Socialist List’, a point meriting attention is that in the
wake of this resolution, and even after the State in fact did possess the legisla-
tive means to disqualify parties challenging the Jewish character of the State,
not one list has ever been disqualified on that basis.15
Attitudes to far-right parties: 
between the ‘militant’ and the ‘immunised’ route
Between the years 1965 and 1981, the State of Israel endured events that would
leave very strong impressions and deep scars. This chain of events began with
Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War, carried on with the trauma of the Yom Kippur
War and its ensuing social crises and eventually culminated in the 1977 par-
liamentary upset, when, for the first time in Israeli history, the Likud (an alliance
of right-wing parties with the Herut at its forefront) was successful in supersed-
ing the Labour Party as the party in control of government. During the course
of those years, the need for party disqualification did not arise. However, the 
profound changes that Israeli society went through prepared the ground for
political extremism. In the long run, this led the country into confrontation with
a racist and anti-democratic party that declared its intentions to essentially
change the State’s character by abolishing democracy, deporting its Arab citi-
zens and establishing a Jewish theocracy. The advocate of such a programme
was Kach, led by Rabbi Meir Kahane.
Kach and Israeli politics – the early years
Meir Kahane, leader of the militant Jewish Defence League in the United States,
emigrated to Israel in September of 1971 and brought with him a new rhetoric
and violent political style previously unknown to Israeli society or political life.
Upon his arrival in Israel he declared that it was not his intention to become
involved in Israeli politics, but rather that he would like to devote his time to 
education. However, one month later, a change in the rabbi’s plans became
evident.16 Kahane rented an office in Jerusalem and initiated the formalities 
necessary to allow the Jewish Defence League to operate in Israel.17
At that time, the Israeli political establishment did not consider Kahane 
as a threat of any kind. In fact, the opposite was true: Kahane came over as a
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warrior liberated from the ‘Jewish ghetto mentality’ image of Jews in the 
Diaspora. The violent actions for which he and his followers were noted in 
the US were carried out in the defence of and for the guardianship of Jews, 
as he vehemently declared. Most of the appreciation for his deeds came from
Israeli right-wing and religious circles. However, once he began an attempt 
to enter the political system, neither rightist nor religious parties wanted to 
integrate him with one of the existing frameworks. This forced him to concen-
trate on launching an independent organisation much like the one he had 
led in the United States; indeed, the first period of Kahane’s efforts in Israel
appeared to be a direct sequel to the labours of the Jewish Defence League. 
At first, the rabbi–leader and his supporters mounted demonstrations against
the Soviet government and began to wage war against Christian proselytism 
and the ‘Black Hebrews’ of Dimona. However, in August 1972, Kahane redi-
rected the goals of his organisation to concentrate on the group which would
eventually become the principal object of his ‘attentions’ – the Arabs. That 
same year, he launched an operation entitled ‘The Arabs Don’t Belong Here,
They Must Go’. The goal of this operation was to encourage Arab emigration 
in exchange for property remuneration. According to Kahane, the deportation
of Arabs was the only feasible course towards a genuine resolution for the 
future of the Jewish nation. In his view, two nations could not occupy the same
land.18
In December 1972, his fledgling party decided to participate in the elections
for the eighth Knesset. The timing was fairly on target, because Jewish ethno-
centrism in Israel had surfaced sufficiently for Kach to chalk up 12,811 votes
which constituted 0.81 per cent of all the valid ballots cast. However, it was not
enough merely to cross the threshold. Kahane and membership in the Knesset
were still separated by a small percentage.19 In the 1977 elections, Kahane once
again registered his List, but this time results were significantly weaker. He there-
upon preferred to dedicate his time to writing and publishing his ideas and devis-
ing grandiose schemes on the subject of the salvation of Israel, while at the same
time his followers took sporadic action against the Arabs.
The State of Israel, which reacted to Kahane’s extra-parliamentary activi-
ties in those years with a variety of measures (elaborated on in chapter 2),
ignored the fact that, concurrent with these repeated acts of provocation, a per-
sistent political apparatus remained in operation and continued to run in every
subsequent election year for the Knesset. A main reason for the country’s lack
of concern was perhaps due to the low percentage of support for Kahane in the
ninth Knesset elections in 1977. In addition, Kahane was not successfully inte-
grated with Israeli society, nor was he able to mobilise an adequate supporting
public, and so, while he was assigned the image of a violent and dangerous polit-
ical activist in terms of his extra-parliamentary exploits, it was still believed that
he had no real chance of being elected to the Knesset.
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Elections to the tenth Knesset: 1981
The turning-point indicating the crucial change in the Israeli establishment’s
attitude toward Kach came during May 1981, following the party’s publication
of a full-page advertisement in the widely circulated daily paper Maariv. Beneath
the caption ‘She is a Daughter of Israel.20 Perhaps Your Sister, Your Daughter or
Granddaughter’, the ad’s text spelled out:
But are you sure that she will marry a Jew? Are you wondering? What a question!
Well then, you are invited at nightfall to visit places such as Tiberias or Acre, Beit
She’an or Nazareth Ilit, Haifa, Be’er Sheva or Dimona, Tel-Aviv or Jaffa and also the
holy city of Jerusalem. You are invited to watch the Arabs roaming about the streets
of Jewish cities in pursuit of the Daughters of Israel. Their pockets are overflowing
with money because they do not serve in the IDF and while we are busy defending
the homeland, they are intent upon making great profits. We have heard the wail
of lamentation emitted from the hearts of Jewish parents whose daughters have
fallen victim to Arab seductive wiles. They live together with the Arabs, they marry
with the Arabs. Was it for this reason that the Jews of Morocco emigrated to Israel,
as well as the Jews of Algiers, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Iraq, Kurdistan, Syria
and all the other ethnicities? Was it in order to assimilate and be defiled in, of all
places, the holy land, that these good, warm Jews left the Diaspora? And who feels
the pain of this abomination? That same prime minister and those same leaders of
the country who cry out to the very heavens against assimilation abroad, yet fear
to raise their voices against the plague of Jewish–Arab relations here in Israel,
because these are our ‘goyim’ (gentiles) and in a ‘democratic’ country, it is forbid-
den to object to assimilation and uncleanliness . . . We, the Rabbi Meir Kahane and
the Kach Movement, will avenge the honour of the Daughters of Israel. With the
help of G–d, upon our election to Knesset, we will propose a law that will put an end
to the disgrace of our Nation and the breaking of the hearts of thousands of fami-
lies in Israel: Draft law: 1. In order to put an end to the plague of assimilation spread-
ing throughout the Land, we propose that the Ministry of Education initiate
compulsory courses in schools all over the country regarding the distinctiveness of
the People of Israel and forbidding the abomination of assimilation and communion
with goyim. 2. In order to deter those that come to entice the Daughters of Israel to
consort and assimilate, we propose an unconditional and mandatory prison sen-
tence of five years with no chance of commuting neither [sic] the verdict nor [sic]
the term of imprisonment for every Arab who has sexual relations with a Jewish
woman. 3. In order to reduce the possibility of commingling and assimilation, we
propose that all members of the United Nation Forces who are not filling a direct
order be restricted to their bases and be ordered by their commanders not to engage
in any type of relations with the Jewish population. The same edict goes for the non-
Jewish foreign workers residing in Israel . . . In order to prevent a perpetuation of
the deterioration, we demand to put an end to all the Ministry of Education’s plans
encouraging social relations between non-Jews and Jews and to conduct studies
only in separate schools for Jews and Arabs. And this is only the beginning. For, it
is evident that the genuine solution is the Kach programme to compel the Arabs of
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the Land of Israel to emigrate to their countries. Is there any other list running for
Knesset which possesses the strength and courage to declare such words? If you
wish for Jewish representatives in Knesset to propose such a bill – vote Kach. This
time – Rabbi Kahane.21
This notice, which expressed severe racism, blatant anti-democratic views and
populist rhetoric, had an immediate public effect. Political parties, ‘civil society’
organisations and individual citizens appealed to the Central Elections Commit-
tee demanding that the Kach list be disqualified from taking part in the elections
to the tenth Knesset scheduled to take place that same year.
In the wake of the surge of appeals which flooded his office, the chairman
of the CEC, Justice Dr Moshe Etzioni, decided to raise before the Committee the
question of Kach’s qualification to take part in the elections. Dr Etzioni’s state-
ments regarding this issue revealed open discomfort because there was no law
giving the Committee the authority to disqualify a political party from running
in the elections on the basis of its programme. Instead, he therefore had to rely
on the precedent of the disqualification of the ‘Socialist List’, as well as the fact
that Kach ideology stood in stark contradiction to the norms established by the
State of Israel’s Proclamation of Independence, stipulating full and equal social
and political rights for all its citizens without difference of religion, race or
gender, and, finally, on Israel’s commitment to remain loyal to the principles of
the United Nations Charter.22
Although shocked at how the guiding principles of the Kach Movement
indeed violated the State of Israel’s Proclamation of Independence, Justice
Etzioni was appalled, it seems, by the ‘Nazi’ style of Kach propaganda, as he
himself described it. In his view, the advertisement implied that the Kach list
wished to introduce the Nüremberg Laws to the State of Israel. Etzioni, who was
well aware of the difficulty of disqualifying a political party in the absence of
the explicit stipulations of a law, was required to use, according to Justice
Vitkon’s precedent verdict which stated:
No free system of government will give a hand to, nor acknowledge, a movement
seeking to undermine this same polity, for it happened not only once in the chroni-
cles of certain countries headed by functioning democratic systems of governance,
that various fascist and totalitarian movements rose against them – while using
those same rights of freedom of speech, press and assembly granted by the state –
in order to engage in destructive action under the patronage of these rights. Those
who have witnessed such a thing in the days of the Weimar Republic will never
forget the lesson.23
With these words, Etzioni tried to find historical as well as ethical justification
for banning Kach from competing in the elections. However, in view of the con-
stitutional implications resulting from a ruling which disqualifies a party from
taking part in the elections in the absence of legislative substantiation, the
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chairman of the CEC allowed Kach representatives enough time to prepare their
defence, including submitting a plea to the Supreme Court of Justice. Members
of Kach, who reported to the Committee in compliance with Etzioni’s summons,
were very surprised to hear that banning their list from the elections to Knesset
had been proposed. CEC session protocols reveal that representatives of the Kach
List had not realised that the danger of disqualification hovered over their move-
ment and accordingly were unprepared for debate on this subject. Further evi-
dence of Kach’s complacency in this regard can be found in the fact that Kahane
himself did not attend the hearing, and in fact did not send any legal represen-
tative on his behalf.
The hearing itself focused principally on the notice published by the party
in the newspapers and its election platform. Among the profusion of ideas pre-
sented there was a paragraph that advocated acts of terrorism against Arabs.
The thrust of the Kach representative’s efforts to defend their party platform was
based on the argument that contrary to the Al-Ard group, which campaigned
under the banner of the destruction of the State of Israel, their own party strove
to sustain, defend and build up the Jewish land of Israel. As had Justice Etzioni,
the Kach defence turned to the Proclamation of Independence in order to find
justification for their ideology. The party advisor specifically referred to the
section in the Proclamation establishing that the State of Israel was to be
founded on the fundamentals of liberty, justice and peace, in reference to the
visions of the Prophets of Israel. The Kach interpretation of the prophecies was
that they emphasised the need to prevent assimilation and to build up a state
which in essence was Jewish. However, the Kach’s members did not rest their
case only on the Proclamation of Independence. They also turned to Israeli mat-
rimonial law which, because it is anchored in Halakhic law, does not in effect
acknowledge the legality of marriages between Jews and non-Jews, and that
made the law a principle conforming to Kach tenets. Party representatives
summed up their arguments by saying that if their list was to be labelled as racist
then they were glad to accept this. However, in their view, the meaning of racism
here did not indicate the Nüremberg Laws or South Africa’s apartheid but rather
guaranteed the Jewish essence as well as the protection of the Jewish people and
the Jewish State.24
Ultimately, and mostly because the lack of a legal reference, members of the
CEC chose to avoid disqualifying Kach, and with a majority of 14 to 5, the 
proposal was dropped from the agenda.25 Even efforts by journalist Moshe Negbi
to prevent Kach from taking part in the elections by appealing to the Supreme
Court of Justice were unsuccessful. The Court refrained from conducting 
a hearing on the details of this affair on the technical ground that only a list
which had been disqualified from running in the elections had the right to
appeal against its disqualification, whereas, in this case, the Kach List had been
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approved and therefore there was no basis for Court intervention in this
matter.26
The State’s moderate attitude toward the Kach Movement at that time was
somewhat surprising due to the considerable importance attributed by the
authorities to this party in comparison to its handling of the ‘Socialist List’.
However, a liberal attitude and adherence to the law were not the only factors
which prompted members of the CEC to block Etzioni’s attempt to disqualify
Kach. Careful scrutiny of the protocols of the hearings leading to this decision
shows that several CEC members in fact wrestled with issues such as the freedom
of expression, the legal jurisdiction of the CEC, and even with the tension
between the principle of representation and the democracy’s stability. However,
other members, mostly those from the religious and ultra-orthodox lists, rose up
against Etzioni’s disqualification proposal. This was because they identified, in
varying degrees, with elements of Kahane’s programme, particularly regarding
the issue of assimilation, and feared that the identification of Kach publications
as ‘racist’ would malign the ideas accepted by major parts of their electorate.
The Mafdal’s representative on the Committee, Tzvi Bernstein, illustrated
the stand taken by the religious lists in the most distinct fashion:
The Kach publication speaks of what they have to offer if they will be in the Knesset,
if the law is passed by a Knesset majority . . . So, everything is kosher and nothing
can be claimed against them and it does not go against the constitution. If the law
is not passed then I haven’t heard that if people want to pass a law through legal
channels, they will be disqualified . . . The main motif is the issue of assimilation –
mixed marriages. Although Kach is in competition with the Mafdal, we agree that
the State should take steps to prevent assimilation . . . It is legitimate to want the
expulsion of Arabs or the attempt to motivate them to emigrate from this country
but [it must be done] in a way that does not worsen the relations between the two
nations in this country.27
Despite what these words indicate, it is highly likely that the decision allow-
ing Kach to compete in the elections was based on reasons which do not all come
from the desire to empower the democratic foundations of the State of Israel.
Still, consequences prove that, to a significant degree, the State decided on a very
restrained response with regard to this party and avoided ‘militant’ steps which
might have led to the erosion of democratic principles.
However, as elections to the eleventh Knesset in 1984 approached, the 
situation changed completely. Kahane, who utterly failed in the tenth Knesset
elections and won only 5,128 votes, which constituted 0.3 per cent of the valid
votes, was much better prepared in 1984 and public empathy with him was on
the rise. For the first time in the history of this country, a genuine possibility
existed that a racist party would penetrate the halls of the House of Legislatures.
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Elections to the eleventh Knesset – 1984
Justice Gabriel Bach, chairman of the eleventh Knesset CEC, whose desk was
flooded with requests for the disqualification of Kach and other parties as well –
especially the ‘Progressive List for Peace’, a nationalist Arab party headed by
Mohammed Miari – knew, like his predecessors, that a sensitive and highly
explosive state of affairs awaited him. Already in his opening statements before
the CEC, he spoke of the great difficulties encountered by the democratic polity
in seeking to limit the rights of its citizens in elections to political office. Fur-
thermore, the problem was aggravated many times over when there was no
clear legal provision in regard to the procedure for disqualification of political
parties.
Nevertheless, and despite the constitutional and moral complexities with
which he had to contend, Bach explained to the members of the CEC that, in
view of the gravity of the evidence found against Kahane and his movement, it
seemed, even in the absence of a specific law detailing the proscription of certain
parties from taking part in the elections, that the essence of Israeli law and the
fact that there were substantial restrictions on various forms of assembly in fact
indicated that Israeli democracy did not tolerate undemocratic organisations
whether they are extra-parliamentary or political parties.28
Quite unlike the session that was conducted in the CEC plenum for the tenth
Knesset, the meeting that took place this time was more comprehensive and pro-
found. This was to a large degree due to the fact that during the years since the
previous session, a great deal of evidence had been gathered regarding Kach’s
programme and its leader’s declarations. Kahane’s own provocative appearance
in front of members of the Committee did not help him gain their support.
Kahane reiterated his racist teachings and his views challenging the democra-
tic nature of the State, and in this fashion provoked the anger of many of those
present. As in the previous circumstances, in this session, too, it appeared that
the position of members of the Committee toward Kahane was based ultimately
on their political persuasion. While representatives of left-wing parties sharply
rebuked Kach and urged its immediate disqualification, the right-wing and
Haredi factions tried to moderate the tone of the stance taken against Rabbi
Kahane.
One of the more compelling issues raised during the session addressed the
very heart and core of the notion of the ‘Jewish ethnic democracy’. Contrary to
liberal democracies that take care to sidestep issues pertaining to the private
domain, such as matrimonial matters, the State of Israel not only defines how
a Jew is to marry and to whom, it actually exhorts against intermarriage
between Jews and non-Jews. The strong words of persuasion delivered by many
CEC members about how assimilation is forbidden and dangerous were suc-
cessful in dampening, to a certain extent, the earlier perceptions of the ‘racist’
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character of Kach’s political programme. Committee member Yehuda Elinson,
of the Mafdal, expressed his sentiments most explicitly:
I would not have believed that during my lifetime in the State of Israel there would
be talk in favour of assimilation. The Israeli people spend billions against assimila-
tion all over the world and here we are presented with an advertisement, what does
it say here, that a Jew should not marry an Arab. What are we talking about here?
So this is called fascist . . . Is this racism? The Jewish Nation loses on a daily basis
hundreds and thousands of the people of Israel because of assimilation. Do you
want this also here in Israel? What are you rising up against? Is this fascism? Is this
Nazism?29
These words are once again evidence of the underlying values contributed by
the non-liberal democracy to the growth of ethnocentrism and racism, and also
of how difficult it is to confront these phenomena in the context of a country
whose liberal components are weaker than its nationalist components.
The appearance of Rabbi Kahane himself was the provocative event that
forestalled discussion of the key principles of the affinity between the State of
Israel and the ways of the Jewish people and brought the debate back to the
future of his party. Kahane did not spare the members of the Committee and,
for the most part, candidly displayed for them the principles of his political doc-
trine. First, he declared that if elected to the Knesset, he would act quickly to
pass a law the goal of which would be to deprive the Arabs of their Israeli citi-
zenship and then embark upon the immediate expulsion of those who would
resist giving up their citizenship, all of this in order to preserve the Jewish char-
acter of the State.30 Second, with regard to the accusations made against his
racist propaganda, Kahane attempted to mobilise the support of the traditional
and religious members of the Committee and therefore argued that his position
on the issue was rooted in the Jewish scriptures, and the Jewish scriptures alone,
which stressed the importance of maintaining the unique essence of the Jewish
people.31
Several members of the Committee presented tough and trying delibera-
tions regarding the question of whether it was fitting to deny Kahane the oppor-
tunity to express his views in the Knesset – particularly providing for the
situation in which they were not at all sure if they were authorised to prevent
his candidacy. Yet it appears that Kahane’s appearance before the CEC had a
sobering effect on most of the members. Thus, in contrast to the position taken
by members of the CEC for the tenth Knesset, which established that the Kach
List should not be disqualified from running in the elections, members of the
CEC for the eleventh Knesset agreed to the disqualification by a majority of 18
to 10, with 7 abstentions.32
The letter written by the CEC chairman to Moshe Neiman, the Kach repre-
sentative, included the following:
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I hereby inform you that in the session which took place on 17.6.1984, the Central
Committee for the Elections to the 11th Knesset refused, by a clear majority, to
approve your list, the Kach list, on the grounds that this list espouses racist and anti-
democratic principles which stand in contradiction to the Proclamation of the 
Independence of the State of Israel, openly supports acts of terror, attempts to stir
up hatred and hostility among different sectors of the population in Israel, intends
to cause offence to the feelings and religious values of a part of the country’s citi-
zens, and whose goals include the negation of the core foundation of the democra-
tic system of governance in Israel. Implementation of the principles of this list would
constitute a threat both to the democratic polity in Israel and is also liable to give
cause to the breakdown of public order.33
However, the hard evidence associated with Kach’s activities which had served
as the occasion for the CEC to take the ‘militant’ step of denying a political party
its right to participate in the elections was not enough to persuade the justices
of the Supreme Court. There, in response to Kach’s appeal against its disqualifi-
cation, a unanimous majority determined that the list must be allowed to take
part in the elections. Four out of the five justices who sat in court called atten-
tion to the fact that the principal impediment in disqualifying Kach was the lack
of a formal law authorising such a measure. The fifth justice, today’s president
of the Supreme Court, Aharon Barak – who was inclined to agree with the idea
that the Court is qualified to adopt a creative approach under the special cir-
cumstances of the absence of a formal legislative provision – declared, in the
same vein as his colleagues, that in such a decision it is preferable that there be
a formal legislative basis.34
It can therefore be concluded that while the CEC opted for a ‘militant’ line
of action, that is, it preferred to uphold Israeli democracy even if that meant
executing measures whose legality was questionable, the Supreme Court
favoured, in this case, the fundamental liberties imparted by the democracy to
its citizens despite the fact that this move essentially condoned the parliamen-
tary representation of a man who advocated racist and anti-democratic notions.
Notwithstanding, the justices intimated to legislators that if there had been a
law defining the limits of the tolerance of the Israeli democracy towards those
intent on causing it harm, the Supreme Court would have seriously considered
restricting Kahane’s party from running in the elections.
And so, following an exceptionally provocative propaganda campaign, Meir
Kahane was able to realise his dream and become a member of the Israeli Par-
liament. The number of voters casting their ballot for his party reached 25,907,
thus granting him 1.2 per cent of the valid votes and enabling him to easily cross
the minimum threshold of representation of the Israeli political system. Upon
hearing the results of the elections, Kahane announced that he would not
conform with the Knesset rules and that he would use his parliamentary immu-
nity and the public platform now made available to him in order to champion
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the tenets of his party, his highest priority being the deportation of the Arabs
from Israel.
The day after the elections, Kahane and his supporters launched their
victory rally. They marched to the Western Wall in Jerusalem, purposely parad-
ing through the crowded market of the Moslem Quarter in the Old City and cel-
ebrating their triumph in the violent fashion typical of their mentor and rabbi.
Brutally, they made their way through market alleys, upending vegetable stands,
striking passing pedestrians and promising local residents that the programme
intended to bring about their final removal from the holy land had indeed
begun.35
Kahane in the Knesset
Much like the CEC and the Supreme Court, the Knesset was at a loss for demo-
cratic tools which would help it deal with the new and not exactly routine
Member of Parliament. Therefore, the Israeli response to Kahane the MP in his
first years inside the Knesset halls could be classified in terms of democratic cri-
teria as ‘militant’, improvised and problematic, to say the least. Although elected
according to the rules of law and he was now the representative of a political
list in the legislature, the Knesset and other governmental authorities executed
a number of actions against Kahane which had significantly limited his basic
rights as a citizen and member of Knesset.
In the first stage, and as a consequence of the provocative actions instigated
by Kahane in the Arab towns he visited shortly after his election, the Knesset,
on the grounds of paragraph 9(a) of the Immunity of Knesset Members Act,
had decided to restrict Kahane’s immunity and prevent him from accessing
certain places, primarily areas of Arab inhabitation. The decision handed down
against Kahane won a majority both in the House Committee and in the House
Plenum. In this case, unlike the examples presented later, Kahane did not appear
before the Supreme Court of Justice and therefore the resolutions passed by the
Knesset institutions did not undergo judicial review. However, apart from the
restriction on Kahane’s freedom of movement, results show that the decision
was also problematic regarding the goals it had set for itself.
The Israeli Police, who were ordered to clamp down on Kahane’s move-
ments, prevented him from delivering a talk on 10 March 1985 at the Univer-
sity of Bar Ilan, an institution associated with the ideological school of religious
Zionists. The explanation was that such a lecture would be very provocative and
incite the Arab students. However, two weeks earlier, Kahane had been given
the opportunity to lecture at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem where the 
percentage of Arabs was considerably higher.36 In general, the modus operandi
preferred by Kahane was one of soapbox sermonising and, as far as he was 
concerned, giving up his provocative excursions to Arab towns was no great loss
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as long as he was able to speak in the peripheral Jewish towns where he enjoyed
notable popularity. In fact, since first achieving parliamentary office and then
later having his immunity restrained, the number of demonstrations organized
by Kach had actually begun to grow and, by the same token, so did support for
the leader and his party. In many cases, these rallies served as fertile ground for
severe acts of incitement against Arabs and assisted in the sanctioning of terror
against them. In a lecture given in Haifa, a city with a large resident Arab popu-
lation, Kahane stated: ‘No one can comprehend the soul of these animals [the
Arabs], these cockroaches. We must slash their throats or throw them out.’37 In
consequence, we can easily classify the lifting of Kahane’s immunity as a step
corresponding to the ‘militant’ route of action. Yet, contrary to what would be
expected from a decision to employ this course of action, and despite the State’s
forceful response to Kahane, its results were minor. For, this measure had little
effect on his patterns of activity, on the incitement and violence aimed at the
Arabs and on the swelling support for him and his views among the Israeli
public.
Another illustration of the considerable restriction placed on Kahane’s lib-
erties was the Israeli Broadcast Authority’s decision to censor his speeches and
activities. The IBA ‘News Forum’ resolution, which was later authorised by the
Authority’s managing committee,38 determined that television broadcasts relat-
ing to Kahane would be limited to news items alone. The motive behind this deci-
sion was the inclination of the IBA – which at the time was a monopolistic
state-run body encompassing all of the Israeli electronic media – to prevent
Kahane from expressing his views and taking advantage of state-run media in
order to recruit support for his views. The News Forum’s closing statement
established that the
screen and the microphone are not supposed to become a type of confrontation
between the radical fringes. The new political scene imposes a great responsibility
upon us . . . [We believe] that everything should be caught on film and recorded;
[but] not everything must go on the air. The standards of what ought to be broad-
cast should meet the criteria of the factual items printed on the front page of a 
newspaper.39
This decision carried the potential to cause fatal harm to Kahane’s objectives.
He, like other politicians, communicated a great deal about his activities to the
public via the media. Kahane realised the implications of this threat to his public
campaigning and so put this ‘improvised’ ruling of the IBA’s managing com-
mittee to the test of a Supreme Court appeal, and won. In this case, Justice
Aharon Barak adopted an approach which safeguarded the freedom of expres-
sion and which essentially tried to stretch the boundaries of this freedom of
expression as far as possible while restricting them only when there was evi-
dence of the risk of genuine and grave harm to the public’s safety. In his words:
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‘The petitioners’ views and opinions make me shudder with repulsion, but I
insist on their right to be made public. This does not imply an endorsement of
their opinions. In my view, they are anathema, but my ruling does give license
to the petitioners’ right to make these anathemas be heard provided they do not
pose a threat to the public order.’40 Justice Gabriel Bach took a more rigid posi-
tion regarding the criteria for establishing freedom of expression, but at the
same time agreed with his colleague that the IBA had exceeded its authority
when it boycotted Kahane.41
In the months that followed, Kahane continued to test the boundaries of
Israeli democracy and in doing so actually contributed to their demarcation. In
practice, this meant a consistent and recurring process in which Kahane would
first present a provocation to the Knesset institutions, to which the Knesset
would in turn respond with ‘improvised’ measures. As a result, Kahane would
appeal to the Court’s legal judgment, and the Court would then evaluate the
Knesset’s authority to limit his liberties.
As he had pledged upon being elected to Knesset, Kahane attempted to
exploit the advantages of his new position to the full in order to promote the
interests of his party. That he became one of the most active Members of Par-
liament, as indicated by, inter alia, the number of speeches he delivered at the
podium, his proposals for no-confidence motions against the government and
the bills he sponsored which were loyal to his party’s programme. As a parlia-
mentary member Kahane’s first truly significant clash with the Knesset’s
speaker came when the latter refused to allow him to submit no-confidence
motions against the government on the grounds that Knesset members repre-
senting single-member factions were not at liberty to do so.
In the verdict handed down by the Supreme Court, Kahane’s petition
against the Knesset’s speaker’s decision was accepted in full. The court’s ruling
attests to the considerable complications involved in the type of procedure pro-
posed by the speaker. Speaker Shlomo Hillel of the Labour Party did not attempt
to remove Kahane’s rights as an MP on the basis of his actions or views. Instead,
he ventured to establish a general ruling regarding all single-member factions,
because at that time Kahane represented such a faction.42 Apart from the fact
that Knesset Regulations did not provide a basis for this kind of decision, had
the ruling in fact been accepted, it would have turned out to be a problematic
step in terms of democratic principles. The denial to smaller factions of the right
to submit no-confidence motions essentially harms the legislature’s ability to
contain the executive’s authority. As with the other measures mentioned above,
this step also is evidence of the panic felt by those in Israel’s political system over
Kahane’s election. It also shows the Knesset’s speaker’s readiness to violate basic
democratic principles in the attempt to suppress Kahane’s activities.
Another step taken by the speaker to restrain Kahane was the decision to
prevent him from placing individually sponsored bills on the Knesset’s speaker’s
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desk. This decision was a direct outcome of Kahane’s persistent efforts to
advance bills which aimed at stripping Arab Israelis of their citizenship and pro-
moting racial segregation between Jews and Arabs. In effect, the parliamentary
speaker and his deputies were working to spare the Israeli Knesset from the great
embarrassment which could follow a publicised parliamentary discussion on
proposed laws of this type. The absence of clear-cut regulations defining the
measures necessary to prevent an MP from proposing certain laws left the House
Presidium with a solitary option, i.e. to appeal to an extended interpretation of
the authorities vested in the speaker by Knesset Regulations.
Once again, the Supreme Court of Justice was faced with a democracy
struggling to resist the most blatant form of racism and anti-democratic senti-
ment the country had known until then. However, the democracy attempted to
protect itself with methods which greatly overstepped limitations that were
specified and anchored in the law. Therefore, in this case as well, Kahane once
again benefited from the Supreme Court’s decree, which rebuked the extended
authority that the Knesset Presidium had appropriated to itself. This position in
effect proved to be a sequel to the 1984 verdict which allowed Kach to take part
in the eleventh Knesset elections. The Supreme Court ruling stipulated that as
long as a political party was deemed legal and qualified to run in the elections,
then, by the same token by which it gained representation, it was thereby vested
with the rights of a parliamentary faction, including the right to propose laws
in accordance with its party platform. In the same way as in the question of the
participation of a political party of this type, so too regarding its parliamentary
activity, the Court ceded responsibility to the legislature. It established that in
order to contend with parties in the judicial realm the Court should be able to
rely on a legal framework appertaining to this issue. The legislature, which at
this point was well aware of the potency of the Kahanist phenomenon and its
implications, did not delay in adopting the Court’s recommendation to modify
Knesset Regulations in order to support the speaker in his struggle with Rabbi
Kahane, MP. Accordingly, a large majority passed Article 134 of the Knesset’s
Regulations which stated that the Knesset’s Presidium43 was authorised to
rescind bills that included incitement to racism or an undermining of the 
democratic and Jewish principles of the country.44
Kahane opposed the Knesset’s ruling and once again filed an appeal for
assistance. He petitioned the Court to instruct the House Presidium to allow him
to proceed with his law proposals. His argument this time was basically techni-
cal and focused on the fact that the new amendment to Knesset Regulations was
introduced after the Supreme Court’s earlier verdict requiring the speaker to
allow Kahane to submit his bills to the House. However, in this particular event,
the Court declined Kahane’s plea and determined that in its earlier verdict it had
not instructed the Knesset’s speaker to allow Kahane’s bills to reach the floor of
the House. Rather it had cited the instance of the existing law and the fact that
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it was unfeasible to infer from that law the authority to prevent Kahane’s 
proposals.45
This Supreme Court judgment reflected the change the judicial system had
undergone in relation to Kahane’s pleas as soon as it was vested with the lawful
authority to limit his actions. Kahane did not acknowledge that change and con-
tinued to pursue Court assistance. In his third and final petition to the Supreme
Court, he argued that the restrictions imposed on his actions as a Member of
Parliament had to be anchored in the law and not only in Knesset Regulations.
The president of the Supreme Court ruled in his verdict that the Regulations and
the procedures were the very same rules that gave rise to a Knesset member’s
right to initiate new laws, and they also defined the boundaries of that right.
The Court, as the words of the ruling disclose, can intervene only in exceptional
cases where an essential flaw has been uncovered in the Regulations’ provision
– and those were not the present circumstances.46
In conclusion, despite the fact that its intention was to essentially restrict
Kahane’s freedom of expression and freedom of action, the modification of the
Knesset’s Regulations nevertheless prevented the general imposition of arbi-
trary restrictions on a Knesset member. Kahane’s right to submit bills was not
indiscriminately restricted but rather was placed under the review of the
Knesset’s Presidium, a body that largely represents the consensus of the legis-
lature. Furthermore, Kahane still retained the right of appeal to the Supreme
Court of Justice, to request that it determine the degree of lawfulness of each
and every one of the Knesset Presidium’s decisions. Therefore, the renunciation
of ‘improvised barriers’ raised in response to a specific incident, and the even-
tual adoption of ‘regulatory barriers’ or ‘legal barriers’ which would help devise
a framework and define clear-cut criteria regarding the response to extremist
phenomena – all this can be seen as an important step in the State of Israel’s
movement in the direction of a more ‘immunised’ route.
The amendment to the Basic Law: The Knesset
A few months prior to the modification of the Knesset’s Regulations, the House
passed an even more fundamental resolution. This was the amendment to the
Basic Law – The Knesset, where the aim was to prevent a recurrence of the
Kahanist phenomenon in the Israeli Parliament. Kahane’s conduct as a parlia-
mentarian was a warning to Knesset members that the use of various ‘impro-
vised barriers’ provided at most an isolated and ineffective treatment for a much
more profound problem. Therefore, MPs were required to address the Supreme
Court’s distinct bidding to create a legal infrastructure that would provide a
basis for Israeli judicial procedure with regard to racist and anti-democratic 
phenomena.
The Knesset chose two principal legislative courses in order to deal with the
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issue. The first, at the criminal level, was the amendment to the Penal Code
dealing with incitement and its extension to include incitement to racism.47 The
second and more fundamental course was the amendment to the Basic Law –
The Knesset, restricting political parties from running for office.
The decision to institute a legal basis for the struggle against extremist
parties was not an easy one for the majority of MPs, some of them Holocaust
survivors. They found it difficult to deal with Kahane’s actions – and with the
notion that burgeoning within the Israeli legislature was a phenomenon that
many tended to link to the darkest of political events of the twentieth century.
The soul-searching shared by many members of the Israeli Parliament prior to
the consolidation of the bill can be detected in the following statement, deliv-
ered by Moshe Nissim, the minister of justice:
We introduce this law symbolically, educationally, and not in order to solve a
problem. The solid foundations of the struggle against such phenomena can be first
of all found in education; through education, it is necessary to fight against any 
phenomena alien to the Israeli heritage. But, gentlemen, there is also a constitu-
tional foundation. The importance of the constitutional foundation is basic to the
democratic system of governance. When we prepared the bill called Basic Law – 
The Knesset (amendment no. 12), we found ourselves accountable and took upon 
ourselves a weighty responsibility knowing that this kind of law is designed to 
deny people their basic right to submit a list to Knesset in order to take part in 
democratic elections and to be elected, and after all this is one of the mainstays of
human rights in Israel. However, we nevertheless take upon ourselves the responsi-
bility, knowingly and fully aware, because, despite the gravity of this law, its neces-
sity prevails over its gravity. And as I have already noted, with open eyes we hold the
view that there is cause for a number of constitutional dictates in the law books
which will determine who will not be allowed to enter the House of Legislature in
Israel.48
Nissim’s statement articulates an orientation which strives to strike a balance
between the liberties guaranteed by the democracy on one hand and the safety
of its existence on the other. His words reflect a holistic approach in the strug-
gle against extremism and feature, for the first time, an Israeli parliamentary
effort to choose a novel and more measured and balanced route in the war
against extremism.
The law draft – as it was passed by the Knesset – also reflects the same stand-
point: ‘A list of candidates will not take part in the elections to the Knesset if
their goals or actions include, explicitly or implicitly, one of the following: 1. The
negation of the existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish People;
2. The negation of the democratic character of the State; 3. Incitement to
racism.’49 One of the prominent indications attesting to the restraint exercised
in the legal amendment is its full subjection to judicial review. The justice min-
ister’s speech, prior to the passing of the law, sought to placate those who feared
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that the legal feasibility of disqualifying political parties would be exploited in
the interest of certain elements. He therefore notified the Knesset that there were
no grounds whatsoever to the fear of general arbitrariness, or the permeation
of CEC decisions by partisan sentiment or politics on account of the provision
included in the law enabling an immediate appeal to the Supreme Court con-
cerning the Committee’s decisions, and which in effect empowered the Supreme
Court to overturn the disqualification procedure instated by the CEC.50
However, despite the overall cautionsness and the numerous checks and
balances found in the legal wording, after the law’s approval by the Knesset, a
number of fundamental arguments were raised against it on different levels. The
first criticism, stemming from an ethical perspective, was put forward by Peled,
stating that the law clearly reflects the ethnic character of the Israeli democracy.
Indeed, the phrasing of the law indicates that while attempting to defend democ-
racy from its adversaries, at the same time it perpetuates the secondary status
of the Arab minority in Israel and in fact entails restrictions of their basic lib-
erties (article 1).51 Further reproach was issued by Barzilai, who argued that, in
procedural terms, the broad scope for manoeuvre accorded to the CEC and the
Supreme Court does not necessarily imply the empowerment or ‘immunisation’
of the democracy in Israel. In his opinion, the sweeping phrasing of article 
7a enables, in principle, the disqualification of almost all political parties 
in Israel, and that decision can rest on each of the three provisions made by 
the law.52 Similar reservations were raised by Cohen-Almagor as well as Bendor,
who stated that it was inappropriate that the first legal instance of the disqual-
ification of political parties be conducted by the CEC, which is itself a political
body and could turn out to be an arena for partisan attacks by one party on
another.53
Although these reservations are understandable, even thought-provoking,
a retrospective glance at the exercise of the law since its inauguration indicates
that the gloomy forecasts about the amendment have, at least for the time being,
been unfounded. First, and despite the fact that it appears to have indeed con-
firmed the ethnic character of the democracy in Israel, article 1 of the law, con-
cerning goals or actions involving the negation of the existence of Israel as the
State of the Jewish People – which could be applied to all of the Arab parties in
Israel – has not once been enforced. Furthermore, the appeal submitted by the
Likud faction against the CEC’s ruling authorising the ‘Progressive List for Peace’
to take part in the twelfth elections to the Knesset in 1988 was rejected out of
hand by the Court.
Second, actions taken by the State of Israel against the ‘Socialist List’ and
Kach prior to the acceptance of the law’s amendment were distinguished by 
‘militant’-type responses which embodied a very liberal conception of the ‘rule
of law’, sufficient in fact, often to undermine it. Since 1985, a legal barrier has
existed in Israel, reflecting a fairly broad consensus among the parliamentary
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factions, which defines the qualifications for the participation of a political party
in an election campaign and also provides for continuous judicial accountabil-
ity. Indeed, what goes for Arab parties goes also for Jewish extremist parties for,
since the passing of the law, the rulings of the CEC as well as the Supreme Court
have featured balanced and in-depth deliberations with a preference for demo-
cratic principles instead of entrenching parliament against extremist parties.
The four elections to the Knesset that took place after the publication of article
1 demonstrate this more balanced approach while only the parties for which the
law was designed, i.e. Kach and its derivative, Kahane Hai (‘Kahane is Alive’) were
disqualified from competing, in accordance with the legislative directive. The
conclusion to be drawn, therefore, is that despite the justified reservations voiced
by those critical of the law, the events described in what follows show that the
State of Israel and its various institutions have tended to make prudent use of
this law, exercising restraint and deliberation. In effect, from the moment the
law was passed, the State’s tendency towards impromptu improvisation in its
response to political parties turned into a thing of the past, another fact attest-
ing to its process of ‘immunisation’.
As a footnote to the discussion regarding article 7a of the Basic Law – The
Knesset, it should be mentioned that during the debate preceding the legislation
of the Basic Law amendment, a number of Knesset members offered to impose
restrictions on extremist factions, not by dint of legal barriers but rather by
structural changes in the parliamentary elections’ process, and also by raising
the threshold of representation that stood at a low 1 per cent of the sum of the
valid votes. However, this issue was quickly struck from the agenda due to the
fact that in the multi-party system typifying the Knesset the smaller factions,
which possessed significant leverage because the coalition would often count on
their support for its stability, adamantly refused any substantial change in the
threshold percentage.54
Elections to the twelfth Knesset: 1988
Rabbi Kahane, who before the ratification of the amendment submitted
provocative bills and gave troubling speeches before the Knesset and the public,
did not change his tune even after the amendment’s approval. Among the racist
and belligerent law proposals that he placed on the Knesset’s desk after the
summer of 1985, note should be made of the ‘three tolls bill’ (1985) which
rejected the civil status of Israeli Arabs and supported the forcible expulsion of
those not willing to concede their civil rights.55 Also noteworthy is the death
penalty for terrorists’ bill (1987) which called for an immediate death sentence,
without judicial deliberation, for every person who de facto murders, or attempts
to murder, or is implicated in an act of murder or in an attempt to murder a 
resident of the State of Israel, or a Jew even if he or she is not a resident.56
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The persistent Kach propaganda, the Party’s proposed bills, Kahane’s dec-
larations to the media and from the Knesset’s podium and the fact that public
opinion polls at the time confirmed that the party was going to augment its par-
liamentary power by a few hundred per cent – according to some estimates,
close to five seats in the Knesset57 – all of these in effect ruined Kach’s chances
of persuading the twelfth Knesset’s CEC that it would be possible to usher in
Kahane’s party past the new-founded legislative filtering mechanism.
The party’s efforts to bring before the CEC compelling arguments against
the numerous appeals for its disqualification were futile. In reply to the allega-
tion that it was undermining the State of Israel’s democratic character, Kahane
stated that ‘democracy’ was a broad concept and subject to many interpreta-
tions, and therefore his party must be regarded as a political body which in fact
fully endorsed the notion of democracy. However, in this case what he was
speaking of was a Judaistic democracy with a structural preference for members
of that religion over those of other religions. In support of this claim, Kach’s
attorney provided several illustrations from other democratic countries which
restricted citizenship rights for immigrants. Similar arguments were raised by
the party with regard to their imputed racism. As Kach saw it, its position with
regard to the Arab population was based on both a security imperative and a
central Jewish halakhic premiss. Kach attempted to prove that its justifications for
discriminating against another ethnic group had absolutely nothing in common
with racist attitudes.58
The debate conducted by the CEC this time was significantly different from
all its precedents. The only members who remained loyal to Kach at this stage
were representatives of the two religious factions, Mafdal and Morasha, whereas
other right-wing parties such as Likud and Tehiyah either joined the proponents
of disqualification or refrained from voting. Ironically, the position of the CEC
chairman, Justice Eliezer Goldberg, merits additional attention. The gist of
Goldberg’s remarks reveals a genuine trepidation regarding the harm to basic
democratic liberties on account of the unwarranted use of article 7a.
Goldberg repeatedly warned CEC members of the extreme cautiousness
they must exercise before voting in favour of the disqualification of a list. He
urged members to avoid an inclusive interpretation of the authority imparted
to them by power of law and to consider each case independently, based on judi-
cial principles and free from political interests. Furthermore, the CEC chair
placed the onus of proof of the party’s ineligibility on the petitioners for its dis-
qualification, and added that any doubts that may arise must work in favour 
of the list under consideration.59 Goldberg’s final request from Committee
members was to include in their list of deliberations an additional, probabilistic
test. He asked them to consider the question of whether there was in fact a
genuine and immediate or foreseen danger to the democracy if the party were
to be allowed to run for office.60
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Despite the numerous reservations listed by the CEC chair, the results of
the CEC members’ vote reflected the attitude towards Kach of the majority of
the represented parliamentary factions. Twenty-seven members voted in favour
of the party’s disqualification on the grounds that it undermined the basic prin-
ciples of democracy, 6 members objected and 3 abstained. With regard to its
status as a racist party, 28 supported its disqualification, 5 objected and 3
abstained.61
The legal dictate authorising the CEC to bar a party from running made it
possible this time for the Supreme Court of Justice to reject Kach’s petition object-
ing to its disqualification. The Court recognised the CEC’s authority to disqual-
ify Kach; it justified the grounds leading to its disqualification and in fact argued
that there was no evidence that the CEC’s decision was influenced by non-
germane deliberations.62
The commentary issued by the former president of the Supreme Court of
Justice, Meir Shamgar, with regard to article 7a during the discussion of Kach’s
petition is evidence of the degree to which this amendment to the Knesset’s
Basic Law contributed to the ‘immunising’ of the democracy in Israel. In his
words:
Article 7a – whose exclusive interest is the goals and actions and their features – is
not therefore a ‘technical’ provision, prima facie, enforced under given factual cir-
cumstances in absence of an interpretative guiding line. The essence of the issue at
hand, that is, the constriction of a constitutional basic right, carries with it by the
same token, both the standard according to which the interpretation of the law
would be duly precise, narrow and limited and, in view of it, the provisions of article
7a will not be exercised except for in the most extreme cases. This interpretative
approach does not in any way contradict that which is written in the written law;
it is a corollary of our understanding of the original legislative objective, which did
not intend to diminish from the protection of liberties but rather protect them in the
face of a genuine danger.63
Elsewhere, he explained:
In devising the fundamentals of article 7a, the legislator did not include the stipu-
lation of the existence of a clear and immediate danger or the probabilistic eventu-
ality of the danger as a result of the actions of this list, or any other similar test
examining the connection of the condemned act to the possibility of its realisation.
These are therefore the guiding principles for the purpose of implementing the afore-
mentioned article 7a:
• The goals or actions of a list of candidates, including one of the fundamentals
introduced in paragraphs (1), (2) or (3) [of the law].
• The alleged goal amounts to a central and dominant goal and is not an insig-
nificant and marginal subject. It is a definitive expression of the list’s nature;
the same applies to any of the modifications upon the matter, when speaking
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of an action as distinct from a goal. Here, too, the alleged action must amount
to a prominent, serious and dominant expression of the identity and essence of
the list.
• The list operates on behalf of the realisation of its goals and in order to convert
them from ideas into actions.
• Taking part in the elections is a means towards the realisation of the goal or
the intensification of the action.
• The negative elements – as specified in paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) [of the law]
are manifested in a grave and extreme fashion.
The evidence for the existence of all the above must be compelling, lucid and
unequivocal.
Throughout the verification, whose principal stipulations are listed above, 
one must always remember that the safeguarding of liberties is preferred to their
restriction.64
Shamgar’s conclusions indicate that in the commentary to the new article of
the law provided by the Court, the scales were clearly tipped in favour of the
freedom of political action over its restriction. The stringent criteria for enforc-
ing the article established by Justice Shamgar confirm the view that the State of
Israel elected to adopt the most effective tools in its struggle against extremist
parties, as long as these accorded with the most rigid framework of democratic
acceptability. Shamgar’s position also conveys, once again, sentiments that
strive to offset criticism of the law, particularly regarding the concern that the
CEC might make decisions on the basis of political considerations. The fact that
each ruling is subject to rigorous judicial review, grounded in clear-cut criteria
of an explicitly democratic nature, forestalls the argument warning against the
politicisation of the disqualification process.
Evidence of the robustness of the disqualification process as prescribed in
article 7a and the attrition of the political option of capitalising on the instru-
ments provided by this article, can be found in the fact that, with the passage of
years, there has been a significant reduction in the number of parties seeking
to exploit the article for ‘vindictive’ purposes. Immediately following its passage
into law, and prior to the twelfth elections to the Knesset, seventeen requests
were submitted in pursuance of the disqualification of seven parties, in addition
to Kach’s appeal to disqualify twelve parties. In contrast, prior to the fifteenth
Knesset elections, only one request for disqualification was submitted – against
the Balad, a party headed by Azmi Bishara, and this request as well was rejected
outright.65 Further support for the assessment that the legislation of article 7a
of the Basic Law – The Knesset did not harm the strength of the Israeli democ-
racy, but rather reinforced it, can be found in a comparison of the case of Kach
with that of Moledet.
Moledet, a far-right party, was conceived shortly before the elections to the
twelfth Knesset by Major-General (res.) Rechav’am Ze’evi, a revered war hero,
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who in the years following his retirement from the military became concerned
about the national security of Israel and principally the demographic balance
between the Israelis and the Palestinians.66 Ze’evi considered the demographic
scales to be tipped in favour of the Palestinians to be a peacetime threat to 
the existence of the State of Israel. In time he came to the conclusion that the
only solution to this danger was to effect a policy of ‘transfer’ against the 
Palestinians living in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Therefore, on 28 June 1988, 
he announced the founding of a new party to carry the flag of the ‘transfer’ of
the Arabs living in the territories.67 As anticipated, the appearance of Moledet
on the political arena elicited extreme attitudes and spurred numerous bodies
to appeal to the CEC seeking to disqualify this new party from running in the
elections on the grounds that the notion of ‘transfer’ was essentially racist and
anti-democratic. The representative of the Ratz faction, Yossi Sarid, MP, was
emphatic when pronouncing the same judgement for Moledet as for Kach,
arguing that, in effect, one was speaking of identical lists.68
Early in the debate before the CEC, it was obvious that Ze’evi would do every-
thing in his power in order to distance his party’s tenets from the standard 
conditions for disqualification according to article 7a. Indeed, while putting for-
ward his arguments, the leader of Moledet succeeded in instilling doubt among
members of the Committee regarding the justifications for the disqualification
of his party. He did this by employing two key strategies. First, he diffused the
acrimony of the idea of the ‘transfer’. As Ze’evi put it, his party was speaking 
of a humane principle of dividing two nations in order to bring an end to the
Israeli–Arab conflict. Furthermore, the use of the word ‘transfer’ does not imply
expulsion but rather an agreement among countries concerning the exchange
of populations.69 Second, Ze’evi succeeded in creating an affinity between the
Moledet ideology and the consensual origins of Zionist thought, and principally
the history of the Labour Movement. He argued that in the early period of the
State’s establishment, the ‘transfer’ idea was accepted by leaders of the Labour
Movement and was in fact carried out by them.70
Whether Ze’evi was successful in persuading members of the CEC by the
weight of his arguments, or whether the members took upon themselves the 
full brunt of the responsibility dictated by article 7a, it appeared that their 
position regarding the Moledet List was different from their attitude to Kach.
Haim Ramon, Labour Party representative, argued that, despite his objection 
in principle to Ze’evi’s standpoint, there was no legal justification to enforce 
the disqualification procedure against him. Hillel Ashkenazi, left-wing Mapam
member, went a step further as he expounded:
It appears to me that in the balance of interests between the necessity of main-
taining a democratic polity where everybody is equal before the law on one hand
RJE1  8/15/02  11:16 AM  Page 54
The parliamentary arena
55
and the need to defend the country from incitement to racism and causing harm 
to the democracy on the other, one must always consider the circumstances in 
which use should be made of the radical enforcement of the legal – albeit, in fact,
undemocratic – process of disqualifying the list. I must say that I have not been 
convinced that the requests calling for the disqualification of the Tsomet, Tehiya
[two other rightist factions whose bids for disqualification were discussed at the 
same hearings] and now Moledet lists justify the radical enforcement of disqualifi-
cation, as I have already mentioned. For, in my opinion, and despite the evidence
. . . the Kach verdict does not apply to these movements as well as in this parti-
cular case of the Moledet movement. I reiterate; employing the process of disquali-
fication has to be carried out with the utmost precaution and with minimal legal
interpretation.71
The position of the clear majority of CEC members regarding Moledet, and the
overwhelming decision not to disqualify its list, signify an internalisation of the
desired balance between the defence of democracy and the protection of its
boundaries – and, by the same token, are further proof of the rejection of the
argument that article 7a was intended to be used for the purpose of political
sparring.
A retrospective glance at Moledet’s actions over the ten years of its existence
as an independent party and later as a member of the Ha’ichud Ha’leumi
(‘National Unity’) alliance reinforces the feeling that the CEC’s ruling on this
party indeed reflects the golden path bridging between the protection of funda-
mental liberties on the one hand and upholding the democratic system, on the
other. From its very first day in the Knesset, Moledet indeed turned out to be an
extreme right-wing measuring stick on anything relating to the borders of the
land of Israel and the peace process with the Palestinians. Still, a review of the
proceedings of the twelfth–fifteenth Knessets reveals that neither Moledet’s
actions nor its statements included straightforward racist messages or a genuine
challenge to the democratic system, such as was the case with Rabbi Kahane in
his term as an MP.
Elections to the thirteenth Knesset: 1992
The policy of the CEC of the thirteenth Knesset, which included the disqualifi-
cation of the Kach and the Kahane Hai Lists and once again allowed Moledet to
compete in the elections, demonstrates that the ‘immunised’ route of the Israeli
democracy, which began with the legislation of article 7a, had been upheld also
on the second occasion that it had been put to the test.
The prohibition of Kach from running in the 1988 elections proved to be a
strong blow to Kahane and his activists who – ironically during the years
1988–1990, when there was a genuine potential for a broadening of support
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for their party in reaction to the Palestinian intifada in the Judea, Samaria 
and Gaza territories – were thus fated to limit their activities to the extra-
parliamentary sphere. On 5 November 1990, approximately a year-and-a-half
prior to the elections to the thirteenth Knesset, the party suffered the worst
setback it could have conceived of when its leader and the figure most identified
with the movement, Rabbi Meir Kahane, was murdered in New York. In the
wake of his death, bitter dissension broke out between Rabbi Kahane’s devotees
and his son Binyamin regarding the question of the party’s prospective leader-
ship and the title to its assets. These differences eventually led to the splitting of
Kach and, as a result, it submitted candidacy for the thirteenth Knesset presented
two descendants – Kach and Kahane Hai. The new-founded version of Kach was
led by Kahane’s underlings Baruch Marzel and Noam Federman, whereas
Kahane Hai was headed by his son Binyamin, who was supported by a number
of activists from the settlement of Kfar Tapuach in Samaria.
Despite their ideological kinship, the arguments of these two parties 
before the CEC were very different. Kach, wiser from the lessons of the past,
refrained from mentioning the Arabs in its election campaign. In effect, the
party’s central counterclaim to the requests for its disqualification was that,
despite its disagreement with the substance of article 7a, it took it upon itself
to adhere to the dictum of the law and therefore forfeited from its programme
any clause which may have been construed as at variance with it.72 However,
most members of the CEC saw this as a fairly transparent attempt by the party
to gain the CEC’s stamp of legitimacy and approval to take part in the elections
while, basically, the true intention of the party leadership was to return to its
original platform if and when the party achieved parliamentary representation.
The profusion of evidence indicates that concurrent with the so-called trans-
formation undergone by the party its leadership, in practice, continued its 
traditional course of provocative activities. This did not make it easy for the 
Kach representative to persuade members of the CEC of the integrity of the
party’s intentions, and consequently the list was disqualified by a considerable
majority.73
Kahane Hai, on the other hand, in fact chose to address the Arab issue and
defended itself armed with the argument that, unlike Kach, its members were
speaking of a new list, one which should not be judged according to the ‘past
sins’ of Kach.74 An additional explanation submitted by the party’s representa-
tives was that they did not wish to conceal their intentions regarding the Israeli
Arab population, for the simple reason that their position towards this popula-
tion had originated in Jewish Halakha, which constituted the base for the party’s
platform. With this reasoning, representatives of Kahane Hai hoped that the CEC
would stumble and fall into the polemics of the existing tension between the
‘Jewish’ and the democratic principles of the State of Israel.75 However, these
efforts to sow seeds of doubt among CEC members did not fare well at all and
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the list’s disqualification was passed by an even larger majority than in the case
of Kach.76
Immediately after the disqualification ruling was passed, both lists peti-
tioned the Supreme Court of Justice in their appeals that it rescind the CEC’s
decisions. However, in contrast to the discussions of principle on the subject that
were conducted in the previous elections, this time the judicial discussion was
relatively simple and the Court ratified the rulings issued by the CEC. In Kach’s
case, and in view of the abundant evidence presented before the judges, it was
decided to reject the appellant’s claim that since it had been disqualified from
running in the twelfth Knesset several years earlier the party had undergone
substantial transformation.77 As for Kahane Hai, the Supreme Court refrained
from entering the arena of the party’s Halakhic arguments and elected instead
to focus on the question of whether this party’s tenets clashed with article 7a
of the Knesset’s Basic Law. According to the Court, the answer to this question
was affirmative.78
Another point worthy of mention is that appeals for the disqualification of
the Moledet List were also submitted to the thirteenth Knesset’s CEC. The chair
of the CEC, Justice Halima, stressed before the CEC that the utmost caution must
be observed while discussing article 7a and by this step adopted the tactic of his
predecessor, Justice Goldberg, as well as that of the Supreme Court of Justice
President, Justice Shamgar, in the verdict regarding Kachs’ petition against the
twelfth Knesset CEC’s ruling.79 The majority of Committee members accepted
the chair’s position and in the absence of evidence indicating a deviation in prin-
ciple on the part of Moledet from the strict interpretation of article 7a, they per-
mitted its participation in the elections by a large majority.80
The disqualification of Kach and Kahane Hai, on the one hand, and the
granting to Moledet of a license to run in the elections, on the other, both
conform, in my view, to the principles of the ‘immunised route’. In the 1992
Knesset elections, also, negotiation regarding the qualification of all lists was
conducted according to a stringent interpretation of article 7a, while at the
same time the arbitrating or judicial bodies exhibited a clear preference for par-
tisan participation over any temptation to rid the Israeli political arena of radical
notions. Moreover, it appeared that many Committee members wholly disap-
proved of the Moledet position, yet most of them did not exercise partisan politi-
cal considerations but rather addressed the essentials. The same applies to their
position regarding Kach and Kahane Hai. Despite Kach’s attempts to try to change
its image and Kahane Hai’s efforts to argue before the Court that its political 
programme was in effect a derivative of the Jewish Halakha, it was obvious to
members of the CEC that these were stratagems and nothing more. The network
of evidence presented before the CEC persuaded its members that these parties
sought to undermine the foundations of democracy and therefore their cam-
ouflage tactics were to no avail.
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The parties law
A significant additional step forward in the ‘immunising’ process of the Israeli
democracy was taken on 10 April 1993, when the Parties Law (1992) came
into effect. Apart from the fact that, for the first time, this law defined the status
of political parties in Israel, it also included a circumscription of the goals and
actions of registered parties. Article 5 of the law determined that
A party will not be registered if its goals or actions include, explicitly or implicitly,
one of the following: 1. negation of the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish
and democratic state; 2. incitement to racism; 3. reasonable grounds for the infer-
ence that the party is going to be used as a front for illegal activities.81
Contrary to the position put forward in this book, according to which 
article 5 constitutes a significant component in the ‘immunising’ process of the
democracy, the article was subject to severe criticism by other social scientists,
including Barzilai, Avnon and Cohen-Almagor. In their view, the restrictions
imposed by this article were excessive and encroached upon basic liberties even
more than did article 7a. First, it authorised the party registrar to disqualify a
party even before it had begun to function. Second, this article confers a per-
manent disqualification, unlike article 7a which enables parties to return and
approach the CEC prior to each election. Hence, as they saw it, this article
entailed grave restrictions on the fundamental democratic right of freedom of
assembly.82
The most effective way to assess to what degree the Law has in fact adversely
affected basic liberties is to once again make use of the test of consequences.
The first party that was most liable to encounter difficulties subsequent to the
Parties Law’s approval was Moledet. Like all other parties in Israel, Moledet was
requested to enlist with party registrar and to present the registrar with, among
other things, a list of its principles. In order to avoid a judicial tangle on account
of article 5, the party’s leader, Rechavam Ze’evi, decided to omit the ‘transfer’
scheme from the clause outlining the party’s goals.83 Despite the fact that its
principles were well known, Moledet encountered no great difficulties and was
given the registrar’s stamp of approval. However, it is important to note that its
qualification, granted twice before by the CEC, undoubtedly helped pave the way
for the registrar’s present authorisation. Therefore, it seems appropriate to
proceed to the discussion of a more problematic example, specifically that of
Yemin Yisrael.
Yemin Yisrael was an extreme right-wing list led by Professor Shaul
Guttman. Its members had left Moledet subsequent to personal disputes and 
ideological differences of opinion. The most prominent divergence from
Moledet’s way of thinking was related to Ze’evi’s readiness to drop the idea of
‘transfer’ from the list of the party’s main premisses in order to avoid conflict
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with article 5 of the Parties Law.84 With the elections for the fourteenth Knesset
approaching, Guttman and his colleagues sought to present the Israeli voter
with a right-wing alternative more radical than Moledet. Directly following
Yemin Yisrael’s request to be registered as a party, the party registrar received
three lawsuits, all intent on preventing its registration on the grounds that the
party was racist and anti-democratic. Furthermore, appellants intimated that
this list was distinguished by an affiliation with the Kach movement which, at
that time, had already been defined by the State as a terrorist organisation.
Because of the grave misgivings associated with article 5, the party registrar
elected to approach this list along the lines of Justice Shamgar’s interpretation
of article 7a from the second Neiman verdict, meaning an interpretation which
was as sparing as possible and which stressed democratic liberties.85
Following an evaluation of all the requests, and having subjected them to
the rigour of the provisions of the law and the principle of freedom of assembly,
the party registrar chose to affirm Yemin Yisrael’s registration.86 Even the appeals
served by two of the petitioners to the Supreme Court of Justice enjoining the
Court to revoke the qualification of Yemin Yisrael were rejected by the verdict of
the three judges who sat in trial. The ruling issued by the Supreme Court Presi-
dent Aharon Barak stated that if the interpretation of article 7a provided the
State with a very narrow range of action when considering the prevention of a
list from participating in the elections, then the non-registration of a party was
even more restrictive for, inter alia, the hearing which decided the party’s regis-
tration took place prior to the party’s actual establishment and therefore before
its actions could even be evaluated. The fact that the non-registration of a party
is at the authority of the party registrar – a conventional administrative body
as opposed to the CEC, which is a kind of ‘Knesset in miniature’ and chaired by
a justice of the Supreme Court – also invites extra caution.87 These deliberations,
and others, led the Court to assume an approach that was as liberal as possible
with regard to the registration of this party. The Ratz faction’s appeal to the CEC
with the intention of preventing Yemin Yisrael from taking part in the Knesset
elections also did not fare well. However, in this specific case, the appeal was
rejected on procedural grounds.88
Hence, the conclusion to be drawn is that despite the serious concerns
regarding the substantial restrictions of freedom inherent to the Parties Law, in
the first real test to which the State was subject regarding that law it did not
display a rigid and problematic position in democratic terms.89 In fact, quite the
opposite is true. The Israeli political organisation most closely affiliated to Kach
was fortunate to be registered as a party, and even tried its luck, albeit with little
success, in running for Parliament. This illustration represents a prominent
example of the restraint exercised by the State of Israel in relation to the restric-
tion of the liberties of political parties and demonstrates a clear preference for
liberal principles over the restriction of political liberties.
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Conclusions
This extensive account of the Israeli response to extremist challenges in the par-
liamentary arena indicates an evolving tendency in the State’s political and judi-
cial policy towards extremist parties. In its early years, the State of Israel lacked
structural or legal barriers which could have limited the participation and rep-
resentation of extremist parties, a fact made prominent in the case of the ‘Social-
ist List’ in which the CEC as well as the Supreme Court were impelled to take
extreme and highly problematic measures in democratic terms. However, the
decision to disqualify the ‘Socialist List’ from running in the elections did not
lead the Knesset to firmly establish the Israeli response to radical parties in a
legal framework. Consequently, with Meir Kahane’s appearance in the political
arena in Israel, the State’s authorities found themselves in a similar situation.
However, in Kahane’s case, despite the repugnance he evoked and the strong
desire of CEC members, and later of the Knesset’s speaker and the managing
committee of the IBA, to clamp down on his activities, the Supreme Court chose
to uphold his liberties as a citizen and an elected representative. At the same
time, it gave the legislature a clear sign regarding the need for statutory meas-
ures which would make it easier for them to deal with the Kahanist phenome-
non. Thus, in the years prior to the amendment of the Knesset’s Basic 
Law, this phenomenon led to strain between representatives of the legislature
who sought to restrict Kahane – even if that involved an abuse of democratic
principles – and representatives of the judiciary who endeavoured to protect
democratic principles even when the cost was the protection of Kahane’s free-
dom of action.
The first productive joint-enterprise between the legislative and judicial
authorities in this regard was passing the amendment to the Knesset’s Basic
Law. This amendment defined the qualifications and limitations necessary for a
party competing in the elections, and opened a window of opportunity for an
extensive legislative system on this issue. A short while after the amendment to
the Knesset’s Basic Law, new clauses were added to Knesset Regulations with
regard to the limitations on the legislature’s forbearance regarding racist and
anti-democratic expressions; and seven years later the Parties Law was passed
as well. The ‘immunising’ process of the Israeli democracy with regard to
extremist political parties was completed in 1998 with the approval of article
28 of the Law of the Local Authorities (Elections). Article 39a of that amend-
ment in effect applies the qualifications which appear in article 7a of the
Knesset’s Basic Law also to parties running for office in the local authorities, and
accordingly, following the November 1998 elections to the local authorities, a
list that denies the democratic character of the State or incites to racism cannot
take part in the elections.90
Evidence of the link between the creation of the new legal structure and 
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the ‘immunising’ of the Israeli democracy can be found in the fact that even 
the gloomy forecasts regarding the political use of this legal framework were
proven wrong. The CEC’s members and the party registrar have so far dis-
played a balanced and responsible approach in their legal interpretation, an
evaluation validated by the Supreme Court which established highly stringent
criteria whenever it was necessary to restrict any of the liberties of political
parties.
However, the simplest way to estimate the quality of the change in Israeli
policy regarding radical political parties is by conducting a retrospective survey
of the debates and rulings issued in respect of the various political parties. Such
a review once again pulls the rug out from under the pessimists who predicted
the erosion of the democratic foundations of the State. In contrast to the pro-
jection arguing that the existence of legal barriers, placed at the State’s disposal,
would inevitably lead to their exploitation, consequently raising many difficul-
ties for political parties seeking to register or compete in the elections, a reality
check in fact proves otherwise. Only two parties were prevented from taking part
in the elections: Kach and Kahane Hai. This fact becomes the more significant
when it is juxtaposed with the increasing radicalism that has developed among
the diverse walks of life comprising Israeli society. This radicalism finds expres-
sion in the elongated boundaries of the discourse conducted in the Israeli Par-
liament and in the increasing representation of radical and militant political
parties in this institution.
Subsequent to the elections to the fifteenth Knesset in 1999, the parlia-
mentary system in Israel could be defined as a form of ‘polarised pluralism’. In
that Knesset, certain Jewish political parties gained representation which did
not hesitate to challenge the democratic government, and its various institu-
tions, and to preach against ethnic groups. Side by side, there were Arab parties,
including the Islamic Movement, which openly objected to the existence of Israel
as the State of the Jewish people. Of course, anti-democratic or ethnocentric
expressions in Parliament are not auspicious phenomena in themselves, but the
very fact that these parties gained representation in the context of a sustained
democratic framework gives an indication of an ability to strike a balance
between the imperative of affording representation to the whole complex of cur-
rents and ideas found in Israeli society at large and the necessity to safeguard
democratic values and structures.
At this juncture, I wish to differ with Cohen-Almagor who argues that a
state must take on the obligation of restricting anti-democratic parties, no
matter what their shade or colour, for the reason that, in the absence of any
such action, the administration in effect becomes an accessory to the consoli-
dation of anti-democratic notions. In his view, there is no need for incriminat-
ing proof that a particular party indeed constitutes a genuine threat to the
democratic polity – the very fact that it practises violence and that its beliefs
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undermine the democratic character of the state is reason enough for its 
disqualification.91
My critique of Cohen-Almagor’s approach focuses on two main points.
First, including the element of violence while deliberating the disqualification
of a political party seems needless in this era of the third millennium. To wit, in
the first half of the twentieth century, the preponderance of anti-democratic
parties in Europe featured prominent violent distinctions, whereas a glance at
the Western political theatre today demonstrates that even the most extreme of
parties appears to refrain from involvement in violent action – a fact which does
not necessarily attest to an empathic relationship with democracy but more
likely indicates an instrumental volition to avoid conflict with the authorities.
Second, the non-liberal context of the Israeli democracy and the divisive cut of
its society create by inference a fertile ground for the growth of extremist parties.
Furthermore, Israel’s character as a Jewish and democratic state engenders fun-
damental complications at all stages in the disqualification process of political
parties. The majority of religious and ultra-orthodox parties would prefer Israel
to be a Jewish state while foregoing its democratic principles, and most Arab
parties would rather see Israel as a democratic state while relinquishing its
‘Jewish’ component. Subsequently, if disqualification were to have been deter-
mined on the basis of party programmes and statements made by their leaders,
then the sword of disqualification would have come down on the heads of many
parties. Therefore, in my opinion, a democracy which chooses the ‘immunised
route’ is obliged also to consider the question of the real threat a party poses
because, without that measure, the right of representation would be denied to
many social groups in Israel.
Although, in view of the above developments, it would seem that the Israeli
democracy is fairly close to the ‘immunised’ polarity of response in terms of
its attitude towards extremist parties, one question remains unanswered: to
what degree is there an underlying base of public support for these changes 
in the State’s policy towards extremist parties? This question is particularly
important due to the growing tension over recent years between judicial elites
in Israel who, by the disposition of their verdicts, are leading the Israeli democ-
racy in liberal directions, and large parts of the population who object to this 
inclination.
In a survey conducted for the purposes of this study, participants were pre-
sented with three statements appertaining to the policy the State must adopt in
its attitude towards extremist political parties. Almost 60 per cent (59.8) of the
respondents agreed with the first statement: ‘It is the democratic polity’s duty
to disqualify extremist parties even if there is no law which defines how to go
about it’. The second statement, ‘The Israeli law which enables the disqualifica-
tion of political parties is not sufficiently enforced in this country’, was sup-
ported by 55.5 per cent, while 56.2 per cent expressed their support for the
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notion that ‘It is appropriate to enforce the idea of the disqualification of
political parties on other levels, for example, elections for local authorities’.
From these findings we can draw the following conclusion: while the State’s
authorities and, in particular, the Supreme Court tend towards moderation of
the restrictions imposed on political parties and appear to confine the range of
response to particularly narrow boundaries, the public, oddly enough, displays
tendencies of a more ‘militant’ nature. At the base of this tendency, there is a
desire to impose a more expansive system of control over political parties and to
reduce the range of representation. These findings point to a fairly wide gap
between the public’s attitudes and those of the State. This fact may increase the
apprehension that, despite the ‘immunised’ tendency spearheaded by political
and judicial elites, a broad public under-structure in support of this tendency is
lacking. In chapter 3, which deals within the State’s efforts to ‘immunise’ Israeli
society in terms of its basic values, findings are submitted to help assess whether
Israeli society is inclined in the immediate future in more liberal directions or
whether it will remain deeply implanted, firm in the non-liberal tradition.
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The State’s response to extremism: 
attitudes towards subversive movements 
and violent organisations
The democratic  polity’s struggle against manifestations of extra-parliamentary extremism and political violence is accompanied by asimilar and perhaps even more acute quandary than its contest with
political parties. In this struggle the government possesses the means to sub-
stantially restrict the freedom of expression and association of its citizens, con-
sequently harming a number of their democratic rights. However, in its struggle
against extremism, violence and, at times, even terrorism, the democracy is
sometimes impelled to employ means that may engender restrictions on the
most fundamental liberties, including the right to life.
Not without reason did Peter Chalk, whose intention was to delineate the
democratic boundaries of the fight against terrorism, put forward an argument
almost identical to that of the ‘paradox of the defending democracy’. Accord-
ing to his reasoning, the elusive challenge confronting every democracy was 
to find the means that would be most effective against insurgent factors while,
at the same time, maintaining moral conformity with liberal democratic tradi-
tions.1 However, the search for these means continues, and the democracy’s
predicament in its fight against violence and terrorism continues to provide
ample grist for the academic mills of numerous social scientists.2
Intensive research in this field, particularly in recent decades, has spawned
a number of theoretical designs. Two ideal types, the ‘war model’ and the ‘crimi-
nal justice model’, have gained notable prominence. Not surprisingly, we can
easily apply these models to the general discussion of the various facets of the
‘defending democracy’. The first type, the ‘war model’, is analogous to the notion
of the ‘militant route’. This model takes on the goal of eradicating violence and
terrorism, whereas the confinement of its actions to democratically accepted
limitations, in its books, is a marginal factor. Alternatively, the ‘criminal justice
model’, assuming more of an ‘immunised route’, regards the preservation of
democratic guidelines as the cornerstone in its doctrine of struggle against vio-
lence, even at the expense of the effectiveness of this campaign.
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Operationally, these models can be distinguished by a number of principal
aspects. First, through the lens of the ‘war model’, political violence and espe-
cially terror are perceived as revolutionary and belligerent acts, whereas 
the ‘criminal justice model’ looks upon them as criminal offences. Commensu-
rately with their differentiated approaches to political violence, these models
espouse different modes of response. The ‘war model’ gives the job of tackling
political violence to the military forces, which may utilise any of the means at
their disposal in order to strike at or suppress subversive elements. The ‘crimi-
nal justice model’, on the other hand, places the onus on the police forces 
while confining its actions to state criminal legislation,3 as further elaborated by
Crelinsten:
In a criminal justice model, the rule of law is paramount, while in the war model,
it is the rules of war that prevail. In the criminal justice model, it is the police who
exercise the state’s monopoly on the use of violence. The rules of engagement, so to
speak, involve the use of minimal force, which requires an exercise of judgement on
the part of the officer(s) involved. Military rules of engagement, on the other hand,
require the maximal use of force designed to overpower the enemy.4
It is no coincidence that Crelinsten posits the ‘rule of law’ as the key distinction
between the two models. The ‘rule of law’ in its rudimentary form is the bedrock
of liberal democratic political culture. The liberal interpretation of the ‘rule of
law’ extends well beyond the minimal requirement of the state for effective law
enforcement. According to liberal premisses, laws must be circumscribed and,
when enforced, the impairment of basic human rights or arbitrary discrimina-
tion among citizens should be avoided.5 This approach obligates the liberal
democracy to confine its struggle against political violence to very narrow
boundaries, a fact that does not necessarily coincide with empirical reality in
many liberal democratic polities, let alone non-liberal democracies.
A consideration of the campaigns waged by democracies against violence
and terrorism indicates that, in most cases, the governing body does in fact
uphold the rule of law, albeit in its formal aspect and not in the far-reaching
liberal sense. Given the above, the use of the ‘war model’ in its academic – ideal
– form, is rather uncommon. Most democracies facing a considerable threat or
a pending crisis tend to forsake the rigid confines of the ‘criminal justice model’.
However, as noted by Crelinsten and Schmid, they still do not cross the line and
de facto embrace the ‘war model’. Rather, they customarily adopt countermea-
sures that avoid a total rejection of the ‘criminal justice model’. These means
include drafting specific anti-terror legislation, the extension of police author-
ity, modifications of judicial processes with the intent of expediting terrorist
prosecution and, in certain cases, special courts for terrorists.6 In this fashion,
the state maintains adherence to the law and at the same time enjoys a greater
field of manoeuvre in its battle against subversive elements.
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Given the above, it is therefore posited that, in practice, the two polarities
demarcating the arsenal of countermeasures to violence and terrorism at the
disposal of most democratic polities are as follows: on one hand, there is the
‘narrow criminal justice model’, which features the liberal interpretation of
the ‘rule of law’; and, on the other, we find the ‘extended criminal justice 
model’, which relies on the procedural interpretation of the ‘rule of law’. The
latter version makes it feasible for democracies to take more extreme counter-
measures against insurgent elements while still avoiding a decline into the ‘war
model’; yet the question remains of whether a system employing the means of
this model can in fact remain, and be called, ‘democratic’.
As reflected in its approaches to extremist parties and its responses to extra-
parliamentary radical and violent acts of provocation, Israel has a history of
continual revision. The general gist indicates a gradual transition from the 
‘militant route’ or course of action – in this case, the ‘war model’ and the ‘ex-
tended criminal justice model’ – to an ‘immunised’ course, i.e. the ‘criminal
justice model’. This chapter reviews the permutations through which Israeli 
counterinsurgent policy has gone, from the State’s inaugural years through to
the third millenium. First, I consider the predominantly ‘militant’ route char-
acteristic of Israel’s early days; then the relationship of the new-born State’s
judicial system to the operational aspects of the ‘extended criminal justice
model’ is examined; the move, from the 1970s on, to a ‘criminal justice model’
comes under scrutiny; and the chapter culminates with a look at the factors
involved in a transition to an ‘immunised’ form of response.
Israel’s early days: the predominance of the ‘militant’ route
At surprising odds with the fact that in its struggle against political parties the
inchoate Government of Israel suffered from a dearth of measures in its effort
to protect itself from radical political manifestations, we find that in regard to
(extra-parliamentary) extremist movements and violent uprisings Israel tended,
even in its early days, to adopt highly rigorous forms of warfare against subver-
sive groups. This approach is given prominence in the words of the first prime
minister of Israel, David Ben-Gurion, only a short time after the founding of the
State:
Democracy will cease to exist – if we debilitate it, render it incapable, powerless and
devoid of effective defensive measures. So that . . . if democracy in Israel seeks to
continue to exist and last for many days, it must be equipped with self-defensive
means and tools of action and implementation that will prevent minorities – and
not only non-Jewish minorities, but rather Jewish minorities as well – from gaining
control by use of internal or external force.7
Israel’s intolerant disposition at the time towards manifestations of Jewish vio-
lence derived from events in the struggle to establish its sovereign State; but it
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was also an outcome of developments which took place during the pre-State
period. The years prior to the founding of the State of Israel were marked by the
Zionist movement’s struggle to lay the foundations of the Jewish State. Like
other nationalist undertakings, violent steps and strategies formed an indis-
pensable part of this project. Of the movements associated with ultra-
nationalist right-wing notions, the Etzel and the Lehi were the most noteworthy
in their use of violence and terrorism. Such violence gave rise to much concern
and dispute among the different political currents in the Jewish Yishuv (settle-
ment) and continued unabated even after the dismantling of the British
Mandate in Israel and the State’s inauguration in the spring of 1948.8
The most noteworthy evidence of the persistence of this ideological polari-
sation after the State’s establishment occurred approximately one month after
the declaration of independence. The nascent State’s political leadership, affili-
ates of the Labour Movement, elected to adopt the more radical of counterin-
surgent options at its disposal in an attempt to put an end to the internal struggle
over sovereignty, as well as to bring about the dissolution of the militant Etzel
and Lehi movements. The incident strikingly illustrating this critical step toward
the assimilation of the ‘militant route’ or ‘war model’ was the affair of the
weapons’ ship Altalena.
On 22 June 1948 the army’s chief of operations ordered his soldiers to open
cannon fire on the S.S. Altalena with the resolute intention of sinking the ship.
This momentous incident took place not far off the shores of Tel Aviv. On deck
there were members of Etzel and in its hold were abundant stocks of weapons
brought from France by the organisation. This drastic step by the State invites
the question – which continued to perturb the political echelons for a long while
after the incident – whether in fact the weapons’ ship Altalena was such a threat-
ening element that it left the decision-makers with no alternative but to employ
the most extreme measure at their disposal.
The answer to this question is multifaceted. Behind the scenes of the 
Altalena affair, there was the attempt by the month-old State to quickly raise an
army to contend with the overall state of war that existed at the time. In order
to organise such an army, it was necessary to combine all the clandestine ele-
ments that were in operation prior to the State’s establishment into one common
national framework.9 However, to hastily unite several factions, often divided 
by vast ideological chasms and a history of bitter confrontation, in a common
framework was no mean feat. Furthermore, the various elements of the new
army less than willing to surrender their respective distinctions and forgather
under a single national framework in which the Labour Movement had a highly
dominant role. The Etzel, for example, strove to maintain a degree of autonomy
in the new State-run army context and asked that its members be accorded 
a favoured status in the distribution of weapons seized from the Altalena.10 The
State leadership saw this as a genuine threat because, specifically, they were
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fearful of an armed, ideological militia operating within army ranks. This threat,
as perceived by the State leadership, was in line with the conventional explana-
tion of countries deciding to adopt strategies of the ‘militant route’.11
As the ship drew closer to the shores of Tel Aviv, the sense of threat to the
leadership grew, for the latter were of the opinion that members of Etzel were
attempting to form an alternative power centre with the intention of challeng-
ing the authority of the leadership of the new-formed State.12 These consid-
erations raised the odds favouring a military option. In the meantime, those
members of Etzel who had been conscripted into the budding national army
abandoned their posts and made their way to the location at which the ship was
expected to berth, thereby exacerbating the feeling of imminent threat, already
prevalent, among the executive leadership. This sense of apprehension might
explain why they did not listen to the Etzel leader Menahem Begin who, in
response to the escalation, attempted to reach a compromise with this same
leadership and thus prevent the sinking of the ship and the consequent loss of
life. Instead, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion’s ministers chose to accept the
stark picture portrayed by Ben-Gurion, that of Etzel as an immediate and unac-
ceptable challenge to the new sovereign Government.13 In the end, the ship was
bombarded and scuttled, the list of fatalities including 16 Etzel members and 3
IDF (Israeli Defence Forces) soldiers.
At this juncture, the question debated by many scholars studying Ben-
Gurion’s actions at the time should be raised. Was his decision to use such mili-
tary force due to the feeling that the sovereign Government was indeed in grave
jeopardy, or was this simply an opportunity to disable his political foes? Horowitz
and Lissak elect to confirm the assumption that applying ‘war model’ tactics 
to the Altalena affair and the elimination of Etzel were steps taken in order to
consolidate governmental stability. From their point of view, Israel’s aggressive
policy toward the S.S. Altalena was only another variation on a universal theme
according to which a group seizing power, within the context of the institu-
tionalisation of nationalist and social revolutions, must apply force in order to
rid itself of any radical elements carrying the potential to undermine the
regime’s stability.14 Departing from this view, Barzilai submits a more critical
stance and argues that a political act was in fact effected: Ben-Gurion’s real
concern was to prevent the build-up of hostile political forces and potential
adversaries to his own party’s Government.15
Whether Ben-Gurion’s motives were driven by sectarian considerations or
were in the national interest, the Altalena affair signified the advent of an exten-
sive campaign whose aim was to crush oppositional militarist factors in the
country. The operation included army raids on all Etzel military installations, a
sweeping arrest of the movement’s leaders, and, in effect, the total dismantling
of its military capacities.16
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With the dissolution of Etzel, the era of the deployment of the ‘war model’
against Jewish political violence in fact came to an end. The higher ranks in
charge of the infant State of Israel began to edge towards the adoption of the
‘extended criminal justice model’ which, at least in the first years of its imple-
mentation was characterised by an ambiguous frame of operation and an incli-
nation to occasionally slide back toward the ‘war model’.
The State of Israel from the 1950s to the 1970s: 
the institutionalising of the ‘extended criminal justice model’
Constitutional and legislative foundations of the ‘extended criminal justice model’
To reiterate: whereas the ‘war model’ in its simplest form relies on the 
rules of war rather than any constitutional or legislative basis, in contrast 
the ‘extended criminal justice model’ is bound to the principles of some sort of
formal legal foundation. The legal system that evolved in the State of Israel
served as fertile ground for the institutionalisation of a model of this type. Ex-
cept for the United Kingdom, Israel is the only democracy which does not have
a written constitution ensuring basic liberal rights, including the freedom of
speech and freedom of association. Notwithstanding the internal political
reasons forestalling the adoption of such a constitution, the budding State was
under a genuine threat from its Arab neighbours, and that fact consolidated a
sweeping public consensus on the issue of the precedence of security and mili-
tary matters over civil rights. However, the sense of foreboding has persisted and
this ‘security complex’ continued to dominate policy and political discourse for
many years. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that over the course of its
fifty-three years of existence, Israel has not adopted a constitution, nor has it
ever retracted the state of emergency under which it has operated for all those
years, making it possible to effect far-reaching extensions of the notion of the
‘rule of law’.17
The existence of a state of emergency in Israel constitutes a key factor in
understanding the institutionalisation of the ‘extended criminal justice model’.
Hofnung argues that a ‘state of emergency’ is a governmental declaration of the
existence of an exceptional set of circumstances, therefore requiring the adop-
tion of extraordinary measures.18 The principal manifestation of the state of
emergency in Israel was the adoption of a complex system of regulations intent
on preserving state security, even at the expense of basic individual rights. An
attempt to make sense of this tangled web of regulations will have to distinguish
between three types of emergency legislation:
1 Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945: inherited from its predecessor, the
British Mandatory Authorities in Palestine, these regulations grant a great
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deal of power to the military command. High-ranking officers are autho-
rised to order house demolitions, impose curfews, make arrests, carry out
searches and detain suspects without judicial restraint. The enforcement of
these regulations within Israeli borders – especially with regard to Jews – is
uncommon and has been carried out only with the approval of the highest
levels of the executive authority (the cabinet or the minister of defence).
2 Section 9 of the Law and Administration Ordinance, 1948, which autho-
rises the executive authority to suspend, revoke or alter parliamentary leg-
islative measures in cases of emergency.
3 Parliamentary emergency legislation.19
For the purposes of this discussion, presented here are seven major operational
courses, deriving principally from the 1945 Defence Regulations, which have
helped lay the formal foundations for the adoption and institutionalisation of
the ‘extended criminal justice model’:20
• Administrative detention. Intended to prevent threats to state security or
public safety, the exercise of this measure was not contingent upon the com-
mission of a felony or the suspicion of involvement in one. In the Defence
Regulations, an administrative detention was defined as the authorisation
to arrest a person, without trial, for a period of up to six months. The mini-
ster of defence and, under special circumstances, the chief of staff, were
vested with the authority to impose such detentions.
• Restriction on freedom of expression. Its principal manifestation was the exis-
tence of a military censor who possessed the authority to prohibit the 
publication of any items, including daily newspapers which, in his opinion,
posed a threat to national security.
• Restriction of the freedom of association. The most severe measure available
to Israeli governments, whose purpose was to limit the freedom of associa-
tion, is provided in the ‘unlawful association’ clause of the Defence Regu-
lations. This clause stipulates that unlawful organisations are those that
recommend, or incite towards, the eradication of the Israeli or governmen-
tal constitution with the use of force, or who are responsible for the incite-
ment to hostilities against the government of Israel or one of its ministers,
or the destruction of the property of the government of Israel or acts of ter-
rorism aimed at the government or its employees. The maximum penalty 
to be imposed upon a member or supporter of such an organisation is ten
years’ imprisonment.
• Restriction on freedom of movement. An individual suspected of subversive
activity may, according to the powers vested in the State by the Defence 
Regulations, be subject to a restraining order that will confine him or her
to his or her area of residence and require that he report daily to the police
station.
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• Special courts. Defence Regulations authorise the chief of staff to set up
special courts for individuals suspected of activity which may jeopardise
state security. Another legal proceeding is putting such suspects on trial in
a civil court of law on condition that those courts sustain verdicts in accor-
dance with emergency legislation.21
• Ordinance for the Prevention of Terrorism. One of the principal legislative 
measures available to courts trying suspects of subversive offences is 
the Ordinance for the Prevention of Terrorism No. 33, 1948. According to
paragraph 8 of the ordinance, the executive authority is responsible for
determining whether or not a political movement is a terrorist one. An illus-
tration of the rigidity of the ordinance is found in paragraph 2, which deter-
mines that an individual taking part in the establishment or activity of a
terrorist organisation, or even in dispensing propaganda in any form, will
be guilty of an offence for which the maximum sentence is twenty years’
imprisonment.22
• Special legislation regarding the occupied territories. Territories occupied by
Israel in 1967 are not subject to state laws (apart from East Jerusalem and
Golan Heights, which have been annexed by law), in which case those areas
are subject to international laws of occupation, thus authorising the
regional military commander to take any measures necessary to maintain
control of, and order in, those territories.23
Such measures were most often exercised against the Palestinian population,
though, as Cohen-Almagor has pointed out, Jewish settlers were also occasion-
ally subject to administrative detention orders.24
From the above, it seems that there was a situation in which the lack of a
constitution necessary for safeguarding civil rights combined with the state of
emergency which existed, entailing the potential enforcement of a wide array
of decrees and regulations that substantially digressed from the notion of the
‘rule of law’ in its liberal democratic sense. This combination provided Israel
with the tools needed to administer a model of response that, despite what
appeared to be couched in a legal framework, was still a far cry from the more
demanding requirements of the ‘criminal justice model’. Further evidence of its
deviation from the limits of the ‘criminal justice model’ could be found in the
decision, which in due course became ossified into tradition, to place the brunt
of the response to extremism and political violence upon an operational intelli-
gence body (counterintelligence) and not the police force.
The status of the General Security Service (GSS)
Contrary to expectations set forward by the ideal type of the ‘criminal justice
model’, which puts the full onus for the fight against extremism and violence on
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the shoulders of the police, the central body dealing with threats of extremism,
subversion and political violence in Israel is the Shabak. Police services are
employed principally in the final stages of the investigation, that is, in the arrest
of felons and their arraignment in court.
Once again it is possible to see how the State institutionalised a model of
response which kept the army away from any involvement in political violence
and terrorism within Israel’s boundaries. At the same time, it ensured the exclu-
sion of the police force as well. Appointing the Shabak as the institution respon-
sible for contending with these incidents is clearly indicative of the State’s
attempt to adhere to some sort of framework within the ‘rule of law’ – yet not
in the liberal perception of this notion.
Unlike the Israeli police force, the legal status of the Shabak is indetermi-
nate.25 Furthermore, unlike in other countries such as the United Kingdom,
where there is a system of robust public control over the secret services,26 in
Israel there is a lack both of the legislation necessary for defining the limits and
methods of the Shabak and of public accountability on the part of the GSS.27 A
frail constitutional infrastructure enables the widespread existence of the phe-
nomenon Crelinsten calls ‘provocative policing’, i.e. actions not necessarily
designed to collect anti-terrorist evidence for the sake of prosecution, but rather
in order to serve intelligence aims of the security forces.28 Moreover, the lack of
a viable system of accountability also opens the door to actions verging on the
illegal or what Carmi Gillon, former head of the Shabak, calls operating in 
the ‘grey’ areas.29 Among the ‘grey’ tools at the Shabak’s disposal – but denied
to the police – are wiretapping, gathering under false pretences information
about individuals, investigations which include the use of physical and mental
coercion, and liberal access to the data banks of various authorities with refer-
ence to, inter alia, the State’s citizenry.
Contrary to the legal developments which, in recent years, encouraged 
the State of Israel to proceed toward a more bona fide interpretation of the ‘rule
of law’ (a theme discussed later), in point of fact the status of the Shabak
has changed little since the 1950s. Efforts also recently invested in the late
1990s to pass ‘Shabak legislation’ and, in general, to more clearly define the
mandate of the organisation’s action, have raised some knotty questions. Para-
graph 7 of the law proposal discussing the goals of the GSS and its roles, deter-
mines that
the Service is in charge of protecting the State’s security, the order of its affairs and
its institutions from threats of terrorism, espionage, breaching of secrecy and other
activities that may cause it damage. The Service is also responsible for the protec-
tion and promotion of other vital sovereign interests of the State as determined by
the government. . . .30
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In their comparative review of legislation concerning the activities of the
secret service, Zimerman and Kremnizer find support for the inference that 
this type of institution almost naturally tends to extend its range of operations
to those so-called ‘grey’ areas which stand in contradiction to the rule of law.
Therefore, the essence of a law pertaining to the secret service would need to
regulate the organisation’s activities and chiefly set the limits of its authority by
means of a clear mandate and by maintaining an effective system of account-
ability. The ambiguous wording of the legislative proposal with regard to the
Israeli Shabak, as far as Zimmerman and Kremnizer are concerned, undermines
this plausibility and removes the law in its current rendition from the realm of
democratic acceptability.31
In the first decades of its existence, the State of Israel therefore engendered
a quasi-legal framework for its counterextremist activities. The generous condi-
tions of prosecution and the fact that an institution of counterintelligence,
benefiting from a lack of accountability, was assigned this function, provided the
State with a broad and almost limitless field of operation in its struggle against
radical and violent elements.
The operational aspects of the ‘extended criminal justice model’
The first sign of genuine transition from the ‘war model’ to the ‘extended crim-
inal justice model’ became evident already in the last stages of the dissolution
of Etzel and in the administrative detention of five leaders of that organisation.
These former commanders were granted the right to appeal to the Supreme
Court,32 a fact which proved that the security forces were liable to the civil court
system, even if this subordination was still partial. However, the most signifi-
cant step towards the adoption of the ‘extended criminal justice model’ and the
repudiation of the ‘war model’ became apparent in those actions taken to elimi-
nate the smallest and most zealous underground right-wing organisation at
that time, the Lehi. The incident that prompted this process was the assassina-
tion of the Swedish diplomat and United Nations mediator for Palestine, Count
Folke Bernadotte.
Bernadotte was killed on 17 September 1948, in a well-planned ambush by
Lehi members. The State’s immediate response to the assassination was more 
in compliance with the ‘war model’. Soldiers from the Palmach (elite army
squads) unit raided Lehi military camps, closed down Lehi offices and arrested
dozens of its members.33 However, the next significant step was more moderate,
conforming to the judicial frame that took shape under the state of emergency.
Three days after the murder, the Government declared Lehi a terrorist organi-
sation, thus expediting the process of the indictment of Lehi-affiliated members,
including those who had not been active participants in its operations. Where
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evidence was found to be less incriminating, members were subject to arrest and
administrative detention.
These steps were an indication that the State of Israel had become an estab-
lished reality and therefore a sovereign entity bound to a system of rules, albeit
an initially frail judicial structure. Every use of military force against civil-
ians now had genuine potential to harm the public legitimacy of the new 
Government. The ‘extended criminal justice model’ was consequently acknowl-
edged as an option often necessary for governmental stability both in order to
gain legitimacy and to justify the expulsion of violent antagonists.
As for the motive behind the identification of Lehi as a terrorist organisa-
tion, Barzilai argues that the decree was more inclined towards the de-legitim of
– and thus subduing – governmental opponents than it was based on the ratio-
nale of taking counterterror stabilising action.34 Notwithstanding the sound
basis of this argument, it seems that the disavowal of the ‘war model’ in favour
of the ‘extended criminal justice model’ demonstrates how Ben-Gurion, in his
efforts to undermine his political opponents, in fact chose a more restrained
approach and ended the rigid methods employed in the earlier stages of the
struggle against Etzel.
The decision to shift the responsibility for dealing with Jewish extremism
and violence from the army to the Shabak was another indication of the insti-
tutionalisation of the ‘extended criminal justice model’ as the dominant 
doctrine in the struggle against Jewish terror. Isser Harel, founder of the Shabak,
began the process of segregating the GSS from the army, thus reinforcing its
status as an autonomous non-military body. According to Harel, this made it
easier to reconcile between security operational needs, on the one hand, and the
legal constraints of a democratic political system, on the other. Harel also
attempted to set the ground rules for GSS operations. As he saw it, the role of
the organisation in the struggle against terrorism should be limited to pre-
emptive surveillance and interrogation. Evidence, once gathered, would then be
transferred to the police for further investigation and prosecution, if necessary.35
On the face of it, it seemed that Harel’s aspiration, to judge from his descrip-
tions, was to limit Shabak’s role to ‘reactive policing’ in relation to Jewish ter-
rorism, a move Crelinsten regards as intended to keep counterterrorism within
the rigid restraints of the ‘criminal justice model’. However, both the test of
reality as well as allegations tendered by Carmi Gillon, who directed the Shabak
forty years after Harel, prove that the course chosen by Harel and his successors
was undeniably ‘provocative policing’. For example, security agents would 
regularly identify targets – including political movements – as potential threats
to subsequently shadow them and to pursue the actions of their leaders in order
to gather information.36
The early 1950s witnessed a number of events which helped provide the
means for the institutionalisation of the ‘extended criminal justice model’. Three
RJE2  8/15/02  11:17 AM  Page 78
The State and subversion
79
radical movements sprouted at that time: Brit Hakanaim (Covenant of the
Zealots), Hamachaneh (The Camp), and the Zrifin (the name of the prison where
members were held) Underground.37
The first two movements eventually merged under a common leadership
composed of militant Haredim (members of the ultra-orthodox) who objected 
to the Zionist character of the State but, ironically, received most of their in-
spiration from Lehi operations. At first their actions amounted primarily to
hooliganism and damage to property, therefore making Shabak involvement
unnecessary. However, when it reached the stage where the police found them-
selves quite powerless in restraining the organisation, the Shabak was asked to
assume responsibility for dealing with this group, and so took on the task of
quelling its operations. Harel, the Shabak’s head at the time, planted two agents
among its ranks whose mission was to monitor and report member movements.
After receiving intelligence reports regarding the intention of the organisation
to step up its actions and engage in more militant tactics of terror, the Shabak
launched a comprehensive campaign against the group and its supporters, and
twenty suspects were put under administrative arrest.38
The handling of the Zrifin Underground, or Kingdom of Israel Under-
ground, is an even more striking example of the increasing entrenchment of the
‘extended criminal justice model’. The Underground, whose members were also
chiefly inspired by the Lehi tradition, began its foray into terrorism in the winter
of 1953, and on 9 February of that year it carried out its most violent and bold
attack. A large bomb was detonated at the Soviet embassy building in Tel Aviv
and three diplomats were injured. Following an investigation coordinated by 
the GSS and the police force, the Israeli Government decided to enforce the 
Ordinance for the Prevention of Terrorism against the group.39 In addition, 
for the first – and, in effect, the only – time in the history of the State of Israel,
a special military court was set up to adjudicate the allegations made against
members of a Jewish terrorist organisation.40
By the mid-1950s, the number of violent threats made by the Jewish public
began to wane. It would be hard to categorically determine whether the enforce-
ment of the ‘extended criminal justice model’ led to this decline, or whether
other factors were responsible, such as the processes of institutionalisation
which the country was undergoing, or the unrelenting tension with Arab coun-
tries that substantially contributed to the consolidation of the Jewish public of
this State in its attitude to its political leadership and national symbols. That
said, and refraining from an attempt to determine a causal relationship between
the two, it could be inferred that the attenuation of threats was also accom-
panied by a substantial change in the assorted toolkit of counterinsurgency
adopted by the State.
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The State of Israel from the 1970s until the new millennium: 
towards a model of criminal justice
Modifications to the legal basis
With the advent of the 1970s, a legislative infrastructure began to take form in
Israel. Its goal was to contain the complex of state reactions to the challenges it
was faced with in a more democratically stable legal framework. This infra-
structure addressed three essentials of the democratic system: human liberty;
freedom of expression; and freedom of assembly.
• Liberty. In 1979, the procedure of administrative detention secured legal
status by power of the statute of authorities, emergency provision (arrests).
It differed from the earlier Defence Regulations by imposing a limited judi-
cial review on the minister of defence’s decision to exercise administrative
detention. The new enactment stipulated that the administrative detention
warrant be presented before the president of the district court within forty-
eight hours of the act of detainment. Despite this adjustment, the rationale
behind the idea of administrative detention remained unchanged: namely,
the State takes upon itself the right to impose restrictions upon an individ-
ual’s freedom as ‘preventive measures’ and without arraignment before a
court of law. Moreover, the law set forth special instructions regarding the
concealment of evidence held against the detainee, which authorise the
minister of defence to prevent the detainee from examining the evidence
compiled against him or her, including information often constituting
reasons for his or her arrest.41
• Freedom of expression. The decrees prohibiting sedition and incitement, as
well as incitement to racism (amendment, 1986) of the Penal Code, 1977
were in effect intended to establish judicial grounds for existing limitations
on the freedom of expression. It should, however, be noted that the offence
of sedition as set down in the Penal Code is currently under the constant
criticism of judicial and liberal factions. Their main objection is that these
enactments provide the State with too much of a free hand when taking
severe steps against radical political activists, a predicament that, accord-
ing to the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, puts freedom of expression
in the country in considerable jeopardy.42 Further confirmation of this ap-
proach is submitted by Kremnizer and Gnaim, who underscore the liberal
approach by arguing that making sedition a criminal offence deviates from
the conventional boundaries of a democratic system, overly restricts the
freedom of expression and does not accord with the principles of legality
and clarity. They propose replacing this offence with a number of penal
restrictions defined in an explicit and lucid fashion, and of a more limited
nature, which also may help avert unrestrained enforcement during times
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of crisis.43 However, while the charge of sedition remains a point at issue,
the ruling against incitement to racism appears to be a law constrained by
a well-balanced system of checks and balances, enabling it to be included
under the bona fide definition of the ‘rule of law’. On the one hand, the law
makes it possible to protect society at large from the scourge of racism; and,
on the other, the law tends to significantly restrict administrative retaliation
in regard to its violators. The maximum penalty for an offence of incitement
to racism cannot exceed five years’ imprisonment and, furthermore, unlike
for other criminal offences, clause 144e of the ruling stipulates that in each
case where the State intends to file suit for crimes of incitement to racism a
written agreement from the attorney general must be obtained.44 At the end
of 2000, a strong effort was made to push forward additional legislation on
the subject of incitement, this time in reference to incitement to violence.
The purpose of this legislation was to replace the use of clause 4a of the
Ordinance for the Prevention of Terrorism.45
• Freedom of assembly. The Penal Code, 1977: Illegal Assembly significantly
curtailed the range of areas decreed illegal by the Defence Regulations 
and in fact incurred substantial reductions in penalties (a maximum of
three years’ imprisonment in contrast to the ten-year sentence originally
ordained by the Defence Regulations). Like the conviction for incitement,
the right of indictment with regard to illegal assembly was given solely 
to the Attorney General. Another law related to the freedom of assembly
was the Law of Associations, 1980, whose purpose was to regulate civil
associations in Israel. Clause 3 of the law determines that an organisation
will be denied formal registration if one of its aims is incompatible with the
existence of the State of Israel or its democratic character, or if there is rea-
sonable cause to believe that the association may be used as a front for illegal
activities.46 This law does not outlaw the existence of assemblies of this type
but it denies them the rights granted to formally registered associations.
The above legislative efforts regarding the freedom of expression and assem-
bly are indicative of Israel’s attempt to confine its struggle against extremism
and violence to an acceptable democratic framework. It nonetheless appears
that the fact that it had not, at the very outset, sought to eliminate the practice
of administrative detention or completely abolish the option of exercising the
Defence Regulations (which can be replaced by the above-mentioned laws)
shows that the State preferred to retain a wide range of operation and counter-
active means which continue to deviate from common democratic principles. A
survey conducted for the purposes of the present study indicates that the State’s
predisposition to retain these forceful means of response is broadly endorsed by
the Jewish population in Israel. Seventy-four per cent of the respondents agreed
with the statement asserting that the Emergency Regulations existing since the
RJE2  8/15/02  11:17 AM  Page 81
Jewish extremism and violence
82
State’s establishment are vital for the preservation of its security. Sixty-nine per
cent supported the notion that administrative detention is a legitimate tool to be
employed in the interests of state security. Another 54 per cent agreed that the
Shabak, and not the Israeli police force, is the appropriate agent for dealing with
ideological delinquency perpetrated by the Jewish extremists.
As outlined above, the State of Israel has an equivocal approach regarding
the measures to be employed in the operational struggle against extremism and
violence. This is a significant factor in determining that a regression to extreme
response tactics marked by a substantial extension of the conception of the ‘rule
of law’ still occurs in many cases, even though there does seem to have been a
gradual improvement in sustaining the unadulterated rule of law.
Issues accompanying the contraction of the ‘criminal justice model’
In this section, I scrutinise Israel’s response to five instances of Jewish extrem-
ism and violence of the last three decades. The examples are as follows: the 
Kach Movement; the Israeli radical left; the ‘Jewish Underground’; Rabbi Uzi
Meshulam’s violent group; and the events preceding the assassination of Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The comparative analysis of these events demonstrates
not only the different responses to these respective threats, but elucidates 
the factors encouraging and inhibiting the toughening or moderation of each
response.
The Kach movement
Kach appeared in Israel in late 1971 and was in effect an offshoot of the violent
and vigilante American organisation the Jewish Defence League. When the
leader of the movement, Rabbi Meir Kahane, emigrated to Israel, it seemed that
his intention was to import the League’s violent methods to this new arena. As
early as 1972, Kahane and his followers proved to be a significant challenge to
the State of Israel when, in the August of that year, Kach simulated a public
show trial incriminating the mayor of Hebron, Mohammed Ali Jabari, for his
part in the 1929 massacre of Jews in this city and the later events of the 1948
War of Independence. In order to carry out this trial, Kahane and his adherents
defiantly entered the mostly Arab city, thus creating significant potential for
violent confrontation. However, the security forces quickly intervened.47 Soon
after, Kahane stepped up his actions and his people became involved in smug-
gling weapons to Jewish terrorists with the aim of causing damage to the Libyan
embassy in Brussels.48
A retrospective look at the evolution of the Israeli response to the Kahane
phenomenon indicates that in his first years in Israel the security forces had a
problem evaluating the charismatic Rabbi’s intentions. The culture of extrem-
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ism and violence which he and his followers brought with them into Israel sub-
stantially differed from anything previously experienced in the country. There-
fore, enforcement authorities preferred to look upon him more as a provocateur
than as a terrorist. In 1973, for instance, he was given a two-month suspended
sentence on routine criminal charges for conspiring to commit offences in the
United States. The conviction was based on evidence from letters he wrote to his
adherents encouraging them to engage in acts of terror.49
Seven years later, the security forces had formed a more concrete assess-
ment of his terrorist potential and, in consequence, began to treat him differ-
ently. The Kach leader became a principal object of surveillance by the security
services,50 and an extensive system of intelligence was employed by them
against Kach. Some of the information compiled by these means ultimately led
to the administrative detention of Kahane in 1980 for a period of four months
consequent to his organisation’s designs to fire a long-range missile at the Dome
of the Rock Mosque on the Temple Mount.51 During the years 1984–88, when
Kahane served as a Member of Parliament, Shabak suspended its surveillance
due to a provision that prohibits the policing of elected public officials. None-
theless, his supporters and party members remained under strict observation
both during his service as MP and also after the disqualification of his party just
prior to the 1988 elections and his subsequent return to extra-parliamentary
activities.52
In the November of 1990, a fatal blow was delivered to the Kach Movement.
The murder of the Rabbi in New York completely devastated his organisation
and led to the dispersal of his followers among two minor movements – Kach
and Kahane Hai. An interesting point is that, despite the peripheral status of
these political movements in terms of the Israeli political discourse of those
years, they still remained a main target of undercover work.
In March 1994, and in the wake of the massacre perpetrated by Dr Baruch
Goldstein at the Tomb of the Patriarchs, the Government decided to enforce the
Ordinance for the Prevention of Terrorism against these two movements. This
governmental resolution strikes one as quite dramatic considering that only two
small splinter groups were the alleged concern. Notwithstanding the occasion-
ally aggressive element in these movements,53 their ranking on the list of violent
extremists at the time was minor, particularly in view of the radicalisation of
the Israeli right, which included either collective or individual blatant acts of
defiance against the rule of law and governmental legitimacy. Still, as if the
enforcement of the Ordinance for the Prevention of Terrorism was not enough
– making it significantly easier to detain and prosecute radical activists – a short
while after the Goldstein bloodbath, the Government issued warrants for the
administrative arrests of nine Kach and Kahane Hai members.54 This gesture
reinforces the feeling that the State of Israel had indeed resolved to take espe-
cially stringent measures in this case. Israel’s approach, in terms of its policy of
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reprisal for extremism and violence, propelled the State many years backwards
to its early years.
The enforcement of the Ordinance for the Prevention of Terrorism specifi-
cally against these movements and the arrest of its members seem quite out of
proportion to the alleged threat that they posed; and the pretext for this decision
appears peculiar. Baruch Goldstein was identified as a ‘lone wolf ’ at the time –
he committed the massacre at the Tomb of the Patriarchs of his own accord,
unassisted by any organisation, a fact that was later substantiated in the find-
ings of the State Commission of Inquiry set up to investigate the events of
the slaughter at the Tomb of the Patriarchs.55 That being so, why did the 
Government take such forceful and disputable action? Cohen-Almagor sub-
mits the following explanation for its actions: exercising the Ordinance for the
Prevention of Terrorism against these organisations was an inevitable develop-
ment simply because the Government of Israel had no other means to deal with
these movements.56 He bases his conclusion on a number of theoretical tests.
One of them is the examination of consequences. This type of analysis adopts
contrasting assumptions. The first assumption, which questions the very need
for the ordinance, argues that its enforcement will not be particularly effective
because the radical movement core will continue to survive and its members
will remain active, perhaps under a different name and exercising more caution.
Another consideration, and no less important, is that the enforcement of the
order would draw the political system close to a slippery slope in terms of its
ethical foundations. The second assumption supports the need for the ordinance
and views its use as a formidable declaration and rejection of the legitimacy of
these organisations and as an attempt to expel them from the licit boundaries
of society.57
A review of these events shows that the State of Israel has indeed reached
the precipice at the end of this slippery slope. On the one hand, the execution of
the Ordinance for the Prevention of Terrorism has perilously eroded its liberal
foundations and, on the other, the movements that were affected by the ordi-
nance remain active and almost unperturbed by its implementation. At the
November 2000 rally in tribute to Rabbi Kahane ten years after his assassina-
tion, the helplessness of the authorities of the law was apparent in respect 
of the enforcement of the ordinance. Throughout the memorial ceremony,
activists cited excerpts from Rabbi Kahane’s publicly outlawed manifesto and
wore shirts embossed with the rabbi’s visage and party insignia. Two months
later, following the murder of the rabbi’s son and leader of Kahane Hai Binyamin
Kahane (who was a random target of Palestinian terrorists), these movements
proved once again their resilience to the State’s measures, and also gave indica-
tion of their expanding membership. In significant numbers, activists from the
two banned movements showed up for the younger Kahane’s funeral proces-
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sion, which quickly transformed into a display of force. Followers of the two
movements committed acts of brutal violence against Arabs encountered
during the course of the funeral procession, waved their flags and called for
revenge.58 Itamar Ben-Gvir, one of the more prominent activists of Kach,
summed up things by saying that ‘trying to make the Movement illegal is simply
a joke’.59
In effect, the slide down the slippery slope and the State’s estrangement from
the fundamental conception of the ‘rule of law’ have been more painful than
Cohen-Almagor anticipated. He argued that the enforcement of the ordinance
was supposed to have prevented the use of administrative procedures which, in
his view, were in any case illegitimate means in the struggle against terrorism.
The fact remains that activists from dismantled movements continue to be under
the constant surveillance of the security services and the exercise of adminis-
trative procedures has not become any the less popular. Since the use of admin-
istrative detention, for Kahane’s devotees, was renewed in the wake of Tomb of
the Patriarchs’ slaughter, warrants for the restriction of movement and arrest
of activists in Judea and Samaria have been issued on a regular basis,60 and these
are additional to the measures assigned to the State by the Ordinance for the
Prevention of Terrorism.61 That said, it should be noted that the judiciary,
having a more liberal approach, tends to prefer the freedom of members of Kach
and therefore, the number of actual convictions remains disproportionately low
in comparison to the number of prosecution referrals. Furthermore, judges have
consistently admonished prosecuting attorneys for their over-zealousness in
bringing charges against members of these movements and for the numerous
charge-sheets they continue to serve against violators of the Ordinance for the
Prevention of Terrorism.62 This posture assumed by the courts presents the judi-
cial authority as a critical mainstay in the struggle to uphold the principles of
‘the rule of law’ vis-à-vis an executive authority which prefers to sacrifice those
values on the altar of ‘security protection’.
Attempts to explain what persuaded Israel to respond with such severity to
these organisations at a time when it seemed that the use of the ‘criminal justice
model’, in its narrowest terms, would have sufficed, lead to the conclusion that
first and foremost, the very feasibility of this Ordinance stemmed from these
movements’ marginality. By exercising the ordinance in relation to these two
radical groups, the State was able to send out a forceful message against those
elements of terrorism indicated above by Cohen-Almagor. The timing of this
decision was also significant. The whole affair took place in the first few months
after the signing of the Oslo Agreements, at a time when a number of powerful
right-wing elements were coordinating huge demonstrations – some of them
violent – against the Government. Kach and Kahane Hai were ideal targets, allow-
ing the State to deliver an ostentatious message to all sides involved. Their 
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considerable political marginality made their denunciation possible without
risking severe public dissent or the mobilisation of a parliamentary lobby for
their cause.
Another explanation for the ironhanded and isolated governmental
response to these two movements in particular can be found in the security
system’s outdated and entrenched perspective. Over the years, state leaders and
security services have regarded Kach and Kahane Hai as the most extreme and
violence-prone factions on the fringes of the far right. In retrospect, particularly
following the assassination of Rabin, this policy has turned out to be mis-
guided.63 In any case, these movements proved to be easy targets for the enforce-
ment of a policy of brash response, a posture readily adopted by intelligence
factors that preferred to adhere to their outmoded perspective instead of extend-
ing their view in the direction of the more genuine threats taking root at that
time.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision to convict Binyamin Kahane
of seditious offences one month prior to his murder is, paradoxically, indicative
of how Israel elected to moderate its stance toward the Kach Movement. This
conclusion is due to the fact that Kahane, who was tried for the distribution of
a pamphlet proclamation in 1992 in which he called for the bombing of the
Arab city of Um el-Fahm, was convicted in accordance with clause 134(4) in
the Penal Code appertaining to the offence of sedition. Theodore Or was the
Supreme Court Justice responsible for prosecuting Kahane, and on that same
day he also acquitted journalist Mohammed Jabarin, who had been accused of
publicly supporting the intifada (the Palestinian uprising) in Judea and Samaria.
His explanation for these rulings was that while Jabarin was sentenced accord-
ing to paragraph 4(a) of the Ordinance for the Prevention of Terrorism, which
prohibits public praise for grave acts of violence, Kahane’s trial was standard
criminal procedure. Moreover, Or determined that while paragraph 4(a) of the
ordinance ‘is a draconian clause which is hard to accept in an enlightened
society where freedom of expression is highly esteemed’, the offence of sedition
as defined in the Penal Code was intended to promote the heterogeneous ex-
istence of an Israeli society comprised of a diverse populace. In addition, the
legal formulation of the sedition offence was very restrained; that is, in order to
convict a person of acts of sedition, it must be proven that there is a ‘con-
siderable’ degree of sedition and that there is a high probability of the com-
mission of violent acts subsequent to the defendant’s proclamation.64
At this stage, in order to avoid unduly simplified conclusions, we are com-
pelled to redouble the effort to be cautions. Indeed, the assumption at the base
of the notion of the democracy’s ‘immunising’ policy posits that responses
limited to legal frameworks are more acceptable than responses anchored in
administrative regulations or special procedures. Certainly, the lesson taught by
experience with regard to the party political system indicates that, in the major-
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ity of cases, Israeli-drafted laws whose goal was to contend with incidents of
political extremism can be seen as weighed and balanced structures subject to
scrupulous judicial commentary. However, as already noted, the law enabling
conviction for offences of sedition deviates, according to some, from the ac-
cepted standards of the democratic system. The legal advisor Professor Miri Gur-
Aryeh specifically took issue with Justice Or’s approach in his verdict regarding
Kahane and, in effect, represented a line quite similar to the general arguments
raised by Gnaim and Kremnizer. In Gur-Aryeh’s view, there is justification for
convicting a person who has initiated a discourse with the potential to fuel a
violent atmosphere. She argues that conviction should be aimed against violent
acts, whereas public speaking with the potential to create a violent climate must
be dealt on a level other than the criminal.65 In sum, I do not retract the
approach that conviction by dint of law indicates restriction of the democratic
response to the boundaries of the ‘immunised route’. However, at the same time,
it seems a justifiable assumption that judicial frameworks should also be liable
to critique and renewed evaluation from time to time, and that, in any case, the
law should be clear and transparent and include only the minimal limitations
essential for upholding democracy.
The radical left in Israel
Another group significantly marginal to the Israeli political scene, and hence
also considerably vulnerable to policies along the lines of the ‘extended crimi-
nal justice model’, is the radical left. Despite Sprinzak’s argument that, in com-
parison to left-wing European organisations, the radical left in Israel has proved
to be a relatively benign element because it rarely engages in violent action,66
Israeli policy-makers tend to view organisations such as Hanitzotz (‘The Spark’)
and The Revolutionary Communist League and, later, Derech Hanitzotz (‘The
Path of the Spark’) as terrorist factions. The reasoning was that these move-
ments did not recognize the State of Israel’s right of existence and, moreover,
were financially endorsed in part by George Habash’s Popular Front, Ahmad
Jibril’s Democratic Front and Naef Hawatmeh’s Maoist-orientated organisation.
Therefore, these movements were branded as Shabak intelligence targets and
their members were closely watched. Furthermore, apprehended members of
these bodies were tried and convicted under the Ordinance for the Prevention of
Terrorism, and not according to standard criminal procedure. Of significant
interest, and confirming the thesis that marginal groups are more susceptible to
strong state counteraction, is the fact that Carmi Gillon, one of the intelligence
leaders in the struggle against them, addressed them as ‘a completely marginal
phenomenon, having no effect whatsoever on society and a phenomenon which
never threatened the fragile consensus in this country’.67
If that was truly the case, why were organisations identified as only mini-
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mally subversive subject to the same policy as those that persistently engaged in
political violence? The following example shows both how this factor of mar-
ginality comes into play here and also how the ‘politicisation’ of the fight against
terrorism reflects the Israeli State’s general orientation toward the radical left.
According to Barzilai, a prominent example highlighting the political use of the
Ordinance for the Prevention of Terrorism is found in the amendment made to
the ordinance in 1986 (paragraph 4h). The purpose of this modification (cham-
pioned by the Likud Party) was the prevention of meetings between Israeli left-
wing activists and Palestinian representatives. Ultimately, the Supreme Court
had to decide the matter and, choosing to avoid political confrontation, it
imposed prison sentences on the leftist activists who took part in such meetings.
The almost laughable incongruity of this matter became acutely evident when,
during meetings between Rabin Administration and PLO representatives in Oslo
in the summer of 1993, official delegates of the Israeli Government found them-
selves in violation of the regulations of the Prevention of Terror Ordinance.68
This incident lends further credence to the assumption that groups suffering
from weak political backing are more likely than those with stronger backing to
be labelled ‘terrorist’ regardless of the degree of threat they pose to the country.
By the same token, it is apparent that counter-terrorist policy and the enforce-
ment of counter-terror measures are substantially influenced by political inter-
ests and, in this particular instance, the political sway of one party over another
in the attempt to preserve a coalition balance of forces.
The Jewish Underground
Further confirmation of the above assumptions from a reverse ideological angle
is exemplified in the case of the Jewish Underground, which sprang from the
settler movement in Judea, Samaria and Gaza – Gush Emunim. Devoted to the
ideology of the ‘Greater Land of Israel’ and inspired by the theology of Rabbi
Kook,69 its principal mode of action – implemented immediately upon its 
formation – was the construction of illegal settlements in Judea and Samaria,
occasionally leading to confrontation with the law authorities, as in the case of
the Sebastia settlement in July 1974.70 Despite that flagrant civil disobedience,
the attorney general, with the endorsement of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin,
chose to avoid bringing the settlers to (criminal) trial.
Gillon’s thesis implies that the decision to refrain from the prosecution of
these settlers was not free of political interests: legal considerations were sub-
ordinated to the prime minister’s aim to avert needless political confrontation,
especially in view of the strong political lobby backing the settlers.71 Gillon adds
that the decision not to enforce the law against these offenders in effect opened
a path toward the radicalisation of several members, eventually leading to the
‘Jewish Underground’, the most sophisticated Jewish terrorist organisation in
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Israeli history. Among other actions, its members were responsible for severely
disabling the mayors of Ramallah and Nablus in the summer of 1980 by sabo-
taging their cars72 and also for the attack on the Islamic College in Hebron about
three years later.
In consequence of these acts of aggression, Prime Minister Menahem Begin
ordered the security services to take forceful action against the perpetrators. The
Shabak was assigned the mission, but, in this instance, the organisation elected
to adhere to a more moderate modus operandi defined by limited goals. The GSS
proceeded to gather all evidence possible in the attempt to bring the culprits to
trial. Then, following intensive investigation and the collection of sufficient
incriminating evidence, the police and Shabak carried out the bulk of the arrests
and began to interrogate suspects, who complied to the full. An interesting 
fact is that both Gillon, who led the investigation, and Haggai Segal, one of
the detainees, reported that the interrogation of suspects was conducted in a
civilised manner and without the use of Shabak’s standard methods.73
It can therefore be surmised that despite the involvement of the GSS in the
investigation of the Underground, it would be difficult to classify this as a case
typical of the ‘extended criminal justice model’, because the Shabak’s role in this
case was in effect restricted to standard police procedures. The process of con-
victing the organisation’s members also backs up the assumption that, in this
instance, the State preferred to remain faithful to a more light-handed, so to
speak, policy of counteraction. Unlike its the treatment of the underground
movements of the 1950s, Israel elected this time not to use the legal methods of
the ‘extended criminal justice model’; in other words, it did not declare the move-
ment to be terrorist, nor did it establish a special court or exercise other admin-
istrative measures against members and supporters of the Jewish Underground.
All members of the movement stood criminal trial and were brought before a
criminal court of law.
A short while after they were convicted (the gravest offence was murder), a
great deal of political pressure was applied to grant them pardon. This pressure
was so effective that in a matter of years not one member of the Underground
remained behind bars. This is clearly illustrative of the reason for Israel’s 
adherance to the ‘criminal justice model’. The State’s relatively liberal response
to the most sophisticated and brutal Jewish terrorist organisation the country
has known was a result of exactly the same circumstances which led it to react
to marginal and minimally threatening movements with much more severity
and ironfisted measures.
The ruling elite and the designers of Israeli defence policy opted not to
respond to the Jewish Underground on account of the threat it posed or the
severity of its actions, but rather on the basis of the political and public clout to
which it had access. The Underground benefited from broad public support,
principally among religious Zionists and right-wing parties, e.g. the Mafdal and
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the Tehiyah, and even the former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir unreservedly
supported the pardoning of organisation members.74
An additional factor helping to solve this analytic puzzle is the security
forces’ and the State’s adherence to certain conceptions, in this case cultural con-
ceptions. Members of the religious Zionist camp, who also formed the wellspring
of the Underground, had struck a positive chord and earned a dependable 
reputation in Israeli political discourse. Many ordinary Israeli citizens, as well
as politicians, found them to be a rejuvenated image of the authentic Zionist
pioneer.75 Unlike members of Kach, who had mostly emigrated from the United
States and the USSR, and were therefore strangers to Israeli culture, followers
of the Jewish Underground represented the very heart and core of the
Zionist–Israeli experience.76 These devotees even ‘captured the hearts’ of their
interrogators. According to Gillon,
The atmosphere in the interrogation of the Jewish Underground suspects was quite
exceptional. Most of the people arrested were considered all-round ‘excellent boys’,
they were officers in the IDF and many of them had served in units which had
worked closely with the Shabak. Now, unexpectedly, there was a situation of inter-
rogator and suspect and they were sitting on the side of those being interrogated, in
the role of the accused. 77
Hence, despite the gravity of the acts committed, the personal background of
the terrorists, as well as their political backing, were factors responsible for
almost completely upending the type of counter-terror tactics enforced against
them.
Uzi Meshulam’s group
Use of the ‘criminal justice model’ in Israel in its purest form can be detected in
the State’s response to the ‘Yehud Affair’. This incident began in the winter of
1994 when a religious sect, led by the charismatic Rabbi Uzi Meshulam, began
to barricade themselves in the rabbi’s house. The declared goal of this sect was
to urge the Government to launch an investigation into the 1950s’ disappear-
ance of Jewish Yemenite children, a social wound that had yet to heal.78 In 
order to cast off all doubt with regard to the group’s unquestionable militancy 
and potential for terror, the words of the incumbent Police Inspector-General
Assaf Hafetz at a governmental session speak for themselves. Hafetz described
the Meshulam coterie as an ‘unprecedented and extreme nationalist terrorist
group’. He added that actions committed by the group cannot be anticipated
and may lead to disastrous consequences,79 and this evaluation later proved to
be not far from the truth. Meshulam’s group confirmed its dangerous potential
even in the first days of their fortification, when adherents threatened to use live
weapons if and when security forces took action against them.
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But, as noted above, the Israeli response was to handle them with much
restraint and to remain within the narrowest limits of the ‘criminal justice
model’. The takeover of the group and arrest of its members were conducted by
the Israeli police forces who opened fire at the barricaded building only after the
first volleys had been discharged by the building’s occupants. After their arrest,
Meshulam and his followers stood trial under standard criminal procedure.
During the course of the trial, there were reports that Meshulam devotees were
dispersed at locations around the country and were intent upon attacking law
officials and engaging in vengeful acts of violence in wake of the verdict.80 These
reports, too, did not lead policy-makers to implement the Ordinance for the 
Prevention of Terrorism against this group, nor to take administrative measures
against its members. However, the police exhausted every inch of its authority
within the standard criminal procedure in order to investigate group members
and use the rigour of law against them.81
An effort to grasp why the State chose this course of reaction and con-
tinued to adhere almost totally to the ‘criminal justice model’ leads the reader
once again to the contentions raised above. As for the marginality-based ex-
planation, Uzi Meshulam and his believers did not benefit from a broad base 
of support similar to that enjoyed by members of the Jewish Underground.
Nonetheless, they were successful in prescribing the public agenda by bran-
dishing an issue that touched a raw nerve in the collective memory of Israeli
society. Subsequent to the group’s entrenchment in the Meshulam residence, a
political front emerged consisting of public figures and Members of Parliament
who demanded a State-run commission of inquiry into the Yemenite children
affair. Scrutiny of the political reasons behind this policy reveals that the State
of Israel was indeed interested in dropping the matter of the abducted Yemenite
children from the political agenda for fear of ethnic riots. If these occurred, any
aggressive action taken by the State against Meshulam and his people might
serve to keep the issue in the political spotlight and subsequently lend credence
to their claim that the State was trying to keep them quiet.
As for the adherence to outdated conceptions – our main argument for the
authorities’ handling of this case, Uzi Meshulam’s group operated out of socio-
ethnic motivations, traditionally not considered by security forces to be associ-
ated with political violence. Policy-makers’ adherence to the notion that Jewish
terrorism is solely a result of the ideological cleavage between right and left pre-
vented them from regarding the fortification of an armed sect with a charismatic
religious leader as a terrorist threat. Therefore, in this instance, the special 
security services and more rigorous counter-terror measures were forsaken, and
instead the ‘criminal justice model’ was implemented in full.
In view of the outcomes of the above events, it appears that the ‘criminal
justice model’ has proved itself to be the most efficacious in comparison to other
models employed by the State of Israel. In the July of 1999, Uzi Meshulam was
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released from prison after serving nearly five-and-a-half years of his sentence,
on condition that he would be responsible for severely restricting the number of
people allowed in his house and limiting his connections with the media.82 At
the time of writing, two years after Meshulam’s release from prison, the leader
remains in retirement from political action and his group is dispersed.
The assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
The traumatic incident that brought down the fragile ‘house of cards’ of the
Israeli response to political extremism and violence and returned the State to
more extended counter-terrorist operations was the assassination of Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin. On 4 November 1995, at the conclusion of a mass peace
rally organised by the Israeli left-wing, the prime minister was shot by a Jewish
religious assassin, Yigal Amir, a student of law at the Bar-Ilan University, who
regarded the Oslo Agreements as a disaster for the people of Israel and con-
sidered Yitzhak Rabin to be a traitor to his country.
The murder of the prime minister was the culmination of an Israeli extrem-
ist right-wing crusade spearheaded by nationalist and ultra-orthodox religious
factions, which began shortly after the signing of the Oslo Agreements between
Israel and the PLO in September 1993. The mounting extremism was marked
by severe infractions of the law and clearly illustrates the factors influencing the
change in Israeli policies of counter-violence.
In general, the Israeli response to extremism associated with the Oslo 
Agreements can be divided into two main time-frames. The first, prior to 
the prime minister’s assassination, was distinguished by a fairly indifferent
approach on the part of the law’s authorities to extremists, especially with
regard to incitement offences and serious provocations against the legitimacy of
the ruling Government. The second, post-assassination, frame, was marked by
the persecution of agitators and the use of a variety of measures at govern-
ment’s disposal against those who had incited and rebelled against the Rabin
Government.83 The hasty shift from an initially fairly indifferent standard to a
position bordering on panic demonstrates the lack of a clear and consistent
policy to counter extremist and violent elements. Furthermore, the running of
the country in the first few months after the prime minister’s violent death 
was a prominent indication of the considerable problems involved when a state,
on one hand, lacks a fixed policy of enforcement and, on the other, has recourse
to a wide array of legal and semi-legal measures in its response to extremist 
phenomena.
The events of the first days following Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination were
instructive of the depth of the shock to the security system and institutions of
law and enforcement. Three days after the assassination, the headline ‘Steps 
to Be Taken Against Extremists’ was spread across the front page of the widely
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circulated Israeli daily Yediot Aharonot. The item reported the convening of an
emergency council of the Ministry of Justice in reaction to the demand for a
more severe penalty against inciters and the need to launch a criminal investi-
gation against individuals who had extolled Rabin’s murder.84 In fact, a short
while after the murder, the Integrated Law Enforcement Task Force against
Incitement and Sedition Offenders was instituted. The composition of the force,
which included appointees from the army, police, the Shabak and the state attor-
ney, was already enough to indicate the State’s regression from the ‘criminal
justice model’.
The most interesting conclusion drawn from an overview of the procedures
undertaken by enforcement agencies following the assassination is that while
standard criminal proceedings as prescribed by the ‘criminal justice model’ were
applied to the murderer and his accomplices, the State’s position regarding the
system that formed the conceptual foundations of the murder was fundamentally
different.
The extensive assortment of measures exerted upon far right-wing activists,
who the State found responsible for providing the religious–idealist license for
the murder, found its expression a few weeks after the tragic event. Rabbi Yitzhak
Ginsburg, head of the Zealot-oriented yeshiva Ohd Yosef Hai (‘Joseph Still Lives
On’), was arrested at the start of 1996 by order of the prime minister and the
minister of defence and was put under administrative custody for a period of
nineteen days.85 The rabbi was arrested on account of a pamphlet that he had
distributed in September 1994 in praise of the murderer Baruch Goldstein.
Shmuel Sitrin and Aryeh Freidman, extreme right-wing activists who expressed
support for the murder of the prime minister, were also placed under adminis-
trative detention by dint of a warrant signed by the brigadier-general of the
Central Command.86
In contrast, when David Belhasan, a resident of Kiryat Arba (a Jewish 
settlement near the city of Hebron), in an interview with the CNN television
network, committed a similar offence by expressing joy at the death of the prime
minister on the day of his funeral, he was convicted under the Ordinance for the
Prevention of Terrorism of declaring words of praise, sympathy and encour-
agement for a violent act. Belhasan received a suspended prison sentence of
three years.87 The State’s approach with respect to the case of Belhasan – even
according to Talia Sasson, director of the state attorney’s Department of Special
Duties – was marked by ‘overstated justice’ due to the stormy climate, fomented
by the prime minister’s assassination, among members of the prosecution.88
Indeed, four years after his conviction, Belhasan was acquitted by the Supreme
Court. His acquittal was predicated on precedents decreed by Justice Or in his
verdict in respect of the journalist Jabarin, according to which the Ordinance
for the Prevention of Terrorism may not be applied in the conviction of offences
of incitement.89
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Generally speaking, it seems that in the period following the assassination
of the prime minister, enforcement of the Ordinance for the Prevention of
Terrorism – also against individuals having no connection with the organisa-
tion to which the Ordinance was applied – became the preferred counteractive
stratagem of the State. In November 1997, the extreme right-wing activist
Michael Ben-Horin, who prepared the book Baruch Hagever (‘Baruch the Man’,
and Goldstein’s first name) for publication, was sentenced to eight months in
prison. This book is entirely devoted to words of praise regarding the actions of
the murderer Baruch Goldstein. As a result, Ben-Horin was accused of incite-
ment to racism under paragraph 114b of the Penal Code, but, at the same time
was convicted for supporting a terrorist organisation under the ordinance.90
Avigdor Eskin, an ex-Kach activist who cast the kabalistic death-wish, the
pulsa denura (Aramaic, meaning, approximately, ‘[to smite with] fiery lashes’),
upon Yitzhak Rabin and who, after the latter’s death, told television photogra-
phers that the curse had been completely fulfilled and that he was planning next
to curse the incumbent Prime Minister Shimon Peres, was also convicted under
paragraph 4 of the ordinance, and was sentenced to four months in prison and
one year suspended.91 In October, 2000, he was once again convicted, in com-
pliance with the Ordinance for the Prevention of Terrorism, for commending an
act of violence. Found in Eskin’s possession were stickers with the following
words printed on them: ‘He will redeem us’ (‘will redeem’ in Hebrew is yigal, also
the first name of Rabin’s assassin; the meaning of the sticker, therefore, was that
the assassin ‘Yigal will save the People of Israel’).92 In view of the Jabarin prece-
dent and the Belhasan acquittal, the prosecution also withdrew charges levelled
against Eskin and acquitted him in both cases.93
The Ordinance for the Prevention of Terrorism was not the only means
employed in this case. Enforcement authorities also tended to utilise the crimi-
nal law whenever an opportunity arose. In the months preceding the prime 
minister’s assassination, Moshe Feiglin, leader of the Zu Artzenu (‘This Is Our
Country’) movement, preached as well as practised civil disobedience, primarily
by blocking central intersections and carrying out illegal attempts at establish-
ing settlements. For these acts, he was convicted of sedition and for publishing
seditious material,94 and was confined to a half-year in prison and received a
one-year suspended sentence.95 Rabbi Ido Elba, on the other hand, who distrib-
uted among his students in April 1994 an article whose theme was ‘Inquiry into
the (Halakhic) Principles of Killing Gentiles’,96 was sentenced to two years in jail
and received a two-year suspended sentence on the grounds of committing an
incitement to racism offence as stipulated in the Penal Code.97 Two extreme
right-wing activists, who brandished signs showing Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin in SS uniform during an anti-government demonstration in October
1995, were also brought to trial after the murder. In this case, as well, the trial
remained within the confines of the criminal law, and they were convicted of
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libel;98 however, at the same time, other right-wing activists who were indicted
in the same charge-sheet were accused and convicted of the offence of sup-
porting a terrorist movement.99
A number of important conclusions can therefore be drawn. First, every
one of the activists affected by state counteractive and penalising measures after
the murder of Yitzhak Rabin came from the right-wing fringes and were not 
affiliated to any of the central political bodies of this camp. In effect, there is 
clear evidence of a pecking-order in terms of the measures enforced against the
various activists of the camp: as activists are closer to the political centre, the
State’s means of reprisal becomes more moderate. This complies with the mar-
ginality thesis as well as the notion of the politicisation of the governmental
response. It is especially interesting in view of the intensive involvement of the
mainstream Israeli right in acts of incitement against the prime minister,100 yet
not one single politician from this camp was interrogated in this matter. Further
corroboration for the marginality explanation can be found in comments made
by Professor Eyal Benvenisti of the Hebrew University, who strongly condemned
the State’s heavy-handed policy against offences of incitement, which remained
in force even several years after the prime minister’s assassination. In his words,
‘the erosion of the commitment to freedom of expression is responsible for the
danger of selective enforcement and the possibility that the bulk of indictments
will be served against the weak and eccentric or people whose opinions and
expressions may happen to rub the prosecution the wrong way’.101
A second inference pertains to the fact that while the State had a wide
variety of statutory measures at its disposal for the purpose of accusing and
arraigning extremists, in many cases, authorities still preferred to utilise pre-
cisely those measures that significantly diverged from the accepted legislative
framework of the criminal process. This fact is of special importance because,
according to Sasson, it is an indication of how the protection of basic demo-
cratic liberties – and, foremost, the freedom of expression – is very important to
state enforcement agencies and, as a result, a greatly abbreviated policy was
decided upon concerning all aspects of indictments pertaining to issues that
might constrain such liberties. However, the test of consequences and Sasson’s
testimony itself demonstrate that members of the general prosecution do not
make an adequately clear distinction between the more democratic tools such
as the Penal Code and the less democratic measures such as the Ordinance for
the Prevention of Terrorism and, therefore, often seek to convict a person or
group of people under the two frameworks at the same time. Furthermore, deci-
sions made by the general prosecution were not always a direct outcome of the
impartial deliberation between the State’s commitment to respond to extremism
and the safeguarding of democratic principles. As argued above, extra-legal 
considerations, such as the prosecution’s emotional state following the prime
minister’s assassination, had a significant effect on policy formation.
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The considerable sensitivity which developed among state prosecutors in
relation to incitement offences in the wake of the prime minister’s assassination
sparked sharp debate among Israel’s most prominent scholars as to the bound-
aries of the freedom of expression in the country. Locking horns with those 
who advocated the enforcement of laws restricting the freedom of expression,102
many senior Israeli jurists argued against the prosecution and the attorney
general. They felt that the extensive regulation of expressions of opinion on the
part of citizens and public appointees, whether on the basis of administrative
rulings or various legal clauses, suppresses, to a great extent, the freedom guar-
anteed by the democratic system. These jurists demanded that the State differ-
entiate between the legal and the legitimate: they called for a distinction to be
drawn between actions deserving to be tried in a court of law and those war-
ranting a ‘social trial’. Ironically, legal scholars who had previously argued that
extremist declarations should be treated using legal and judicial means, argued
in this case that extra-judicial means – and, above all, the education system and
civil society – are to be preferred.103 This orientation conforms with our a major
contention of this book – to be discussed later – regarding the importance of the
education system to democratic principles and to the vibrant functioning of the
‘pro-democratic civil society’ in the process of the transition from a ‘defending
democracy’ to the ‘immunised’ trajectory of response.
In summation, the comparative perspective applied to the five cases presented
above indicates that despite the appearance of a gradual tendency towards a
more restrained policy of response, it seems that variables associated with politi-
cal or security system considerations and conceptions are of notable impact still
on the nature of the response. Hence, it can be posited that, even at the start of
the third millennium, a clear-cut policy of counteraction is yet to materialise 
in Israel and that, in effect, the majority of the decisions reached by systems of
security and enforcement are in response to a specific occurrence.
Conclusions
The emerging reality in Israel since its establishment indicates that in contrast
to the policy regarding extremist political parties, which has undergone a per-
ceptible process of ‘immunisation’, in relation to the policy of response towards
radical and violent movements this process has proven to be more equivocal.
However, one cannot overlook the far-reaching changes in the nature of the
State’s response to these phenomena in the fifty-three years of its existence. In
legal terms, the State of Israel has endeavoured to steer retribution as much as
possible in the direction of democratically acceptable frameworks, and therefore
it has made an effort to replace emergency-empowered authorities with legal
capacities listed in a parliamentary consensus. One of the more prominent 
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manifestations of this was demonstrated during the Fifteenth Knesset’s term in
office with the launching of a commission whose role was to evaluate the plau-
sibility of revoking the prolonged state of emergency.104 However, it seems that
for as long as the State’s executive order feels that the State is exposed to grave
security threats, both outside and inside its borders, the chances are remote that
the emergency state will be retracted or that the Shabak’s role will be delimited
in a type of legislation befitting a democratic system of government.
The more substantial modifications that took place in Israel’s policy of
counteraction reside in its operational aspects. In general, the State of Israel in
its earliest years already discarded the use of the ‘war model’, that is, the
approach which holds the army responsible for dealing with Jewish extremism.
As time passed, and with the adoption of the ‘extended criminal justice model’,
a more moderate trend became institutionalised, according to which it seemed
appropriate to entrust the treatment of these phenomena to the Shabak and
make use of administrative measures. However, in due course, and principally
with regard to the case of the Jewish Underground, the State sought to refrain
from overdoing the severity of its response and tried to limit it as much as pos-
sible to the narrower boundaries of the ‘rule of law’, i.e. to the ‘criminal justice
model’. This tendency reached a peak in the handling of the Meshulam ‘affair’
which was limited entirely to the bona fide realms of the rule of law.
What, therefore, is the likelihood that, with the start of the third millen-
nium, the State of Israel will complete its ‘immunising’ process in the many
respects of its response to Jewish extremism? Prima facie, the State’s general ten-
dency towards moderation, either in its attitude to extremist parties or in its
approach to radical movements, can be seen as a deterministic process that will
ultimately lead the Israeli policy of response to reside within genuine frames of
the ‘rule of law’. Still, a number of major obstacles in the path of this process
must be accounted for.
First, it is again worth noting the relative weakness of the liberal tradition
in Israeli political culture.105 In the absence of an underlying liberal culture, 
the conditions necessary for the adoption of modes of counteraction which
respect the rights and liberties of the individual cannot prosper. Furthermore,
the lack of a constitution which defines the State’s principal tenets and ethical
boundaries does not make it any the easier to determine which counteractive
measures are legitimate and which are not. Inquiry into the Israeli public’s 
attitudes to these questions reinforces the argument supporting the relatively
modest status of liberal democratic values in the moral perspective of the 
Jewish society in Israel and reveals that the cultural underpinnings essential for
significant change and the adoption of a liberal policy of counteraction are still
shaky.
Although table 2.1 indeed indicates that the Jewish public in Israel tends to
generally uphold the democratic framework of this country, however, a more
RJE2  8/15/02  11:17 AM  Page 97
Jewish extremism and violence
98
meticulous review of the results shows that in contrast to that disposition, a
great part of the population (more than 25 per cent) rejects even the most basic
democratic principles. Specifically, 41 per cent objects to the notion of equal
social and political rights for all the country’s citizens while, over the course of
time, the percentage supporting the equalizing of rights is also gradually declin-
ing; 31 per cent objects to public criticism of the government in times of emer-
gency; 62 per cent believes in imposing severe restrictions on democracy also in
cases where there is a modest threat to state security; and, finally, 29 per cent
prefers to live under a non-democratic government with opinions similar to
theirs than to be ruled by a government that was democratically elected but does
not represent their opinions.
This multi-faceted system of values has proven to be comfortable ground for
the continued existence of Israel as a democracy, but it still underscores the more
formal elements at the expense of substantial elements of the democratic polity.
The ongoing Israeli–Arab conflict and the Israeli Jewish sense of apprehension
regarding the State’s Arab citizens constitute an additional key factor which may
Table 2.1 Commitment to democratic values and attitudes ( findings appear as percentages
and include the answers ‘agree’ and ‘absolutely agree’)
1994 1995 2001
survey survey survey
The State of Israel must uphold complete
equal social and political rights for all its
citizens regardless of religion, race or
gender 77 69 59
In emergency situations as well, the
government can be publicly and openly
criticised 65 – 69
The lightest threat to state security is enough
to justify serious restrictions of democratic
rights 26 41 38
I prefer a democratic government whose
opinions and actions are opposed to 
mine to a non-democratic government
with whose opinions I agree 70 62 71
Source: 1994–95 surveys, Peres and Yaar-Yuchtmann 1998, pp. 237–9; the 2001 survey was
conducted for the purpose of this study.
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have a part in thwarting genuine reform in the Israeli response to extremism.
Israeli society, which has been defined by sociologists as a ‘society under siege’,
has developed, due to the protracted sense of looming peril, a considerable
reliance on its security system and an attitude that comes close to being a veri-
table glorification of the Shabak and other elite units. A study conducted towards
the end of 2000, despite the fact that it followed a lengthy period where the secu-
rity establishment in general and Shabak in particular underwent noticeable
erosion in their public image, fully confirmed the above assumption: 92 per cent
of respondents expressed a strong belief in the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), 90
per cent in Mossad and 85 per cent in Shabak.106 An opinion poll administered
nine years earlier dealing with the attitudes of the Israeli public regarding the
judicial system in general and the security context in particular, revealed that 46
per cent of Israeli citizens in this sample were absolutely opposed to judicial crit-
icism served by the Supreme Court of Justice against the defence system’s
rulings.107 In a survey conducted for the purposes of the present research early
in 2001, the ‘index’ now stood at 55 per cent of the population objecting to this
type of censure. In this case, the Israeli security establishment continues to enjoy
the almost complete and unreserved trust of the Israeli public, a fact which pro-
vides it with a very generous mandate for its operations.
One point that is of special concern, and which is a direct outcome of the
non-liberal character of the Israeli democracy, pertains to the fact that the
general propensity of the State’s Jewish residents is for security considerations
over democratic ones with regard to internal security. However, a significant gap
can be found between their attitude towards Israeli Arabs (militant) and their
attitude towards Israeli Jewish residents (liberal). A substantial rejection of the
‘war model’ and, indeed, the ‘extended criminal justice model’ as the preferred
responses to extreme right-wing-instigated violence is apparent among the
Jewish population sector (only 28 per cent supported the use of military means
against violent radical right-wing activists while 42 per cent supported the tran-
sition of responsibility for the treatment of these activists from Shabak to the
police). It is noteworthy that the attitude towards the response considered appro-
priate for extremists among the State’s Arab residents is inverse: 62 per cent
endorsed the employment of military means in regard to radical and violent
actions among Israeli Arabs and 64 per cent supported the notion that the
responsibility for dealing with the Arab population continue to be assigned to
Shabak and not the Israeli police force. A summary of the results presented above
indicates that the Israeli Jewish public may in fact aspire to live in a democratic
state, but in each case where there is a conflict between democratic values and
security concerns, it exhibits a consistent preference for security interests. In
addition, the figures indicating the public’s willingness to apply a more moder-
ate model of response against extremists in the Jewish right-wing bloc still does
not indicate a liberal approach; rather, the opposite is true. That the findings are
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inverted with regard to Arab Israeli militants and that the majority of the public
tends to support the employment of the ‘war model’ against this sector rein-
forces the assumption that the desire to respond more lightly to right-wing
extremists comes from an identification with them and not from an adherence
to liberal democratic values.
In conclusion, justice and enforcement systems in Israel would seem to be
willing to continue the process, and to adopt the ‘criminal justice model’. Its
main principles consist of the liberalisation of the response to extremism and
violence and a greater adherence to the fundamentals of the ‘rule of law’ in a
democracy. There are, however, still major obstacles to the adoption of this
‘model’ as the Israeli doctrine of response.
The existence of such factors as the defence system’s outdated conceptions,
the intrusion of political interests and external events in decision-making on the
policy of response and, furthermore, the absence from the immediate context 
of a distinct constitutional structure and especially its lack of a liberal demo-
cratic political culture, make it difficult for the ultimate transition of the Israeli
response to Jewish extremism and violence to substantially democratic frame-
works. In the ensuing chapters, I attempt to provide an answer to the ques-
tion, to what extent is it possible to identify the potential for change in Israeli
society, in particular concerning its attitude to liberal democratic values, a
change which must also supply the social basis for the democracy’s immunis-
ing process?
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The Israeli response to extremism: 
the social sphere
In what follows, the focus of the analysis of the ‘defending democracy’shifts away from the legal and judicial domains extensively discussed in theprevious chapter. Here, I examine the extent to which the democracy can
generate ‘antibodies’ which will help stay the expansion of political radicalism
in society and, in this fashion, also reduce the mobilising potential of organisa-
tions and political parties calling for an alternative to democracy. The most
promising means by which to obtain such ‘antibodies’ is the process of political
socialisation. Among all the agents of socialisation to which an individual is
exposed throughout his/her childhood and youth, there is one which remains
entirely faithful to the goals of the state: the state-run educational system. 
Moreover, the official conduit for the inculcation of democratic values among
schoolchildren of all ages is the civic education curriculum. Any system of gov-
ernance, no matter of which type, aspires to educate its citizens in the spirit of
its beliefs. According to Michael Walzer, the aim of political socialisation is to
unite citizens around national symbols and key values of the state. This is a nec-
essary condition for guaranteeing the legitimacy of the governing polity and its
stability.1 This process of socialisation applies to totalitarian forms of govern-
ment that, by means of political indoctrination, succeed in somewhat reducing
the need for the coercive–violent mechanisms at their disposal. Democracies,
too, are interested in inculcating and sustaining, by means of both formal and
informal socialisation, the political conceptions basic to the ruling polity.2
The discourse regarding education in values and democracy is fundamen-
tally a volatile one and has been the subject of much criticism, particularly from
liberal and postmodern theorists who have traditionally disapproved of state
involvement in the individual’s privacy and the political sovereign body’s
attempt to shape its citizens ‘in its image’. Yet as Levinson3 observes, in the
1990s – a decade rife with ethnic conflict – violence and political extremism had
resurfaced globally and, in consequence, liberal theorists began to reveal new
interest in the subject of civic education after years of disregard and neglect.
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Many in this field now consider an education programme dedicated to citizen-
ship to be a highly important factor contributing to the development of the ‘civil
society’ and the preservation of the liberal state’s stability.4
However, conforming to a traditional liberal stance, the writings of most of
these scholars evince a rather narrow approach regarding the essentials of this
democratic education. The core concept conveyed by this area of education,
according to the majority of the liberalist school, should be the inculcation of
the basic ideal of tolerance.5 Others extend the programme to include education
in mutual respect but, generally speaking, not too much more.6 Departing from
this approach, Levinson proposes teaching a more comprehensive profile of civic
qualities while remaining faithful to the narrow boundaries of the liberal tradi-
tion. In her view, pupils in liberal democracies should learn about fundamental
democratic rights, such as the freedoms of speech, assembly and religious
expression, rights attaching to ownership and property, the right to privacy and
the right to engage in political action. However, pupils must also be taught civic
duties in order to be exposed to the formal aspect of governmental processes,
that is, the constitution and constitutional proceedings, which form the value
basis of the liberal state. Furthermore, Levinson suggests, the ways and means
of political exercise should be taught. To achieve this, certain skills must be cul-
tivated that will help pupils become more aware of political issues, including
casting a ballot and even taking action if necessary. Finally, according to this
approach, the school civics’ curriculum should aim to generate in learners the
basics of the critical assessment of political alternatives.7
Research conducted in the last decade has shown that some of the ideas dis-
cussed by Levinson have already been taken up by many liberal democracies and
included in their curricula.8 Several countries, such as the United States9 and,
at a later stage, Denmark and Germany,10 have expanded the role of civic studies
from a reduced procedural perspective, which considers the structures and func-
tions of governmental institutions, while consciously avoiding more controver-
sial issues, to the adoption of liberal and even post-materialistic values into the
school curricula.
However, while liberal democracies continue to debate the acceptable
degree of state intervention in the education process as well as the nature of the
ideas taught and the methods of conveying them, the quandaries with which
the non-liberal democracy must struggle are much more profound. As illus-
trated in the introductory chapter, one of the main features of the non-liberal
democracy is its adherence to the more formal meaning of the democratic idea.
Democratic rules of the game are maintained, including free elections and
multi-party competition but, at the same time, this form of government is dis-
tinct from liberal democracy. Conceptually, this is because non-liberal democ-
racy places the interests of one group of citizens over those of other groups,
encroaches upon the social sphere and restricts civil liberties. The non-liberal
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democracy is therefore laden with numerous incongruities, and these are even
more prominent in its education system.
Nearly all of Levinson’s proposals regarding civic education, as well as 
those of many other liberalist scholars, provide a genuine challenge for the ‘non-
liberal democracy’. Liberal tradition places a strong emphasis on the individual
and his/her liberties and this emphasis conflicts with the collective, and often
ethnic, interest of the ‘non-liberal democracy’. Consequently, the paradox – and
an inherent failing – of the ‘non-liberal democracy’ acquire added meaning
when applied to the provision of citizenship lessons.
Incapable of reconciling the contradiction between the polity’s democratic
and non-liberal principles, the ‘non-liberal democracy’ – and especially one that
must contend with extremist elements – meets head on with paradox. On the
one hand, it will attempt to inculcate democratic values among its pupils, in par-
ticular the essentials it believes will prevent future citizens of the state from
becoming enamoured with radical ideologies and anti-democratic ideas. It will
try to direct them towards action within legal political frameworks and, in that
fashion, reduce the impact of the challenges it will inevitably face and, in con-
sequence, be able to moderate its response to these elements. On the other hand,
in the paramount importance invested in the national ideal and through the
mobilisation of the dominant ethnic collective in the interests of the state there
is the risk that, in the very cultivation of nationalist tendencies among the
majority, ethno-nationalist seeds are planted which eventually may burgeon
and ironically foster these same radical elements.
In the ensuing parts of this chapter, I attempt to examine how the State of
Israel has contended with these paradoxes and, by the same token, try to find
an answer to the paramount questions. Has the state-run education system in
Israel undergone a gradual transition towards an increased emphasis on demo-
cratic values in its school curricula, consequently leading to the reinforcement
of the ‘immunisation’ of the ‘defending democracy?’ Alternatively, has the 
non-liberal element gained the upper hand, thus reducing the prospects for the
complete abandonment of the ‘militant’ attitude in response to extremism?
Civics education in Israel: the predominance of nationalist 
ideas in the first decades
In her comprehensive review of the evolution and formation of citizenship edu-
cation in Israel, Orit Ichilov distinguishes between two major periods: the years
preceding the State’s establishment (pre-1948) and those following it.11 In the
pre-State period, the predominance of nationalist particularistic values and 
an almost complete absence of democratic tendencies were both prominent.
However, this can be attributed to the non-democratic traditions among the
majority of the Jewish population in Israel at the time. Many immigrant Jews
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came from Arabian, North African and Eastern European areas and, in the
main, from countries which lacked democratic distinctions.12 Perhaps an even
more significant part was played by the Zionist ideology, revolutionary processes
and massive construction enterprises in Israel, all of which demanded univer-
sal consolidation around collective myths and national ideals.13
The concrete result of the subordination of civic studies to ethno-national
dictates was evident in ‘the education in Zionist citizenship’, which formed an
integral part of Hebrew pedagogy prior to the State’s establishment. The essen-
tials of ‘education in Zionist citizenship’ well represented ethno-national aims.
They embraced the entire fabric of the Jewish pupil’s life at school and were inte-
grated into all class courses – particularly those subjects where it was easy to
instil ideological strains, such as Moledet (geography of Israel, literally, ‘home-
land’) and Bible classes – but could even be found in mathematical studies. The
subject matter of such citizenship studies underscored the absolute right of the
Jewish people to the land of Israel, while disregarding the interests of local Arab
residents or at the most revealing a patronising attitude towards them and
depicting them as backward natives.14
The insemination of ethno-national principles by means of the education
system did not end with the Proclamation of Independence in 1948. Approxi-
mately four years later, the ethnic component attained formal status in the edu-
cational system. As part of the first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion’s vision of
Mamlakhtiut (statehood), education in Israel was nationalised, a process that led
to the elimination of most of the more distinctive educational orientations insti-
tuted during the pre-State era. In paragraph 2 of the Statehood Education Act
of 1953, the intentions of the nascent State to subject the national education
system to the interests of the nation-in-the-making were transparent. ‘The goal
of Statehood education is to establish a basic education in this State upon the
values of Israeli culture and scientific achievements, on the love of the home-
land and loyalty to the State and Nation of Israel.’15
This policy was put into practice by performing a twofold weeding-out
process, in both the general education programme and, in particular, in civic
courses. First civic studies was reduced to the formal procedural aspect of gov-
ernmental institutions, and then the programme was marginalised in relation
to other courses whose objective was, in part, to emphasise the ethnic spirit of
the Israeli national ideal among Israeli students.
A review of the works of liberal scholars in a wide range of disciplines asso-
ciated with civic studies reveals several subject categories. The leading category
comprises the liberties espoused by democracy. The formal aspect of govern-
mental or political proceedings and institutions comes some way down the list.
The State of Israel, by its very nature a ‘non-liberal democracy’ and therefore
unable to guarantee equal rights for all of its citizens, has consciously elected to
avoid any debate regarding those rights or any other sensitive issue specific to
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the non-liberal polity.16 As a result, Israeli pupils have been presented almost
exclusively with the narrow procedural perspective of this subject.17 The
primary goal was to establish the subject ‘The Polity of the State of Israel’ as the
core field of the school curriculum. The topics constituting this educational
chapter in effect merely displayed the formal ‘appearance’ of Israeli democracy:
the proclamation of independence, legislative and judicial proceedings, elections
procedures, the Knesset (the Israeli Parliament) and the government. Even when
attempts were made to broach more substantial questions, such as the nature
of Israeli citizenship, the (non-existent) constitution and the status of religion
in relation to the State, the designers of the curricula and the matriculation
exams in citizenship courses chose to focus upon the legislative procedural 
perspective instead of devoting an in-depth – not to speak of critical – 
discussion of their sum and substance.18
In a quantitative content analysis of textbooks, including junior high and
high school civics books from the 1970s and 1980s, empirical support for the
preferred status of the formal element in the school curriculum was indicated
by a significant disparity in favour of the procedural component over any other.
Figure 3.1 is based on Ichilov’s analysis, and demonstrates that political struc-
tures and procedures represented 31 per cent of the subject matter of these
books, while the Arab–Israeli conflict took up 21.2 per cent, social problems 20
per cent and economics’ topics only 13.4 per cent. As anticipated, with regard
to the subject of the ‘non-liberal democracy’, Jewish nationalist principles also
permeated civic studies’ curricula and took up about 9.1 per cent of the topics
appearing in the books. Another fact that comes as no surprise is the negligible






























Figure 3.1 A quantitative content analysis of the contents of Israeli civics education books
Source: Ichilov 1993, p. 129, table 6.4.
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of which is likely to offer direct contradiction of the idea of the ‘non-liberal
democracy’, and therefore reached a proportion of merely 0.6 per cent.19
However, as noted earlier, it was not only textbooks that evidenced a focus
on the formal aspect of Israeli politics. Bagrut (Israeli matriculation) exams on
civics also reflected this tendency. A Bagrut exam from the summer of 1988,
sampled for the purposes of the present study, shows that the weighting of the
compulsory subject of ‘The Political System of Governance in Israel’ was 26
points. Pupils were required to answer one of these three questions:
1 The Knesset is the supreme legislative body of the State of Israel. Nevertheless,
it is qualified to empower other authorities to enact subsidiary legislation. Why
does the Knesset confer its legislative authorities to other authorities? What are
the types of subsidiary legislation? Specify two forms of accountability for this
legislation.
2 There are those who favour transferring many authorities from the central to
the local government. Present two arguments in support of this position and
two objections to it. Submit three examples of how the local government is
accountable to the central government in Israel.
3 There is an argument positing that the national unity government in Israel in
1984 reduced the opposition’s effectiveness. Explain what is the difference
between the composition of a national unity government and that of a coali-
tion government in Israel. Describe three parliamentary implements employed
by the opposition in Israel.20
The complete reproduction of these questions is not intended to weary the
reader but rather to present him or her with the picture in full. The formula-
tion of these questions exemplifies how the compulsory element of the Bagrut
exam in citizenship restricted the Israeli adolescent student to formal and, to a
great degree, technical subjects found in the remote margins of Israeli political 
discourse. Even the third question, regarding the opposition’s standing in a
democratic government, has been almost completely drained of substance and
forces the student to focus mainly on the mechanical aspect of the opposition’s
actions.
The precedence given to formal topics and the tendency of civic studies to
avoid in-depth discussion of substantive issues were significantly sustained by
the ongoing Arab–Israeli conflict. The conflict was taught as an optional topic
in civic studies but often from the narrow perspective of the national narrative.
In fact, in the Bagrut exam noted above, alongside a topic such as Tfutzot Yisrael
(Lands of the Diaspora), which primarily underscored Israel’s affinity with Jews
living abroad, there was also an optional chapter on the Arab–Israeli conflict.
The two questions under this heading, which, due to limited space, could not be
presented here in their entirety, well reflected the traditional Israeli orientation
regarding the rightness of the path chosen by the nation’s leaders and the moral
superiority of the Israeli side in the conflict.
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However, the most striking example of the defusing of the highly charged
issue of the relations between Israel and the Arabs was ironically found in the
optional topic ‘The Arabs in the State of Israel’. The three questions encoun-
tered by the Israeli student (see below) are an indication of how the Education
Ministry in Israel could exclude substantial issues from the discussion on the
cleavage between the Jewish majority and the Arab minority and in their place
focus on the lesser aspects of the said cleavage.
1 Since the State’s establishment, there have been far-reaching changes in the
Arab educational system, however, the system must still cope with formidable
problems. Describe three key changes in the Arab educational system and
explain their causes. What are the problems facing the Arab educational system
in the 1980s?
2 Changes in the agricultural department of the Arab sector since the State’s
establishment have had a noticeable effect on Arab society in Israel. Describe
three principal changes in the Arab agricultural department and explain how
the changes you have presented have had an effect on Arab society in Israel.
3 Arab intellectuals in Israel have held a significant role in the progression of
Arab society. What roles do Arab intellectuals fill in Arab society and how do
they contribute to its advancement? Provide examples and explain three spe-
cific obstacles encountered by these intellectuals when filling these roles.21
Despite the fact that these questions reflect the conventional policy of an avoid-
ance of the complexity of ethnic relations in Israel and, in particular, the ques-
tion of the Arabs’ minority status and their rights in a democratic state, it
appears that the efforts of the authors to devise questions of a neutral nature
did not fare well either. An additional perusal of the questions gives the impres-
sion that they were written from a paternalistic and, to a certain degree, eth-
nocentric standpoint. This conclusion is reinforced by Bar-Tal’s research on 
the Israeli educational system’s orientation toward Arabs. Bar-Tal found that
although the delegitimisation of Arabs was indeed rare, textbooks presented
them mostly in terms of negative stereotypes.22
Indeed, the reduction of civic studies to formal rudiments, as well as its
detachment from social and political reality, considerably served the State in its
attempts to instil in its future citizens the Conviction that Israel is, to all intents
and purposes, a democratic state. However, this policy also obscured the con-
tradictions embedded in the political system and at the same time repressed the
critical capacities of those citizens.
Although it would be going too far to claim a causal relationship between
the two, a 1999 study evaluating the attitudes of Israeli citizens regarding the
quality of its democratic governmental system confirms the assumption that
Israelis generally find little fault with the democratic nature of their State.23
Findings show that while subjects born and educated in Israel expressed high
levels of satisfaction with the degree of the State’s democracy, immigrants’ levels
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of satisfaction (particularly those from the West) were much lower. In response
to more specific questions, e.g. regarding the protection of civil rights in Israel,
native-born Israelis expressed very high levels of satisfaction in comparison with
immigrants (75 per cent of the Israelis strongly agreed that individual rights are
respected in Israel, in contrast to 50 per cent of immigrants). These findings
were replicated and found even more prominence over the issue of equal rights
in Israel (61 per cent of Israelis claimed there were full equal rights in Israel in
comparison to 22 per cent of immigrants). The significance of these findings is
that while Israelis born and educated in this country adopted reigning attitudes
regarding the democratic nature of the State, immigrants from Western democ-
racies, wielding a broader perspective of the implementation of the democratic
ideal, expressed a greater degree of scepticism regarding Israel’s conformity to
the liberal democratic model.
Yet, the State of Israel did not settle for the simple diminution of the con-
tents of citizenship lessons, and another tactic was employed in the restriction
and dilution of civic studies. As the next section demonstrates, the course was
accorded a marginal status in comparison to other subjects, in particular those
which reinforced the unity of the national identity.
The status of civic studies
Together with formal civics education, the Israeli education system made an
effort to widely inculcate Zionist–Jewish values by means of subjects such as
Bible studies, geography, Jewish history and Tushba (Oral Law).24 The first sign
of the subjection of citizenship courses to national orientations was evident in
the fact that the training of civics teachers was part of general academic history
or the history of the Jewish people. This was because, unlike most other sub-
jects, citizenship was not considered a discipline in itself requiring any special
training.25 Therefore, a single teacher was responsible for subjects such as Jewish
history or the history of Eretz Yisrael (‘Land of Israel’) – which reflected the
ethno-national aspects of the State and served the purpose of constructing a
common history and consolidation around the nation’s symbols and myths –
together with subject matter that was supposed to be of a more liberal and uni-
versal nature. The findings of a survey administered to civic studies teachers
indicated that despite their general willingness to teach more diverse subject
matter, they themselves tended not to prefer universal values over national
values.26 In the curricula of technical schools, the marginality of civic studies
was even more pronounced. Civics was taught under the heading ‘Study of
Nation and State’, or, in other words, a section of the curriculum that dealt with
Jewish history.27
An additional indication of the marginality of civic studies in comparison
to other subjects was evident in the number of school hours accorded to this
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subject. Citizenship courses in Israel are not taught at all in elementary school
(grades 1–6), the schoolchild’s first contact with the formal state education
system. In junior high school (grades 7–9), few schools list the subject on their
course programme, despite the fact that a special curriculum has been designed
for pupils of this age. In addition to the personal preferences of school princi-
pals, a reason for the omission of this subject is rooted in its non-enforcement
by the Ministry of Education. These tendencies reflected Ministry of Education
policy, which has discouraged the exposure of pupils to potentially provocative
and disputable issues.
Therefore, the first genuine contact of schoolchildren with civic studies
subject matter has tended to take place only in their final year of high school,
the grade 12. In that year, teachers are obligated to teach compulsory subjects
for the matriculation exams, and, in consequence, devote all their time and
energy to the instruction of the procedural aspects of the subject on which the
exam has traditionally focused.28
The marginality of civic studies is additionally underscored in the Bagrut
certificate for the Israeli adolescent student. Despite being an apparently 
compulsory subject, civic studies is equal to only one learning unit in the 
matriculation certificate. In comparison, subjects such as Bible studies, Hebrew, 
composition and literature – courses that are dependable conduits for the dis-
semination of national values – all benefit from a minimum weighting of two
compulsory learning units. Translated into hours of instruction, this means
that each of these subjects consists of a minimum of 180 class hours, in con-
trast to 90 hours of citizenship lessons. Furthermore, the Ministry of Education
gave adolescent students the option of extending each of these subjects up to
five learning units (450 class hours) for the final exam while civic studies was
restricted to its original single unit.
Time and again, objections regarding the peripheral status of civic studies
in Israel have been directed to the Ministry of Education. Professor Emanuel
Gutmann, who was chiefly responsible for the design of the course programme
in citizenship studies, appealed in the early 1990s to the Minister of Education
and argued:
Citizenship courses have been assigned, according to the general school curricula,
no more than 90 class hours (out of all the years of high school education). In 
the present programme, three subjects were taught in these 90 hours, each allotted
30 hours. ‘The Polity of the State of Israel’ was a requisite subject and this was 
supplemented by two additional courses out of five electives . . . For some years now,
it has become quite clear to ministerial officials in charge of civic education that it
is impossible to teach the course on Israeli polity in thirty hours and therefore, 
in reality, many more hours are devoted well and above this quota. The inevitable
consequence was that in recent years, only two subjects in effect were taught, one
requisite and one elective.29
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The test of time has shown that this complaint, like numerous others tucked
away in the Ministry of Education archives, was cordially acknowledged and
then discarded in its dusty files.
To sum up, the above findings confirm that for many years, the Israeli pupil
has been exposed to the subject of civics for a short period of time, and then only
at a relatively late stage (grade 12). Moreover, out of the whole far-reaching and
complex fabric of political and social life in Israel, he or she was introduced to
only those aspects which were easy for authorities to deal with and which indi-
rectly were intended to reinforce the younger generation’s convictions about the
legitimacy of nationalist ideals and the governing body. In this fashion, the edu-
cation system served the State in its efforts to shape a collective consciousness
based on the belief that Israel is a democratic state, in spite of the institution-
alised dominance of the Jewish majority and the State’s powerful station vis-à-
vis its citizens. What instruction took place was of course delivered without a
discussion of the middle on grey areas which might evoke questions with regard
to the essence of a polity of this type. In all, the inevitable and telling by-product
of these circumstances has been the weakening of the democratic quality of the
State.
Indeed, research conducted since the early 1980s demonstrated that 
political extremism, ethnocentrism and a regression from democratic values are
deep-seated among youth and adults alike in this country.30 Most of these
studies reveal significant support for undemocratic attitudes, e.g. curtailing the
freedom of speech of political opponents, the exclusion of ethnic minorities from
society and Israeli politics, a call for a strong leadership that can navigate the
country as it sees fit and an increase in religious legislation. Comparative
research further accentuates the extremist profile of certain sectors of Israeli
society and reveals that adolescent Israeli students tend to score very highly on
measures of ethnocentrism and authoritarianism in comparison to students
abroad.31
Quandaries accompanying the efforts to reform civic studies
Three pivotal events took place in Israeli political history during the 1980s and
1990s. On the face of it, these events should have spurred the country’s lead-
ership to adopt a more ‘immunised’ route, which should have included, inter
alia, an extensive reformation of the civic studies curriculum in Israel, an expan-
sion of its framework and the incorporation of more liberal and humanistic
principles. Chronologically, the events are as follows. First, there was the pene-
tration of the 1984 Israeli Parliament by a racist party (Kach); later, the signing
of the Oslo Agreements of 1993; and, more recently, the assassination in 1995
of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin.
In retrospect, it appears that these events did in fact inspire planners of the
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education system to change its traditional approach and submit an extensive
and new-fashioned plan of action. The blueprint was built on shoring up demo-
cratic studies and a modification of civics course material in order to introduce
the student to liberal democratic views (principally, a comprehensive schooling
on the concept of democracy with an emphasis on human rights and liberties)
as well as problematic and disputable issues (a broad and critical discussion of
the ethnic character of the Israeli democracy and the political expressions of the
cleavages that cut across it). However, the policy taken up by the State of Israel
in respect of civic studies suffered from a lack of consistency. On the one hand,
steps were indeed taken to bring about a broad and genuine change in civics
education with the aim of strengthening a democratic liberal perspective. On
the other, the non-liberal constraints on the State still prevented a smooth tran-
sition to a liberalised curriculum for civic studies and instead this process
advanced quite unsteadily, punctuated by stops and starts and numerous 
diversions.
The inaugural efforts to liberalise civic studies can therefore be linked to the
election of Rabbi Meir Kahane to the Israeli Parliament. Following Kahane’s
success in parliamentary elections and the many surveys and studies which con-
firmed that the racist rabbi’s views had indeed begun to find a stronghold in the
Israeli streets, a new sort of anxiety became apparent, both among policy-
makers as well as among the rank and file, regarding the future of democracy
in Israel. Among the assortment of State responses, which have already been
elaborated in preceding chapters, there was the undoubted influence of the
Kahanist phenomenon on the chief executive body of the education system. A
short while after Kahane’s election to the Knesset, the Ministry of Education
decided, for the first time since the establishment of the Israeli State, that prior-
ity must be given to the democratic element over the nationalist–particularist
element in civics education. If, until the 1980s, documented material regarding
the education of the Israeli citizen in democratic values was infrequent or coin-
cidental in the Ministry of Education’s archives (where the setting of goals
remained abstract and the recommendation was predominantly the integration
of the topic of democracy in various courses), then, after Kahane’s election to
the Knesset, the tone changed, and the emphasis shifted from an ‘education in
Zionist citizenship’ to ‘Democratic education’. In addition, the years 1986 and
1987 were declared years of democratic education.32
Nearly nine years after Kahane’s achievement of Knesset membership, the
Oslo Agreements between Israel and the PLO were signed. This second critical
turning point was supposed to have led to the reform of school curricula. The
Oslo Agreements were to mark the passage from the belligerent past to a new
era of peace between Israel and the Palestinians, and, within this framework,
both Israel and the Palestinian Authority were committed to altering their
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school curricula and removing all ethnocentric indications.33 The third and
perhaps most traumatic event and milestone for Israeli society was the murder
of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by a Jewish perpetrator. Yigal Amir, graduate
of the national religious education system, explained that he committed the
murder out of the belief that not even a democratically elected government had
the authority to make decisions which stood in stark contrast to the Jewish
Halakha or the will of a sector of the nation.
In spite of the significant public outcry that arose in the wake of these
events and proclamations heralding a new direction in the curricula of civic
studies, a retrospective analysis of the steps taken to translate words into action
reveals many setbacks in the attempt to bring about substantial reformation 
in this area. Obstacles preventing the liberalisation of civic education due 
to the failings of the non-liberal democracy can be examined according 
to three principal levels of analysis: structural; policy-making; and policy 
implementation.
Structural level
One of the first steps taken by the Ministry of Education, in 1985, immediately
subsequent to Rabbi Meir Kahane’s election to Parliament, was the establish-
ment of a special division for the advancement of democracy and coexistence
in Israel. The inherent tension between the democratic and non-liberal compo-
nents of this country could already be felt in the making of this decision. The
new resolution was in effect an official acknowledgement by the Israeli Ministry
of Education that formal civics education in Israel – contrary to other countries
where the term ‘civics education’ includes concepts which address both general
democratic values as well as the country’s system of governance – had not 
fulfilled its role in strengthening democratic values.
The called-for step was a broad reform of the civics education programme,
entailing an increase in class hours and the replacement of formal subject
matter with discussion of more substantive democratic principles. However, this
type of reform could be tolerated only under one condition – a change in the
State’s attitude. Still loath to abandon the ethnic, anti-liberal, character of
Israeli democracy, the State opted for a more innovative agenda in democratic
studies. The course of formal instruction on citizenship remained in its tradi-
tional form and a complementary programme was initiated for teaching demo-
cratic values. Although the formal course of civics remained marginal in terms
of class hours and resources, in relation to democratic studies it still enjoyed a
clear advantage. Traditional civics studies remained an integral part of the offi-
cial Israeli school curriculum, whereas democratic studies, which focused more
deeply on the relations between Jews and Arabs, the idea of ‘rule of law’ and
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civil rights, received extra-curricular status,34 making it an optional subject for
the majority of school principals. They preferred to devote all available school
hours to matriculation subjects.
In addition, not only was democratic studies assigned peripheral status, but
the Division for Democracy and Coexistence (DDC) itself was considered a 
marginal body in the Ministry of Education and therefore a pawn in the hands
of policy-makers. Shortly after the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin, elections were held in which the right-wing bloc, under the leadership of
Benyamin Netanyahu, was victorious by a small margin. Zevulun Hammer, rep-
resentative of the Mafdal, was appointed to the post of minister of education.
Hammer, in line with the traditional position of his party, maintained there was
no justification for promoting the democratic aspects of civics education
without a similar expansion of Jewish nationalist values. He therefore decided
on the establishment of the Board for the Education of Values (BEV) whose
objective was to be an umbrella framework for the agencies responsible for the
cultivation of Jewish studies, along with the Division for Democracy and Coex-
istence. Once again, the quandary inherent to the non-liberal democracy reared
its notorious head. A single directorate of the Ministry of Education became
responsible for both reinforcing Jewish national identity as well as the assimila-
tion of liberal values. The practical implication was that these two conflicting
initiatives now operated under the same organisational framework. The Educa-
tion Ministry’s budget proposal for the 1999 fiscal year illustrates this predica-
ment. The proposal states that the Board for the Education of Values financially
supports ninety voluntary organisations involved in Jewish Zionist education on
one hand and ninety voluntary bodies associated with democratic education on
the other. However, the Board gives priority to those institutions which combine
the two fields. A close inspection of the proposal revealed that this type of body
did not exist.35
After Minister Hammer’s death and the appointment of Itzhak Levy, a
member of the same party, to the post of minister of education, ministerial pri-
orities were once again rewritten. Minister Levy decided to pare down the man-
agement and budget of the BEV, established by his predecessor. Levy understood
the difficulty of running two segregated systems of instruction on similar
subject matter, while only one of the two was anchored in the official course
curriculum. According to him, the decision to cut back on the Board’s activities
was the outcome of two major predicaments: first, the significant financial
expense of two coexisting systems; and second, the failure of the BEV to reach
its projected goals. As the minister saw it, there was no way to force teachers
and pupils disinterested in the Board’s activities at their school to make the effort
to teach and learn subject matter which was not an integral part of the formal
school curriculum.36 Ultimately, a short while after left-wing Meretz member
Yossi Sarid became minister of education, a final decision was issued to dis-
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mantle both the BEV and the DDC. Corroboration provided by the civics educa-
tion supervisor reinforces the view that the status of these two councils as extra-
neous to the education system minimised their effectiveness.37
In this case, despite the official intentions of the Ministry of Education to
give priority to the liberal–universal aspect in relation to the non-liberal ethnic
aspect, policy-makers with the final say ensured that civic studies continued in
its traditional procedural form. The initiative to elevate the standing of democ-
ratic studies with the formation of the DDC appeared to be a commendable
venture but, in effect, it failed from the moment of its inception. This was a con-
sequence, first, of its peripheral status and, later, of policy-makers’ objections to
the teaching of democratic values in isolation from national values.
Policy-making
The perspective of policy-making even more markedly reflects the symbiotic 
and inseparable connection that exists between the teaching of nationalist 
and democratic values in Israel. In March 1995, about one-and-a-half years 
after the signing of the Oslo Agreements and one year prior to Prime Minister
Rabin’s assassination, Professor Amnon Rubinstein, Meretz member and minis-
ter of education at that time, appointed a committee to advance the democratic
reform of state-run civics education, to be headed by Mordechai Kremnizer, a
professor of law. Its aim was the ‘development of a comprehensive initiative for
the inculcation of citizenship in pupils as a moral and behavioural foundation
shared by all citizens of the State’.38 The panel consisted primarily of academi-
cians and representatives of diverse ethnic, political and religious groups in
Israeli society. It tried to learn the nature and roots of the problems in the civics
curriculum and attempted to address the need for change in the instruction in
political processes deemed responsible for instilling anti-liberal attitudes among
pupils:
While the widespread public belief is that democracy is the government of the
majority, the more liberal conception of democracy has not been sufficiently inter-
nalised, i.e., a political system placing at its centre the individual who has the power
to shape and develop his or her personality as a human being in a society whose
ultimate purpose is to defend individual rights and guarantee the protection of
the rights of various groups in society. A noticeable weakness is in the lack of an
internalisation of universalistic values detected, for example, in attitudes toward
Arabs and ultra-orthodox, freedom of speech and the freedom of press . . . There is
an aspiration toward a homogenous and harmonious society while, in actuality, it
is necessary to cultivate an awareness of the diversity and pluralism of this society,
the legitimacy of partaking in debate, the positive aspects of debate and the guide-
lines for settling conflicts based on a tolerant approach, while using peaceful and
democratic ways.39
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In summation, the panel presented proposals for an extensive reform of
civics education while granting a clear priority to liberal perceptions and, above
all, individual rights over the rights of the Jewish collectivity. On the face of it,
it seemed that this committee and its clear-cut policies indicated a consensus
among Israeli policy-makers regarding the genuine necessity to liberalise civics
education curricula. However, reality proved otherwise.
Four years earlier, in October 1991, the minister of education at that time,
Zevulun Hammer (Mafdal), had nominated a committee with an almost identi-
cal composition, although the goal of this committee was to review the status
of Jewish studies in state-run education. Even though the committee’s conclu-
sions demonstrated a relatively pluralistic tendency, the gist of its recommen-
dations was straightforward – proposals for expanding Jewish studies and
courses in the history of the Israeli people at all levels of instruction (from 
elementary to high school). Furthermore, the Shinhar Committee, named after
Professor Aliza Shinhar who was placed in charge, reinforced the status of
four Jewish subjects in the matriculation exams and also introduced new 
subjects.40
Once again, Ministry of Education officials were faced with the double
imperative deeply embedded in the Israeli political structure: on the one hand,
they were confronted with the need to bolster the State’s democratic founda-
tions by introducing liberal values; and, on the other, they strove to maintain
the unity of the dominant Jewish ethnic group with regard to its national–
religious symbols. The BEV was assigned the role of applying the recommenda-
tions of both reports, a fact that only exacerbated the state of paradox charac-
teristic of the Board. After the Board was dismantled, two supervisors from the
Ministry of Education were placed in charge of implementing proposals. 
Today, these two share a single desk in the Ministry of Education in Jerusalem,
which seems to be another symbolic illustration of the inability to distinguish
between liberal and national objectives.
Policy implementation
So far, the paradoxes involved in the efforts to steer the social base of the State
of Israel in a more ‘immunised’ direction by formulating certain policies and
promoting democracy studies in Israel at the institutional level have been pre-
sented. In point of fact, this same paradoxical picture was similarly repeated in
the efforts to bring about structural change in the formal school civic studies
curriculum.
Beginning in the mid-1990s, then later on with the Kremnizer Report and
the failure of the DDC, there is evidence of attempts at the revision of compul-
sory topics of the civic studies programme. The Ministry of Education team
responsible for this programme worked vigorously in order to present study cur-
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ricula that would address the essence of social and political life in the State of
Israel and, by the same token, demote the formal procedural aspect from its dom-
inant position. This approach constituted a challenge to the Ministry of Educa-
tion’s official policy over the years, where controversial topics were kept out of
the school classes.41
An initial perusal of Being Citizens in Israel, the basis of the new curriculum
and approved as the core textbook for the study of civics in the year 2001, indeed
presents an in-depth review of the substantial issues of the State of Israel. These
include the status of the Arab population, cleavages in Israeli society, the status
of civil law vis-à-vis religious law, the rule of law in a democratic state and civil
rights.42 This doctrinal turnaround and, in particular, the Ministry of Educa-
tion’s apparent renunciation of its commitment to national narratives in favour
of liberal principles conforming with Levinson’s tenets, supposedly reflects the
same transition toward liberalism which, according to Shafir and Peled,43 Israeli
society is presently undergoing.
However, a second, and more informed, scrutiny of the implementation of
the curricular reform reveals otherwise. Civic studies, it appears, has never been
able to liberate itself from its inherent failings since the State’s establishment
and, therefore, recent declarations on the liberalisation of values in Israel have
turned out to be premature. A methodical survey of the programme’s core issues
and the degree of significance accorded to democratic liberal values proves that
the resilience of ‘Jewish ethno-nationalist tendencies’ is not to be made light of.
Examples are found in the chapter introducing students to the ‘Principles of the
Social Contract’. In contrast to what might be expected of a chapter with 
that title, much of it is devoted to the biblical pact drawn between Israel and
G–d. Moreover, this text makes it quite clear that in the time of the prophets 
Ezra and Nehemiah the Jewish nation embraced the authority of the Oral 
Law as the standing constitution of the State and people of Israel.44 Therefore,
despite the declared intentions of the new programme’s designers to reduce the 
degree of the Israeli student’s exposure to ethnic, religious and national values
in the civic studies programme – values which he or she would in any case
encounter in other classes – the role of the State in shaping the Jewish citizen
who is above all loyal to his or her people and the Torah would not be completely
abandoned.
However, this does not bring to an end the complexities of teaching civic
studies in Israel in the new millennium. Apart from the difficulties created by
the ideological hindrances noted above, reform also faced administrative obsta-
cles. The new curriculum was supposed to include twice the number of civics
class hours in order to provide enough time to teach all the subject matter of
the programme in its new format.45 But, in reality, the number of class hours
remained the same, that is, ninety class hours in the final school year. The
cutback in the number of hours required screening out many topics from the
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intended programme, and most of the eliminated subject matter unfortunately
happened to touch upon essential concerns of the State: the cleavages of Israeli
society and the status of the Arab minority; freedom of speech in a democratic
society; and elections in Israel. On the other hand, the formal aspect, provided
by the chapter depicting the political system and governmental institutions, still
enjoyed a central role in the new curriculum.46 According to the civics educa-
tion nationwide supervisor, even after the removal of some of the course matter,
the number of issues was still significantly higher than the time allotted for their
delivery in class. This posed a problem because civics teachers, who, over the
years, became accustomed to instructing in the formal aspect of the Israeli 
political system, preferred to stick to the course material with which they were
familiar. In fact, in many cases, they felt comfortable enough to overlook the
new and thornier issues such as the debate over the extent to which the State
of Israel conforms to the definition of a democratic polity.47
There are still further problems. A new curriculum, currently under dis-
cussion by the Ministry of Education, proposes that several subjects, including
civic studies, should no longer be included in the school curriculum as required
subjects for the matriculation exam. According to the Ministry of Education
supervisor responsible for the pedagogy of civics, this would lead to a situation
where school principals would rather devote school hours to compulsory
matriculation subjects than to allocate time to those subjects, such as civics,
which no longer require a final exam.48 These new plans are in outright defi-
ance of the recommendations of the Kremnizer Committee, which asserted that
citizenship studies should be enhanced and taught as early as elementary
school, and throughout junior high and high school, culminating in a matricu-
lation exam equal to 3–5 learning units. Another factor weakening the effec-
tiveness of a critical and universalistic study programme is the Ministry of
Education’s decision not to include a single social science subject (sociology,
political science) in the list of compulsory matriculation exams.
Educational reform in civics education in the new millennium: 
a quantitative assessment
Notwithstanding the many paradoxes shrouding civic studies in general and 
the new curriculum in particular, I sought to examine the degree to which, if
at all, it was possible to verify the effect of civic studies on adolescent students’
attitudes. Interest centred in various topics pertaining to the wide gamut of
democratic life, and whether civics courses still have the ability to help the 
State of Israel ‘immunise’ the social structure of the ‘defending democracy’.
However, before presenting research findings, several theoretical issues per-
taining to the relationship between instruction in citizenship and the internal-
isation of democratic values among students should be mentioned. From the
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early 1960s, beginning with an intensive research involvement in the educa-
tion in democratic concepts, two main schools of thought have made their
mark. The conclusions of both schools relied on empirical findings. The first,
more senior, school, whose prominent representatives include Langton and 
Jennings as well as Niemi and Sobieszek, posited that correlations between an
education in citizenship and the espousal of political knowledge and democra-
tic attitudes are marginal.49 On the other hand, according to the second group
of scholars, whose roots are planted in the works of much earlier researchers
such as Merriam50 and V. O. Key51 (works which have, however, gained consid-
erable reconfirmation in recent years), participation in citizenship courses, par-
ticularly in combination with additional factors such as an appropriate class
atmosphere, is in fact found to be in positive correlation with the internalisation
of democratic values.52
Under the present circumstances, it would be pretentious to try to bring 
this controversy to a resolution. Rather, by relying on the most prominent
approaches of the second school in the last few years, which posit that the teach-
ing of democratic principles at school necessarily has the effect of consolidating
more democratic values among pupils, this section seeks to assess the degree 
of influence of the new civic study programme on the attitudes of youth in
Israel.
The research design devised for this purpose was based on sampling the ado-
lescent student population and administering questionnaires to 729 students in
five state-run schools in northern Israel. The sample was made up of two groups.
The first group consisted of 333 grade 12 students (students in their last year
at high school, aged 17–18) who studied civics in their last year of school
according to the new curriculum. These students constituted 45.7 per cent of
the sample population. The second group consisted of 396 grade 11 students
(aged 16–17) who had not yet been exposed to civics courses at high school.
These students constituted 54.3 per cent of the sample population. Question-
naires were distributed during March 2001.
The aim of the research was to examine the effects of an education in demo-
cratic principles on the complex of perceptions associated with political and
democratic issues, while conducting a comparison between the two groups. In
order to minimise the effect of intervening variables, particularly socio-
demographic variables, an attempt was made to ensure, while selecting the
sample, representation of the various population sectors. Accordingly, the
sample included 285 boys (39.2 per cent) and 444 girls (60.8 per cent). In terms
of parental education there was some preference for students of parents with a
higher education (father’s education – 2.6 per cent elementary school, 36.9 per
cent high school and 60.4 per cent higher education; mother’s education – 2.4
per cent elementary school, 32.5 per cent high school and 65.1 per cent higher
education).53 However, with regard to students’ ethnic origin, the distribution
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appeared proportional and commensurate with State population figures
(father’s country of birth – 45.5 per cent Israel, 14.1 per cent Europe–America,
12.1 per cent Asia–Africa, and 25.1 per cent countries of the former USSR;
mother’s country of birth – 49 per cent Israel, 14.1 per cent Europe–America,
11.5 per cent Asia–Africa, and 25.4 per cent countries of the former USSR;
student’s country of birth – 77.6 per cent Israel, 3.5 per cent Europe–America,
0.7 per cent Asia–Africa, and 17.2 per cent countries of the former USSR).
While this study included one independent variable (that of exposure to
civic studies, which distinguished between the two groups), there were five
dependent variables in this study:
• democratic orientation;
• political cynicism;
• ethnocentric attitudes toward Arabs;
• political efficacy; and
• political knowledge.54
Underlying the rationale for the inter-group comparison was an assumption
relying on prior research,55 which stated that if the civic studies programme in
Israel not only conveyed formal knowledge but was indeed successful in affect-
ing students’ attitudes, then in comparison to those who did not learn this
subject, students exposed to civic studies would demonstrate
1 a greater inclination toward democratic orientations in comparison to the
control group;
2 lower levels of political cynicism in comparison to the control group;
3 a greater sense of political efficacy in comparison to the control group; and
4 lower levels of ethnocentric attitude toward Arabs in comparison to the
control group.
And with the aid of the fifth variable, political knowledge, an attempt was 
made to focus the debate and examine which features of Israeli politics the 
Ministry of Education was successful in inculcating among its students. Was it
knowledge related to the formal and technical aspects of the political system
typical of past curricula, or was there also a familiarity with events in the system
itself and Israeli political figures?
Results
Table 3.1 features the levels of support among civics students and non-
civics students on items comprising the dependent variables, and elicits 
a number of findings which merit attention. With regard to all aspects of the
democratic orientation items, it appears that students from both groups are
inclined to express high support for the statements. However, upon closer
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inspection, the numbers reveal two interesting findings. The first pertains to the
fact that most students, both those who did and did not study civics (87 per cent
and 85 per cent, respectively), perceived political action as unnecessary when
decision-making is believed to be in the hands of a competent leadership. The
sweeping support for this statement indicates a weakness in the internalisation
of the idea of the citizen’s role in a democratic state and may be closely associ-
ated with the relatively low levels of Israeli citizen participation in ‘civil society’
organisations, a subject which will be elaborated in the next chapter. An addi-
tional important finding alludes to the significant correlation (p = 0.008)
between the independent variable and the statement dealing with the demo-
cratic government’s obligation to protect the rights of minorities. Granted,
among both groups there was relatively high support for this statement; still,
the gap in favour of those who participated in civics lessons is quite significant
(89.4 per cent compared to 82.8 per cent among students that did not 
learn civics).
A review of the items constituting the measure of political cynicism demon-
strates a reverse tendency of the above. Unexpectedly, not only did both groups
express high levels of political cynicism, the level of cynicism on behalf of the
civics group was consistently higher than that expressed by those who did not
take the course. Although no significant correlations were found between the
study of civics variable and these items, according to the descriptive data it is
still possible to conclude (with some caution) that if participating in civics edu-
cation has any effect on students, it only leads to an increase in cynicism with
regard to the political system.
The profile emerging from the findings on students’ views about political effi-
cacy is a little more complicated. On the one hand, many students from both
groups feel that generally there is a great breach between the individual and
government and that government officials are not attentive to citizens of the
State (63.1 per cent among civics learners and 61.8 per cent among non-civics
learners). In addition, most students affirmed that politics and governance are
too complicated for them and that they have difficulties understanding the
workings of political procedures (57.2 per cent among civics learners and 58.7
per cent among non-civics learners). On the other hand, the majority of stu-
dents are aware that numerous avenues of political action are available to them.
This conclusion is based on the relatively large support for the statement on the
right to express an opinion (59 per cent among civics learners and 50.3 per cent
among non-civics learners) and also from the considerable support for the state-
ment that there are other ways to express a political attitude aside from voting
(54.7 per cent among civics learners and 47.4 per cent among non-civics learn-
ers). Another interesting finding is that there is a significant correlation between
the last two statements and the independent variable ( p = 0.016 and 0.045,
respectively). An attempt to sum up this complex picture leads me to submit 
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Table 3.1 Effects of an education in democratic principles: levels of support (in percentages)
for different components of the dependent variables and comparison of mean grades for every
one of the items among the two groups by means of t-test
Supported Supported 
by civic by non-civic
studies studies
Variable Item students (%) students (%) t-value Significance
Democratic Competition among 
orientation political parties
makes the political 
system stronger 57.91 57.10 0.048 0.825
Occasionally, a successful
political leader must also
make compromises
with his political 
opponents 92.54 90.62 0.890 0.345
Government carries the
responsibility for 
protecting the rights 
of the minorities 89.47 82.80 6.988 0.008
Any individual or 
organisation has the
right to organise 
opposition or resistance
to any governmental 
initiative 86.97 85.71 0.246 0.619




in the hands of a few 
trusted and competent
leaders 13.00 15.00 0.404 0.525
Political Government officials 
cynicism are not highly competent 70.48 66.57 1.294 0.255
Governmental clerks 
and officials do not 
pay much attention to
citizens 85.18 80.76 2.564 0.109
Political parties are 
interested only in
winning the elections 79.15 73.68 3.062 0.080
Government officials 
usually do not perform
effectively and legally 72.66 71.81 0.065 0.798




by civic by non-civic
studies studies
Variable Item students (%) students (%) t-value Significance
The government would 
function better were it
not for political interests 81.86 77.84 1.833 0.175
Political I think that public 
efficacy officials care about
what people like me 
think 36.91 38.19 0.130 0.718
Voting is not the 
only way that people 
like me can have a 
say about how the
government runs things 54.73 47.38 4.000 0.045
Often, politics and 
government seem so
complicated, however, 
a person like me can 
still understand what’s 
going on 42.79 41.35 0.156 0.692
Election results are not 
the only factor according
to which the state is 
governed 35.09 33.53 0.199 0.665
Regular people like me 
have the right to
express an opinion about
governmental initiatives 59.05 50.29 5.713 0.016
Xenophobia In the event of a nationwide
referendum on the subject
of the peace process, it
would be better if Arabs 
did not take part 48.00 48.67 0.033 0.855
Arab complaints of
discrimination are not 
justified 52.88 58.75 2.55 0.110
The Israeli Government 
should encourage Arab 
emigration from Israel 54.49 55.16 0.003 0.951
Arabs are too demanding 
regarding anything to do 
with their rights 67.59 70.50 0.725 0.394
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that whereas students – and particularly those studying civics – are aware 
of other avenues of political action in a democratic state, they still show little
faith in their ability to understand the political system or have an effect on
policy-makers.
Oddly enough, the statements referring to xenophobic attitudes reveal a
more homogenous profile. In relation to all the items comprising this variable,
there were only marginal differences in the attitudes of the two groups. With
regard to almost all items a similar picture emerges, according to which more
than half of the students express high levels of hostility towards Arab citizens
of Israel, and object to their claims for civic equality. These findings stand in con-
tradiction to the extensive student support for the statement that government is
responsible for ensuring the protection of minority rights. Although it is not 
possible to establish a statistical relationship between the two, the contradiction
between the acknowledgement, on the one hand, that the democratic polity is
committed to protect minority rights and the outstanding support for a state-
ment such as ‘The Israeli Government must encourage Arab emigration from
Israel’, on the other, is an indication of the success of the Israeli education
system and its traditional civics curriculum. This may be an indication that
there are also other agents of socialisation in this country that are communi-
cating to students the distinction between taught democratic values and the
place of these values in Israeli democracy.
After an initial glance at the descriptive data, we attempted to examine the
effect of the State’s civic studies curriculum on the combined dependent vari-
ables featured above. For this purpose, we conducted a MANOVA procedure (see
table 3.2). Analysis of the findings first show that the entire analysis is signifi-
cant at a level of p = 0.001. As for the variables themselves, we found signifi-
cant differences between the two groups (p = 0.00 and 0.03, respectively) for
the variables of democratic orientation and political knowledge. With respect to the
variable of political efficacy, we found marginal significance (p = 0.08). There-
fore, already at this point, it is possible to assert that regarding the variables of
political cynicism and xenophobic attitudes towards Arabs, the effect of civics 
education on student attitudes is not significant. Furthermore, the difference
between the mean grades of the two groups is very small. However, it is impor-
tant to point out that regarding xenophobia towards Arabs, despite the slight
difference between the means, it appears that among civic studies learners there
is, paradoxically, slightly greater support for these attitudes. This finding once
more demonstrates the weak effect of civic studies courses on the formation of
pluralistic attitudes towards minorities in Israel.
As noted above, in order to obtain further indication regarding the subject
matter that nonetheless was internalised by students in the context of the civics
courses, we took advantage of the index of political knowledge. A number of
interesting facts regarding this index can be found in table 3.3, and additional
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confirmation of the limited effect of civic courses is evident from these data. 
A variance analysis shows that there was a significant difference (p = 0.00)
between civics learners and those who had not learned civics only in relation to
their knowledge of institutions of the political system. In comparison, regarding
the other two factors (knowledge of political figures and of political processes),
apart from the absence of significance between the groups, the means of stu-
dents’ knowledge were also almost identical, with only a small preference for
civics learners. Therefore, it can be reasoned that while there appears to be 
no difference between the groups in respect of all the dynamic aspects of the
political system and students’ familiarity with the processes therein, citizenship
courses nevertheless do have a considerable, if anticipated, effect on the assim-
ilation of formal knowledge of this system.
Table 3.2 Multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA) for the assessment of the effects of civic
studies in relation to dependent variables (comparison between civics learners and non-civics
learners)
Standard ANOVA Significance Significance
Index Reliability Range Group Mean deviation value ANOVA MANOVA
Democratic Civics
















knowledge 1–4 learners 5.704 2.245 4.38 0.036
Non-civics
learners 5.357 2.245
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Conclusions
What conclusions can therefore be drawn from the above analysis regarding 
the efforts (and successes) of the ‘defending democracy’ to imbed antibodies 
in Israeli society, so that they might constitute a system of checks against the
expansion of extremist and violent phenomena?
First, in order not to give the wrong impression, it should be noted that
Israel’s nature as both a Jewish and democratic nation state engendered a
paradox, or ‘inherent failing’, in the educational system in the country, and
occasioned its leadership quite a lot of discomfiture. Along with the effort to
inculcate a democratic political culture among citizens, there was always an
aspiration to deepen and fortify the status of national, ethnic and religious
values designed to strengthen the ethno-national character of the State of
Israel. The cost to the State of this ‘inherent failing’ was high indeed. The con-
sistent exposure of youth to nationalist messages conveyed via various agents
of socialisation, in the absence of the moderating effect of liberal and human-
Table 3.3 Analysis of variance for the purpose of comparing between different levels of
political knowledge acquired in civic studies courses (comparison between civic studies
learners and non-civic studies learners)
Standard ANOVA Significance
Index Range Group Mean deviation value ANOVA
Political Civic studies
figures 1–4 learners 2.452 1.328 0.07 0.785
Non-civic 
studies learners 2.426 1.338
Institutions Civic 
and formal studies
procedures 1–4 learners 2.218 0.994 20.22 0.001
Non-civic 
studies learners 1.878 1.074
Political Civic 
system and studies
its process 1–2 learners 1.027 0.663 0.10 0.754
Non-civic 
studies learners 1.011 0.711
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istic principles, would see their allegiance deteriorate from a commitment to 
a national ethos to the adoption of ultra-national and even racist ideas. There-
fore, it appears that, in terms of the ‘defending democracy’, a kind of cyclical
sequence developed. The State was the factor which fostered a national iden-
tity, and when that identity spilled over into ultra-nationalist margins it was 
again the State that had to deal with the ensuing extremism in its multi-faceted
manifestations.
In summing up the ethno-national perspective, the Israeli state-run educa-
tional system chalked up not a few successes. Most outstanding was the con-
solidation of the Jewish populace around national symbols and values (even at
times of deep controversy), and principally the collective consensus regarding
the need to preserve the ethno-national character of the State and reinforce 
its Jewish essence. On the other hand, efforts at evaluating achievements in the
education of democratic principles must be more cautious.
The leaders of the State, who in due course became familiar with the con-
tradiction between its ethno-national and democratic elements, chose to deal
with the need for instruction in citizenship by employing different practices
aimed at diluting the subject. This dilution involved both a technical aspect, i.e.
the reduction of the subject matter solely to the formal elements of government,
and a time-restriction aspect, i.e. limiting classes to the minimum possible of one
hour per week. However, despite the dramatic events experienced by the State
of Israel and the resolutions made by its leadership to grant more import to 
the inculcation of democratic principles, there has been no real change. For
every step taken to promote the democratic fundamentals proffered by the 
education system, another almost immediately followed, usually offsetting it,
leading either to the reinforcement of Jewish national education or, alterna-
tively, to various administrative restrictions preventing the institutionalisation
of democratic values in the education system.
Only towards the end of the year 2000 did the first reformation take place
in the nature of civics education as well as in its contents with the aim of solid-
ifying the status of the democratic element vis-à-vis the ethno-national element.
However, an assessment of the effect of this reform on student attitudes in rela-
tion to the variety of qualities associated with a democratic lifestyle revealed
only partial success. The majority of students who took part in this research
expressed high levels of support for attitudes reflecting both political cynicism
and hostility towards the Arab minority in Israel, and no significant difference
was found between the group which studied the civics course and the control
group in regard to these variables. A possible explanation for this finding would
be that the course curriculum did not sufficiently stress the importance of the
values of tolerance and trust as part of the democratic worldview.
An additional indicator of the weakness of civics education in Israel is
related to the weighting among the different topics that were supposed to be pre-
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sented to students. As already noted, the goal of reform was to liberate the civic
studies curriculum from its technical–formal character and to introduce stu-
dents to the more substantive essentials of political and social life in the State.
However, the only topic where a significant preference was found in favour of
students of civic studies over those who did not study this subject was that of
political institutions and knowledge of formal procedures. This leads to the con-
clusion that, despite the declared intentions to reduce the weight of the formal
element in course contents, in reality this element remained uppermost.
Nevertheless, two important findings should not be overlooked. Survey
results indicate that the group of civic studies learners displayed higher and sig-
nificant levels of support for issues related to democratic orientations as well as
confidence in their ability to influence the political process (efficacy) than did
the control group. Although differences between the group means are not dra-
matic, they are the first indications of the potential effect of civic studies in its
new format.
The positive correlation between the reform in the civics curriculum and
the internalisation of democratic orientations – despite being partial – implies
a positive and untapped potential in the study of democratic values from the per-
spective of the ‘immunising’ of the ‘defending democracy’. This inevitably raises
the question of whether civic studies in its new format will indeed sink roots and
lead in the near future to the promotion of basic democratic values, a reduction
in levels of political cynicism and the adoption of a multicultural and tolerant
attitude towards minorities, or, alternatively, whether the ethno-national ten-
dency will again predominate so that the future identification of the Israeli cit-
izenry with democratic values will only be weakened.
Any attempt to provide immediate answers to this type of question will
amount to conjecture. However, a number of indications suggest that there are
significant obstacles to the process of completing the reformation. Among these
obstacles, the education system’s organisational conservatism merits mention,
as does the teachers’ difficulty in adopting new study curricula. However, at the
same time, we can assume that these hindrances are less problematic and more
easily resolved than are the obstacles involved in policy-making, implementa-
tion and reformation of the system of values underpinning Israeli society. This
last factor has proven to be a remarkably recalcitrant and entrenched barrier to
substantial change.
To elaborate: Ministry of Education policy in regard to the nature of nation-
wide study programmes is to a great degree subject to the strength and in-
fluence of the head of the Ministry, who has the power to allocate or 
withdraw resources for a particular programme. In fact, during the years in
which the Ministry of Education was managed by right-wing parties, there was 
a discernible preference by incumbent ministers to reinforce the status of
ethno-national qualities over democratic principles. Yet ministers from left-wing
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parties, who were more aware of the importance of civic studies reform, like-
wise made insufficient effort to ensure its full implementation. So, for example,
despite vouching for the implementation of reform in the 2001 school year, offi-
cials of the left-centre Ehud Barak administration were still speaking of only a
partial reform during 2001, pertaining only to course topics, whereas the mar-
ginal status of the subject in terms of class hours and on the Bagrut exam was
left untouched. The expansion of the course’s topics, in the absence of funding
for additional instruction hours, significantly hindered reform implementation
because of the need to teach such a wide variety of subjects without changing
the timetable. These unfavourable circumstances led the Ministry of Education,
and many teachers as well, to forego precisely those new issues in favour of older
and potentially less contentious topics.
Yet, the greatest obstacle thwarting nearly every effort to elevate the status
of democratic principles in the education system invariably involves public 
sentiment towards reform. According to the survey conducted for this study, 
the Jewish public in Israel is still unrelenting in its desire to reinforce the unity
around Jewish national values and symbols, and to inculcate these values by
means of the state-run education system. So, for example, 66.9 per cent of the
respondents agreed that the education system in Israel does not place enough
emphasis on national values and on the affinity of the Israeli people to their
country. This orientation was displayed also in relation to the instruction of the
subject in citizenship, where 64.2 per cent of the subjects agreed with the state-
ment that ‘in civics lessons, first of all, the right of the Jewish People to Eretz
Yisrael (the Land of Israel) must be given priority and only after that there should
be the discussion of universalistic democratic values such as equality among all
people and freedom of expression’. Furthermore, 40.2 per cent of the partici-
pants expressed support for the immediate abrogation of the civics education
reform and a return to the earlier format.
These findings are an indication of the considerable difficulties facing the
‘defending democracy’ in Israel in its attempt to take the direction of the ‘immu-
nised’ route. If the preceding chapters presented a somewhat optimistic picture
implying that the barriers erected by state institutions in the battle against polit-
ical violence and extremism are, over the course of time, gradually taking form
in accordance with a liberal democratic vision, then in order to build up this ten-
dency citizens of the State of Israel must learn the importance of maintaining
a democratic framework and so bolster that tendency with a stronger infra-
structure. However, in the light of the attitudes of policy-makers and the public
at large towards the inculcation of democratic principles, it seems that the
process of liberalising the response to extremism remains for the moment the
prerogative of a small circle of elites, headed by the judiciary.
The prognosis for the role of civics education in the ‘immunisation’ of
the Israeli democracy can be set out under two types of perspective. A quantita-
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tive perspective proposes that if reformation is fully implemented, a window 
of opportunity will be made available for students of in the state-run education
system to eventually adopt a democratic orientation and become members 
of a social structure that, to a certain degree, will be ‘immunised’ against the
expansion of the plague of extremism. On the other hand, a historical perspec-
tive suggests that the numerous obstacles thwarting efforts to implement such
a reform considerably reduce the likelihood that it will in fact come to fruition.
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stances was measured using two questions addressing the attitudes of political parties 
in Israel on political and economic affairs. Questions were in the form of two answers,
correct and incorrect, so that the total mark on this section ranged from 0 to 2 
points.
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Education, Community Norms and Political Indoctrination’, American Sociological Review,
28 (1963), pp. 69–75.
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The role of ‘civil society’ 
in the ‘defending democracy’
This  chapter expands further on the construct of the ‘defendingdemocracy’ by inquiring into the ‘pro-democratic civil society’ and its rolein the context of the ‘defending democracy’ model. The following pages
will underscore the significance of the actions of this non-state actor in the
‘defending democracy’s’ transition from the ‘militant’ to the ‘immunised’ model.
The fundamental argument here submits that, as a result of its isolation from
the State, ‘civil society’ in Israel probably plays a threefold role in safeguarding
Israeli democracy.
First, in a country such as Israel, the official authorities have not yet forged
a clear-cut policy on the central principles by which its future citizens should be
educated. Therefore, there is ample space for intervention by non-state institu-
tions seeking to promote an education in democratic values either by means of
school courses or less formal avenues. A no less important role is reserved for
civil organisations hoping to bridge the various and gaping social abysses of
Israeli society.
Second, these same non-state bodies, operating in the social sphere, are also
capable of responding to the expansion of extremism. They are very open to
those extremist movements responsible for fuelling the flames of extremism well
before they have developed into a political alternative and a veritable threat to
the government. Consequently, as ‘civil society’ becomes more effective, the
State feels less threatened by extremist elements and subsequently finds less
cause for exercising aggressive tactics against them.
Third, the ‘pro-democratic civil society’ is capable of responding to the chal-
lenges presented by extremism; it also has the option of setting its sights on the
‘militant’-like ways of the State. That is, in order to bolster essential democratic
values in circumstances where the State feels under attack, the latter must be
protected both from its adversaries and from itself. This is because democratic
governments under threat often tend to choose ‘militant’ routes of action
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against elements they perceive as extremist, as was broadly demonstrated in
chapter 2.
The ‘civil society’ on the one hand strives to reduce levels of extremism and
so limit its manifestations, and on the other it attempts to restrain the govern-
ment’s heavy hand in its fight against extremists. It is the bearer of one of the
main keys to the solution of the ‘paradox of the defending democracy’. However,
before proceeding on to its role in the struggle against extremism, this ‘civil
society’ and its ample virtues should first be defined.
The term ‘civil society’ is not new to the social sciences. Numerous political
scientists, among others Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, de Tocqueville, Hegel,
Marx and Gramsci, have made use of it at one time or another, and in almost
every case the term was used in a different sense, a fact which led it to become
one of the most pliable constructs in the mainstream social-scientific literature.1
In order to avoid the pitfalls and snares of the multifarious senses of the 
term, this discussion adopts the approach of Yishai who, as a first step, chose to
define ‘civil society’ by a process of elimination. According to this approach,
‘civil society’ is a realm whose activities are distinct from those of the domain of
law enforcement (the state), of primordial ties (the family) and of competition,
where the aim is to maximise profits (the marketplace). If so, what then is ‘civil
society’? Yishai’s definition proposes that ‘civil society’ consists of those activ-
ities occasioned within an organisational context, whether established or 
transient, but which do not fall within the context of the private domain. A 
necessary (albeit insufficient) condition for the existence of the ‘civil society’ 
is that its groups are voluntary and based on civilian readiness to contribute
energy, time and resources towards the goal of cooperation with fellow citizens.2
Five principal types of organisation are featured in this definition of the
‘civil society’. First, there is the interest group acting in order to further the vested
– most often, economic–professional – interests of its members, and, second the
self-help group, which caters for either the disadvantaged or a population with
special problems promoting a cause in which its members have a close and tan-
gible interest. These first two may be relevant to the ‘defending democracy’,
whereas the other three certainly have an important role in it. These are: social
movements seeking to effect changes in society or on the state’s agenda; grass-
roots groups striving to influence their close environment and whose activities
revolve around the community or neighbourhood; and, finally, volunteer associ-
ations consisting of citizens whose main objective is to help out and care for the
welfare of their fellow men and women.
Debate on the notion of ‘civil society’ over the years has not been restricted
to the attempt to delineate the boundaries of the concept. The main objective of
the ‘civil society’, according to many scholars, derives from the assumption that
groups and organisations included beneath its banner have a central role in bol-
stering the democratic process. The source of this assumption can be found in
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de Tocqueville’s writings, according to which voluntary associations in the
United States at the turn of the nineteenth century were perceived as the basis
of democratic life.3 In recent years, this view has gained much support in the
works of Robert Putnam, who indicated a relationship between an active ‘civil
society’ and a prospering democracy.4 Indeed, many studies based on this per-
spective underscored the contribution of ‘civil society’ to the democratic process
as well as to processes of democratisation. It comes as no surprise, therefore,
that recently there have been voices proclaiming the potential of ‘civil society’
in relation also to the safeguarding of new democracies from defiant elements
whose source can be found in the extreme right.5
However, this optimism regarding the role of ‘civil society’ in the democra-
tic process has also been the subject of much controversy. One leading criticism
accuses Putnam, by following in de Tocqueville’s footsteps, of neglecting the less
democratic aspect of the ‘civil society’, specifically, its conflictual and violent
aspect. In this latter context, Berman has demonstrated ‘civil society’s’ part in
the rise of the Nazi regime in Germany,6 and Weinberg and Eubank have pre-
sented a similar position in relation to the fascist regime in Italy.7 In view of all
the above, Foley and Edwards chose to introduce an analytical division of the
construct into two principal types. Putnam’s use of the term was called ‘civil
society I’, implying groups contributing to democratic life, whereas, ‘civil society
II’ indicated the conflictual potential of ‘civil society’ associations. This second
type included groups that were part of the social sphere and which engaged in
organising opposition to tyrannical regimes.8 Booth and Richard supplemented
the above classification with a third type, ‘civil society III’, or the ‘uncivil
society’, in which they included active associations of a challenging and violent
nature. The challenge in this case was not aimed at tyrannical regimes but
rather targeted democratic systems of government. Examples of this type of
association are the Ku Klux Klan, the white militias in the United States and the
death squads of Central America.9
Despite the widespread assumption that ‘civil society’ groups of all types,
regardless of their aims or range of activities, constitute an important factor in
the democratic structure,10 this analysis seeks to focus on the phenomenon we
will call the ‘pro-democratic civil society’, i.e. a group of associations all with
one objective, namely, the empowerment of democracy. Apart from its typolog-
ical importance, the classification of ‘civil society’ into three distinct types can
be helpful in defining the status and functions of ‘civil society’ in terms of the
‘defending democracy’ (see Figure 4.1).
The first (civil society I) and the second type (civil society II) show signifi-
cant promise in their ability to protect democracy because these groups are
united under one common goal, the fortifying of democracy; yet, at the same
time, the targets of their activities differ. In other words, while civil society I
invests most of its efforts in society, civil society II directs the bulk of its activi-
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ties toward the state. The combination of the different targets of their activities
is essentially that which grants valuable social facilitation to the ‘defending
democracy’.
To elaborate further, the function of civil society I is to abet democracy prin-
cipally by means of the erosion of extremist infrastructures underlying society
and by attempting to reduce the scope of activities of civil society III which
builds on these underlying foundations. The principal means at the disposal of
civil society I include the following: raising public awareness and mobilising
support for the denunciation of extremist phenomena; tracking the expansion
of extremism and violence; providing succour for the victims of extremism; and,
finally, the reinforcement of the democratic base of society particularly by
means of education.
Figure 4.1 Pro-democratic civil society and the targets of its activities
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The role of the second type of civil society is no less important. Whereas the
thrust of the efforts of type I organisations is aimed at dealing with extremist
phenomena, the second type of ‘pro-democratic civil society’ directs all its activ-
ities towards limiting the state’s response to a substantive conformity to the
notion of the ‘rule of law’. From the perspective of the ‘defending democracy’,
state accountability is just as important as containing anti-democratic elements
because, as noted earlier, in the absence of this type of accountability, state 
legitimacy as well as its moral stature is put at risk.
On the whole, the ‘pro-democratic civil society’ embraces the sum of organ-
isations whose declared goal is the fortification of democracy. This group is inter-
nally divided into two subgroups according to the target of their activities, i.e.
civil society type I and type II groups. Nonetheless, it is important to point out
that despite this typology of organisations according to the target of their activ-
ities, attributes of both the first and second types may appear concomitantly in
certain cases.
‘Civil society’ in Israel
Research dealing in Israeli state–society relations and on the interrelations
between these two as far back as the first days of its establishment consistently
generates one conclusion: for a long period of time, the State of Israel has been
distinguished by a ‘civil society’ reduced in scope and influence. The main expla-
nation for civil society’s weakness in Israel is rooted, as put forward by Yishai,
in the pre-State era when all Jewish settlement in Israel was governed by a polit-
ical elite originating from Eastern Europe. Members of this elite brought with
them a worldview according to which only a centralist and strong state capable
of mobilising its people could lead to the realisation of national goals, foremost
among which was the need to establish a stable Jewish sovereignty in the land
of Israel. In line with this vision, a centralised and paternalistic state or, as
termed by Yishai, a ‘guided democracy’, was instituted in Israel. It was David
Ben-Gurion, the first prime minister of Israel, who encapsulated the distinctions
of the ‘guided democracy’ in the words: ‘It is not important what the people
want, more important is what is necessary for the people.’11
Indeed, guided by Ben-Gurion’s ‘statehood’ orientation, the State was suc-
cessful in harnessing non-governmental bodies, among them, the Keren Kayemet
L’Yisrael (‘Jewish National Fund’) and the Histadrut (‘Labour Federation’12) to its
exclusive interests and, by the same token, was almost completely successful 
in suppressing challenging groups, such as Shurat Hamitnadvim (‘Line of
Volunteers’), a group founded some years after the State’s establishment and
whose goal was to alert attention to and exhort against corruption in the 
governmental system.13
However, it was not only non-political oppositional bodies or movements
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that were absorbed by the State: political parties which were central actors in
the Israeli political system in its early years14 also underwent a similar process.
Although researchers such as Keane or Foley and Edwards15 perceive the insti-
tution of the political party to be part of the ‘civil society’, political parties in
Israel proved to be instruments of the State and assumed an accompanying role
in permeating many aspects of the citizen’s life.16 The considerable centralism
and ideological control of the State over Israeli society eventuated in a condi-
tion describes by Ben-Eliezer as one of ‘democratic coma’.17
In the last few decades the State of Israel has undergone a series of changes
that provided a window of opportunity for the emergence of an active yet at the
same time somewhat detached ‘civil society’. These were economic changes,
manifested mainly in the form of reduced governmental involvement in the
economy and an increase in the quality of life, as well as political changes and,
especially, the decline of the old-guard party blocs of Labour and Likud, tradi-
tionally identified with the State. Further political changes included the bur-
geoning of smaller parties founded on sectoral interests (Shas, Yisrael B’aliyah,
Shinui) which were more closely in tune with certain parts of society, and
changes in the security situation, particularly the growing public fatigue with
the state of incessant tension largely resulting from over-extended IDF control
over the territories of Judea and Samaria.18
Changes in the Israeli ‘civil society’ are specified by Yishai according to six
criteria:
1 A significant growth in the number of civil associations (non-profit organ-
isations19) from 3,000 registered in 1982 to 27,000 in 1998;
2 a change in the profile of the ‘civil society’, manifested primarily in the
decline of large groups closely affiliated to the State, on the one hand, 
and the development of grassroots social groups, both nationwide and
local/community-based, on the other;
3 permutations in patterns of ‘civil society’ action and a significant increase
mainly in public protest;
4 leaders of various movements gained increasing access to policy-makers
and policy-making processes;
5 a greater degree of state response to the demands of the ‘civil society’; and,
finally,
6 the growing legitimacy accorded to the ‘civil society’ by the State.
Unlike times past, when the State fought head-on with ‘civil society’ organ-
isations, the strategy adopted by the State towards the end of the 1990s was to
recognise their legitimacy and to expand the scope of their activities.20
However, despite the rapid growth of the ‘civil society’ in Israel, both Yishai
and Ben-Eliezer demonstrate redoubled caution when endeavouring to define 
its status, especially vis-à-vis the State. Ben-Eliezer adopts a critical stance and
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regards the recent flourishing of the many non-profit organisations (NPOs) in
Israel as deceptive. The gist of his argument is that the hegemonic structure of
the State of Israel was both versatile and prudent enough to absorb NPO poli-
tics, gradually reducing the gap between the State and ‘civil society’ to the point
where the latter, in effect, has been deprived of one of its main roles.21 Yishai
puts forward a somewhat less decisive view and attempts to demonstrate that
while in regard to certain aspects of the ‘civil society’ – particularly, its opposi-
tion role to the government – the State imposes economic, legislative and even
moral limitations on its activities, with regard to groups acting in the interest of
the polity’s stability the State in fact enables them to develop and fulfil their
goals.22
From the perspective of the ‘defending democracy’, three questions arise.
First, is there in fact a group of organisations in Israel which can be identified
as constituting a ‘pro-democratic civil society’? Second, if it is indeed possible to
detect a viable ‘pro-democratic civil society’, will the bulk of its activities, in
accordance with Yishai’s assertion, be directed at the stability of society? And
will those groups whose target is the State suffer from a lack of autonomy and
remain ineffectual? Or, perhaps, in accordance with Ben-Eliezer’s argument,
will all organisations be rendered ineffectual and suffer inclusively from a lack
of autonomy? And, third, with regard to the internal distinctions characteristic
of this ‘pro-democratic civil society’ and its relationship to its environment, are
there indications that one is speaking of a substantive body capable of estab-
lishing itself in a forthright manner as a central social actor at the juncture
between the social and political systems, or is one simply speaking of a passing
phenomenon? In order to answer these questions, I have chosen not to settle for
one research method but rather have combined the findings of a qualitative
analysis together with an analysis of the results from a survey conducted among
associations of the ‘civil society’.
The ‘pro-democratic civil society’ and the ‘defending democracy’ in Israel
Tracing the evolution of the ‘pro-democratic civil society’ in Israel turned out
to be no easy matter, to a large extent because of the relative novelty of the phe-
nomenon in question. The literature documenting it is sparse and the ability to
detect the various groups comprising it is limited. In order to identify as many
groups as possible, a cross-comparison of findings from a number of principal
sources was conducted: the Israeli guidebook to self-help organisations, the
guidebook to bodies operating in voluntary fields, the NPO Registrar, the list
from the ‘New Israel Fund’ and a list of bodies supported by Shatil (Hebrew
acronym for Empowerment and Training Centre for Social Change; literally,
‘plant’ or ‘seedling’). After an initial classification according to their objectives
and the targets of their activities, a list was drawn up of 156 associations which
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met the previously specified criteria of pro-democracy organisations. Each was
sent a questionnaire, and out of 156 80 ultimately responded, which consti-
tuted 51 per cent of the total population of associations. At a later stage, 
in-depth interviews were conducted with representatives of a number of promi-
nent associations from various fields.23
Data analysis was performed in two stages contingent upon the questions
we sought to answer and methodological constraints. In the first stage, based
on the data gathered from associations and in-depth interviews with represen-
tatives of the various groups, our intent was to delineate ‘pro-democratic civil
society’ activities according to the target of its activities (society, ‘uncivil society’
and the State), and to evaluate which of these targets received more emphasis
in practice. Moreover, we attempted to discern features of the interrelations
among the various organisations on the one hand and between those organi-
sations and the Israeli State and society on the other, and to gain insight into
their degrees of success as reported by representatives in relation to their activ-
ities. The second stage was based on quantitative findings collected from all the
relevant factions, and its main purpose was to put forward an additional per-
spective in our evaluation of the support which the ‘pro-democratic civil society’
could potentially provide to the ‘defending democracy’ in Israel. Included in this
evaluation was an analysis of variables related to the ‘pro-democratic civil
society’ itself and variables pertaining to the relationship of these organisations
with their external environment.
The ‘pro-democratic civil society’ in Israel: 
targets and prominent organisations
At first glance, both quantitative and qualitative data already provide at 
this stage a fair indication, albeit partial, of the answer to the first question,
regarding the existence in Israel of the ‘pro-democratic civil society’. Findings
show that alongside ‘civil society’ associations in Israel which are intent on
advancing various ends – and, as a secondary activity, also have a hand in pro-
moting democracy – it is possible to detect a group of organisations (not par-
ticularly large, i.e. 10 per cent of the total population) whose declared objective
is to defend and build up democracy while directing its activities at those same
three targets included in the above definition of the ‘pro-democratic civil
society’.
Society-oriented organisations
A close look at the internal classification of organisations according to the
targets of their activities shows that there is a clear preponderance, more than
80 per cent, of associations which may be called ‘society-oriented’. This large
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group has chosen as its goal the mitigation of the prospects of the extremism
that most likely stems from the dangerous cleavages which divide Israeli society
in general and Jewish society in particular. As for the features of the activities
of society-oriented groups, the majority define their objective as an effort to
strengthen the role of democratic values in Israeli society and to bridge the deep
cleavages cutting across it. These bodies are distinguished by two principal aims:
first, the effort to reduce alienation among different groups in Israeli society and,
second, the dissemination of and education in democratic principles.
The group of organisations working to reduce alienation among various
sectors of Israeli society is distinguished by a relatively low level of institution-
alisation (reflected in certain practical features and their local nature, for the
most part). The activities of associations of this type primarily focus on initiat-
ing meetings among Jewish and Arab citizens, and in the last few years – fol-
lowing the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin – have also attempted
to foster dialogue among secular and religious domains. The combination of
their local, oftentimes community, non-institutional character and the nature
of their activities, i.e. encounters among various groups, places them low on the
scale in terms of their potential for promoting Israeli democracy. The same
cannot be said for the group of associations which aims at strengthening the
democratic foundations of society through educational means.
The description in chapter 3 of the relatively marginal status of democra-
tic studies in Israel can help explain the ‘groundwork of opportunities’ setting
the way for the inception and activities of organisations of this type, particu-
larly beginning in the mid-1980s, when there was an increase in the tendency
towards political extremism among older and younger generations alike. One of
the more prominent organisations at that time was the Adam Institute for
Democracy and Peace, founded in commemoration of the peace activist Emil
Greenzweig, who was murdered in 1983 by a Jewish perpetrator during the
course of a demonstration against the war in Lebanon. The aim of this associ-
ation was to devise and implement educational projects whose purpose was to
promote democracy and peace, an education in active citizenship, an awareness
of equal human rights, the prevention of violence and the resolution of con-
flicts in peaceful ways.24 Use was made of workshops geared to a more adult 
population whose primary aim was to promote discussion of the fundamentals
of the democratic notion. Another, more central, activity was the delivery of
instruction in democratic subject matter at state-run schools. The Adam 
Institute was one of the organisations to be adopted by the Division for 
Democracy and Coexistence in the Ministry of Education (eventually to become,
the Board for the Education of Values) and, through this collaboration, educa-
tors working for the ‘Adam Institute’ were also able to make contact with school
pupils. Although these educational activities were not officially part of the
school system, the programme still presented school pupils with a forum for the
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discussion of democratic values that was almost entirely absent from the formal
study programme.25
The Adam Institute was not the only association to be favoured with the
State’s approval. The Institute for Democratic Education and the Foundations
Institute similarly gained access to the formal education system. Much like the
Adam Institute’s programme, the Institute for Democratic Education sought to
inculcate democratic values among school pupils. The Institute founded the
periodical Panim L’khan U’l’khan (roughly, ‘There Are Two Sides to Things’)
which intended ‘to assist the educational system in reinforcing an education 
in citizenship and democracy, to foster a culture of dialogue, encourage involve-
ment in current affairs, develop critical thinking, cultivate political education,
encourage a tolerance of different opinions and cultivate a democratic person-
ality’.26 Perusal of the journal’s contents reveals that it indeed dealt with an
impressive variety of subjects, including: democratic involvement, the civil
status of Israeli Arabs, tolerance and ethics.27 According to Institute director
Shlomo Tzidkiyahu 67 per cent of state-run schools made use of the periodical’s
subject matter within the context of their school programme, a claim that was
true of the late 1990s. This fact, in his view, demonstrates the Institute’s success
at the time when he was director.28 The modus operandi of the Foundations 
Institute is somewhat different. Its target population is the religious–national
public in Israel and members focus their efforts on introducing educators in reli-
gion to a more holistic worldview which integrates religious belief and values
on the one hand with democratic principles on the other. Rabbi David Atzmon,
a senior moderator of the Institute, uses utmost caution when attempting to
evaluate the degree of Foundations’ success, yet notes that evidence of the effect
of its programmes can be detected in the promotion of pluralistic values among
many educators from the national–religious education sector.29
However, the relative success of associations promoting education in demo-
cratic principles in establishing themselves and building closer ties with the
object of their activities – Israeli society – gives rise to the problematic aspect
noted by Yishai and Ben-Eliezer: specifically, the State’s role as their custodian.
Ben-Eliezer colourfully describes this phenomenon ‘the State’s paternal
embrace’ (his exact term is ‘bear hug’30); Dryzek refers to the process of ‘inclu-
sion’ undergone by these groups.31
One of the main reasons for their survival and their ability to further their
goals is that the state-run education system originally opened its doors to them,
thus allowing them to operate in state ‘territory’. This enabled the associations
to increase the scope of their activities, while simultaneously fostering their
institutionalisation because they were compelled to adjust the nature of their
activities to conform with state dictates. The growing affinity between organi-
sations and State was, however, manifested beyond their access to the education
system. Several willingly fell victim to a process of inclusion with deeper roots:
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that is, they became financially dependent on the Ministry of Education and the
activities of many of them were entirely reliant on governmental budgets.
Indeed, in 1999, when the Ministry of Education introduced a policy discon-
tinuing the funding of those associations engaged in school instruction, the
Coalition of Organisations for the Empowerment of Democracy appealed to the
minister of education and informed him that this decision to defer payments
would in effect lead to a complete suspension of their activities.32
This led to a state of ambivalence, particularly for those same organisations
wishing to operate in the fully state-controlled field of education. On the one
hand, state cooperation was vital in order to gain access to school pupils but, 
on the other, as ties grew closer between the State and ‘civil society’, the
autonomous status of the latter would suffer. If Israeli ‘civil society’ were to
become dependent on the State for its budget, it would, in effect, assume the
properties of a state affiliate, as claimed by Yishai and Ben-Eliezer, who base their
argument on Dryzek’s idea of inclusion, and units of this type were thus drawn
away from the social ‘civil’ sphere and absorbed into the political one.
Results from interviews with these organisations’ executives, as well as the
quantitative data (see p. 156), demonstrate that although they did tend to be
financially dependent on the State in the first years of their activities, in the
course of time and subsequent to recurrent changes in Ministry of Education
policy, they were able to increase their economic autonomy from the State of
Israel, henceforth making it easier for them to operate independently.33
Nevertheless, still unresolved is the predicament in which organisations
that are financially autonomous still depend upon the State for access to the edu-
cation system. In the absence of other programmes providing education in
democratic values, state-run schools remain the main objective for such associ-
ations, so that ultimately the State continues to wield significant power over
them.
‘Uncivil society’-oriented organisations
The circle of ‘uncivil society’-oriented organisations represents an additional
problem associated with the activities of the ‘pro-democratic civil society’ in
Israel. In many European countries, it is often possible to detect earnest partic-
ipation in the civil realm, manifested, for instance, in demonstrations by extrem-
ist and pro-democracy groups congregating on opposite sides of the street.
North America is populated with large, well-established, associations which
often engage in tracking and charting the operations of the ‘uncivil society’ and
which subsequently offer ways of combating the phenomenon. In Israel, on the
other hand, conditions are widely different and the fight against the ‘uncivil
society’ in Israel has over the years been especially circumscribed. The reasons
are varied; however, the most salient explanation appears to be that the divided
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nature of Israeli society make it difficult to determine which is the ‘civil’ and
which the ‘uncivil’ side in the public debate taking place within the context of
the Jewish and democratic State (and this latter definition is itself fraught with
a number of paradoxes, several of which have already been discussed in previ-
ous chapters).
Therefore, even when we consider the imposing demonstrations launched
by the Haredi public against the Israeli judicial system in early 1999 and the
counterdemonstrations mounted by the secular public in support of the judicial
system, to simply subsume these events under the general heading of the ‘civil
society’s fight against the ‘uncivil society’ is problematic. In the first place, this
is primarily because the above events reflect a struggle among political, religious
and secular bodies, a struggle painted in bold partisan colours. Second, both
sides display attitudes which to a great extent conform to state doctrine. While
the secular public sought to support the judiciary and in this fashion underscore
the importance of the democratic element in the State of Israel, the ultra-
orthodox public attempted to restrain judicial measures that in their view had
great consequence for the priorities in the country, and in this way aimed to
bolster its Jewish element.
Therefore, aside from the grassroots initiatives mounted against the various
guises of ‘Kahanism’ which marked the second half of the 1980s and consti-
tuted an exceptional example of public protest against ‘uncivil’ elements, the
majority of public action in Israel would be easier to classify according to the
cleavages cutting across the society rather than on the basis of the analytic
framework of the ‘civil society versus the uncivil society’.34
Another explanation for the dearth of active public objection to ‘uncivil
society’ tendencies is closely linked to the discussion presented in the second
chapter, to wit, the state’s close monitoring of extremist and violent elements
and the exercise of significant force in cases when associations of certain 
types were considered dangerous. The almost absolute control of the State in
response to ‘uncivil society’ activities leaves open only a narrow opportunity for
‘civil society’ associations which seek to be active in this realm. One of the prob-
lematic outcomes of extensive state control and the forceful nature of its oper-
ations is the ensuing damage to basic democratic rights and, in consequence,
the great need for organisations of the type of ‘civil society II’ which will contest
such forceful policy. The role played by these associations in Israel is discussed
below.
An extensive examination of the entire population of organisations cur-
rently active in Israel brings to the fore one particular group: Keshev (‘atten-
tiveness’, ‘ear to the ground’) – The Centre for the Protection of Democracy in
Israel. Keshev’s principal goal is the restraining of the ‘uncivil society’, and it
concentrates on the documentation and exposé of trends, groups and activists
which and who might pose a threat to democracy in Israel. Keshev was instituted
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by a group of intellectuals, attorneys, academicians and public figures in the
wake of the Rabin assassination and it tenaciously protects its autonomy and
finances its campaigns on donations alone. In this fashion, it prevents any ges-
tures of inclusion proffered by the State and preserves its standing as a critical
and a fairly state-defiant association. In operational terms, Keshev systematically
collects information and investigates trends involving the delegitimisation of
state institutions, groups with anti-democratic ideologies and practices, inci-
dents of incitement to violence out of ideological motives, and the enforcement
of the law on these issues. Accumulated information is then analysed and pub-
lished by staff members in the form of investigative findings, reports and infor-
mation sheets. Comparable to American ‘civil society’ organisations engaged in
similar issues, such as the Anti-Defamation League, Keshev submits the reports
it has prepared to government offices in order to draw attention to extremist ten-
dencies and encourage the State to respond with law enforcement, to initiate
new legislation, monitor policy or introduce changes in policy. Although the
principal target of the group is the ‘uncivil society’, Keshev members do not settle
for those activities alone, but, directs resources also towards the State and
society at large. Within the context of its social activities, Keshev is involved in
information campaigns, training and education; it takes part in study days and
seminars, and it assists students and pupils wishing to research democracy and
the threats it faces. Their activities in relation to the State are restricted to those
cases where Keshev members find authorities remiss in enforcing legislation or
when objects of enforcement are chosen on the basis of partial interests, such
as political or ideological preferences.
As for its achievements, the managing-director of Keshev, Yizhar Be’er,
much like his colleagues in other associations, brings up the difficulty involved
in estimating its degree of success in implementing its goals. Still, in his opinion,
the very existence of the organisation and its persistent efforts in detecting anti-
democratic tendencies in the social sphere helps keep these issues on the public
agenda in Israel and requires the State to respond accordingly.35 Be’er’s cautious
statements are certainly thoughtful and to the point. Although Keshev enjoys
full autonomy and is a relatively well-established institution, it still provides an
insufficient basis for the claim that significant action is in fact taken against the
‘uncivil society’ in Israel when, after all, that action is based on this single and
not very large organisation.
State-oriented organisations
Compared to the highly circumscribed arena of organisations with ‘uncivil
society’ tendencies, the state-oriented bodies and their activities are more sub-
stantial: 18 per cent of those included in the survey explicitly asserted that their
actions were directed at the State in the attempt to impact and change policy on
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various issues. However, not all of them can be classified as ‘civil society II’ or
oppositional organisations whose work is devoted to keeping the State’s strug-
gle against extremists within the limits of the ‘rule of law’ and in this fashion
to make inroads into the non-liberal elements characteristic of Israeli counter-
active policy. In effect, a great number of the organisations which aim to serve
the interest of Israeli democracy, while directing their activities at the State have
academic affiliations, such as the Israeli Democratic Institute and the Carmel
Institute for Social Research, which conduct research and hold discussions in
which the principal aim is to propose alternative policies designed to reinforce
the status of state democratic institutions.
Yet, alongside these, there are more militant organisations whose primary
goal is to keep state action within the limits of democratically accepted conven-
tions. The Movement for Quality Government in Israel, for example, has set 
its sights on inculcating democratic norms among public representatives 
and government officials, on improving political culture as well as the ethical
climate in the State, and on the assimilation of a scale of values based on 
foundations that include democratic principles, sound public administration,
ethics and the rule of law. While the Movement employs information campaigns
and even extra-parliamentary means of protestation, the main part of its 
activity is concentrated on the media and the judiciary.36 Despite the notable rep-
utation earned by the Movement’s deeds, its efforts at limiting state action to 
the substantive boundaries of the ‘rule of law’ do not apply directly to instances
where there are ‘irregularities’ in the State’s response to extremists. In this 
type of event, the Movement refers appellants to the Association for Civil 
Rights in Israel (ACRI) – the large and most active such organisation in Israel,
which mainly concentrates on promoting the viability of democracy by means
of restraining the government’s heavy-handedness and by protecting civil
rights.
The main rights which ACRI (established in 1972) fights for are equality,
freedom of expression, freedom of religion and the right to a fair trial.37 The
Association, whose moral dictates are based on the universal proclamation on
human rights ratified by the United Nations Assembly in 1948, and also on the
State of Israel’s Proclamation of Independence, focuses the bulk of its efforts on
the legislative (draft laws on the subject of human rights) and judicial (litigation
for various legal instances, often before the Supreme Court) levels.38 Its defiant
nature requires the ‘Association’ to maintain as much autonomy as possible
from the State. Admittedly, in many cases, in order to move forward various leg-
islative initiatives the help of Members of Parliament is needed, so that activists
must frequent the corridors of power. However, there is no evidence of the
‘inclusion’ of ACRI by sundry governmental bodies, and all of its activities rely
on state-independent sources of finance, whether one is speaking of supporting
funds or membership dues.39
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Much like other organisations, ACRI does not limit itself to specific targets
of action. Granted, its principal target is the State and its goal is the attempt to
constrain the nature of the latter’s counteractive policy, but it still devotes a con-
siderable part of its resources to social issues, particularly for promoting ideas
related to civil and human rights both on educational and public levels. This is
done by its publishing of study and didactic materials and the sponsoring of in-
service training and workshops at universities and schools. Furthermore, ACRI
operatives work with the security forces (army, police, prison services and border
police) with the intention of raising awareness of and sensitivity to the rights of
detainees and suspects in particular and civil rights in general.
Like the majority of groups which comprise the ‘pro-democratic civil
society’, ACRI reports significant accomplishments in the advancement of its
goals. Freedom of expression and political action are two major fields in which
the Association has scored significant points, particularly in the judicial sphere.
As befits a movement which champions liberal values and is not affiliated with
any particular political bloc, the Association has intervened on behalf of
members of all protesting groups, no matter whether they are Arabs or Jews,
secular or religious, left-wing or right-wing. In fact, it has even made efforts to
protect the civil rights of Jewish settlers in the occupied territories and members
of the Kach Movement.40 The achievements of ACRI underscore the vital impor-
tance of civil society type II groups in terms of helping the ‘defending democ-
racy’ advance in the direction of the ‘immunised’ pole of the spectrum. The very
fact that one is speaking of an organisation which advocates democratic-liberal
values, and does not work under the auspices of any specific group, empowers
its status and enables it to raise essential concerns related to the quality of
democracy and place them on the public and judicial agendas of the State of
Israel.
Following the establishment of ACRI, and in the wake of its successes, two
additional associations with similar goals joined the ‘pro-democratic civil
society’ in Israel. The first is the Israeli extension of Amnesty International,
famous for defending individual liberties and directing its actions at State
authorities as well as society. The second organisation is B’Tselem, a local group
which strives to protect human rights in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, so that 
the major part of its activities involves protecting the rights of Palestinians.
However, as just mentioned, on occasion it will also act to defend the liberties of
Jews who live in those areas.41
By this juncture, we should have some grasp of the dimensions of the ‘pro-
democratic civil society’ in Israel, having mapped out the range of its activities
and demonstrated its prominent features. The above analysis points, however,
to a particular obstacle standing in the way of the entire population of organi-
sations in general and society-oriented ones in particular: the ‘danger’ of inclu-
sion by the State and the subsequent weakening of the ‘civil society’. But is 
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one speaking of foregone conclusions? In what follows an attempt is made to
describe a workable resolution to this obstacle, one which also has the potential
of building up the status of ‘civil society’ associations. I refer here to a certain
type of organisation, the foremost example of which is the New Israel Fund,
whose main goal is to aid in the growth of the ‘civil society’ in Israel.
Aid for the development of organisations
Indeed, aside from the fact that, over the years the State of Israel has lessened
restrictions originally imposed on ‘civil society’ activities, the most significant
assistance which has contributed to the growth of the pro-democratic civil
society in Israel has been related to the establishment of the New Israel 
Fund in 1979. The New Israel Fund, the dominant body in financial assistance
for pro-democracy organisations, is a public body launched as a joint initiative
by American and Israeli Jews. The Fund’s main goals, in its own words, are 
to act in the interests of democracy, equality and social justice. The Fund’s assets
come from contributions donated by private individuals who find the goals of
the Fund close to their hearts, and resources are then distributed to non-profit,
non-partisan, organisations active in society and community. However, Fund
activities involve more than best owing financial assistance. In 1982, directors
of the New Israel Fund founded Shatil. The decision to set up Shatil crystallised
after lessons were drawn from the experience of the first three years of its 
operation, that is, after the ‘New Israel Fund’ had financed a number of associ-
ations that proved to be only partially successful. The directors arrived at 
the conclusion that aside from making monetary contributions, there was also
the need for professional consultation services which could provide assistance
to organisations in the relevant areas, from their registration as an NPO and 
the initial raising of capital, to staff and work management, as well as promot-
ing policy changes by means of lobbying and making use of the media. In 
view of the declared goals of the New Israel Fund, Shatil provides professional
training services to NPOs which specialise in the following fields: civil and
human rights; the rights of the Palestinian society in Israel; women’s rights;
Jewish–Arab co-existence; religious pluralism; social justice; and environmen-
tal issues.42
According to Itzik Shanan, media department director of the New Israel
Fund, since its establishment in 1979 the ‘Fund’ has been successful in strength-
ening liberal elements of the Israeli democracy mostly by its considerable
support for organisations which represent peripheral groups, including women,
Arabs, Eastern Jews and in fact the homosexual minority of the country.
However, the combined activities of the New Israel Fund and Shatil have 
also laid the ground for organisations seeking to constrain the State’s actions
and keep them within democratic limits. Approximately one-half of the ACRI
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fiscal budget, for example, has for many years been underwritten by the Fund’s
sources.43
We can therefore assume that the ‘pro-democratic civil society’s’ future in
Israel is rooted, to a great extent, in the ability of pro-democracy bodies to attract
resources and establish their operations while, at the same time, remaining
detached from the State’s strong embrace. The New Israel Fund constitutes a
propitious foothold for these same ventures, especially if they are grassroots
associations which have to rely on limited financial resources. As more
resources are made available to organisations such as the New Israel Fund or
the Jewish Agency (which also has joined the group of benefactors providing
financial assistance), the chances will increase that organisations belonging 
to the ‘pro-democratic civil society’ – especially those in the early stages of
development – will attempt to attract financial support from independent 
funds rather than from the State and in this fashion help build up the autono-
mous status of the ‘pro-democratic civil society’.
To sum up, a number of conclusions can be presented. For some years now,
a perceptible ‘pro-democratic civil society’ consisting of organisations targeting
the various objects included in the above definition has been at work in Israel.
But, at the same time, it must be noted that this population consists of a rela-
tively small number of initiatives which are disproportionately divided in terms
of the targets of their activities. When speaking of activities in relation to the
challenges of extremism in society, we can find a wide variety of organisations
operating in different ways. However, the number of those challenging the State
amounts to one-quarter of the total, and the sum of the organisations active
against the ‘non-civil society’ comes to one.
In the nature of things, it can be assumed that the number of associations
endeavouring to establish democratic values in Israeli society and which operate
in various regions of the country will be greater than the number operating 
vis-à-vis the State. However, the almost negligible amount of activities aimed 
at ‘uncivil’ groups reflects the problematic tendency to blur the boundaries
between the ‘civil’ and the ‘uncivil’ in Israel, and the confusion generated by the
prescriptions of the ‘non-liberal democracy’ among its citizens. Active repre-
sentatives also revealed in interviews a marked bias in estimating their organi-
sation’s ability to advance its objectives. In general, these officials reported
degrees of success, albeit limited. A closer scrutiny reveals that one of the major
pitfalls in their path concerns the operational as well as the ideological aspect of
the ‘non-liberal democracy’. Organisations whose objectives do not present a
challenge to the State of Israel and instead aim to further causes which in many
cases coincide with State objectives often find themselves in a delicate situation.
They become primary targets for ‘non-liberal democracy’, which, because of its
centralist nature, seeks to control as much as possible those activities which take
place in both the political and the social sphere. In operational terms, the State
RJE4  8/15/02  11:21 AM  Page 155
Jewish extremism and violence
156
attempts to assimilate this field of operations by creating an economic depen-
dency on the State. In terms of values, the State endeavours to shape these
organisations in its own image and thus in effect prevent them from presenting
pupils with topics and subject matter which do not fully conform to the values
that the State itself is built on and those it wishes to promote.
These conclusions present the reader with a relatively surprising finding.
Contrary to Ben-Eliezer’s assumption that the general population of organisa-
tions will fall victim to the State’s ‘bear hug’, and perhaps even in contradiction
of Yishai’s position, that the more ‘challenging’ will be the major target of the
State’s arrows, the activities of the ‘pro-democratic’ groups demonstrate that by
their very defiance of the State these associations of civil society type II main-
tain their distance from it and are therefore protected from its policy of inclu-
sion while, in fact, society-oriented organisations (civil society type I), in need of
the State’s auspices, may be subject to its manipulations.
Features of the ‘pro-democratic civil society in Israel’: 
quantitative assessment
The next step was to take stock of the current state of affairs as well as to try to
chart future implications. Therefore, on the basis of the organisations’ survey
results, an attempt was made to estimate the ‘pro-democratic civil society’s’
utility in the ‘immunisation’ of the ‘defending democracy’ in Israel.44 The 
considerable methodological hindrance involved in the quantification and 
measurement of this facilitating potential and in particular the impact of pro-
democratic groups on the robustness of the ‘defending democracy’ in Israel,45
led to the use of a number of variables derived from an index developed by 
Yishai to evaluate ‘civil society’s’ contribution to democracy.46 This index
includes predictive factors on two levels. The first level focuses on inter-
organisational variables, including the socio-demographic and political features
of the organisations themselves. The second level deals in variables concerning
the status of the organisations in relation to the external environment, includ-
ing their degree of reported financial and operational autonomy in relation to
political parties and the State,47 and the degree of cohesion among the different
bodies which constitute the ‘pro-democratic civil society’.
In the final stage, a comparison was conducted between activists’ own
reports on successes in advancing their goals, and the public assessment of the
activities of these organisations based on an opinion poll that was devised spe-
cifically for this part of the research. As already noted, findings from the survey
were compiled at the beginning of 2001 and therefore have the potential to
provide a profile that is up-to-date and at the same time put the account of the
evolution of the ‘pro-democratic civil society’ as portrayed above in a compara-
tive diachronic perspective.
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The emergence of the ‘pro-democratic civil society’ in Israel
Before attempting to appraise the potential of the ‘pro-democratic civil 
society’ in helping the ‘defending democracy’, a finding which provides im-
portant insight to the evolution of the organisations included in this group is
presented.
Figure 4.2, which charts these organisations’ evolution according to the
year they were founded, demonstrates that, regarding both the majority of ‘civil
society’ organisations in Israel as well as the ‘pro-democratic civil society’, the
initial significant growth in their number began in the early 1980s (33 per cent
emerged in that decade in contrast to 6 per cent in the previous decade). This
was the result of several prominent factors, foremost among which were the
window of opportunity which opened following the State’s resolve to allow more
freedom of operation to non-state organisations, the commencement of New
Israel Fund initiatives and, beyond doubt, the unfolding radicalisation in Israeli
society that elicited a sense of discomfort among many population groups,
which in consequence felt the need to respond to this tendency. Figure 4.2 also
shows the gradual increase in number of these associations, while the 1990s
proved to be the peak of growth in their number so far – 49 per cent were

















Figure 4.2 The emergence of a ‘pro-democratic civil society’ in Israel 1950–2000
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Internal features of the organisations
One of Putnam’s central assertions regarding the civil society’s capability in 
supporting democracy addresses the internal heterogeneity of organisations
and the fact that ‘civil society’ guarantees ‘political equality’. In other words, by
virtue of their membership, all organisations are guaranteed equal rights, 
and relations among them are vertical and not horizontal.48 That being the case,
we shall arrange the internal features of the organisations of the ‘pro-
democratic civil society’ according to two major categories. The first consists 
of the socio-demographic features of their members, in order to verify the 
extent of heterogeneity. The second attempts to gauge the nature of these 
organisations in order to see whether democratic practices are also practised
internally.
socio-demographic  features
Survey findings indicate that the tendency of Israeli society in recent years to
split into sectarian subgroups on the basis of ethnicity, religion and ideology,49
which, according to Madison and Olson, presents a threat to democratic states,50
has eluded the ‘pro-democratic civil society’. All organisations participating in
the survey reported high levels of heterogeneity among their ranks. Close to 72
per cent reported that the majority of members did not belong to the same age
group; 73.7 per cent indicated heterogeneity in terms of ethnic origin and com-
munity of members; 75.3 per cent claimed that their association integrates
native-born Israelis and new immigrants; 81.8 per cent reported that the major-
ity of members do not live in one settlement; while 67.5 per cent stated that
members did not belong in the same income group. The lowest finding, as antici-
pated, pertained to the question of nationality: only 45.5 per cent could claim
that their organisation integrates Jews and Arabs. Surprisingly, even this low
figure addressing the integration of Jews and Arabs in various contexts is indi-
cative of a positive trend. Close to half reported cooperation between the two
nationalities, and this in a society where there is an almost complete separation
between these two sectors in all other walks of life.51
The next stage, despite the smaller population sample, which itself
constitutes a methodological limitation, sought to examine the relationship
between the variable of heterogeneity52 in an organisation and the other vari-
ables used. Indeed, there was a nearly significant correlation between hetero-
geneity and year of establishment (r = 0.211, p = 0.067). This meant that the
later the year of establishment, the higher the degree of heterogeneity among
its ranks. This finding is perhaps a positive indication of the democratising
processes to which organisations of the ‘pro-democratic civil society’ were
subject to over the course of time and the possible effect of these processes on
society.
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the degree of  democracy in organisations
Another, no less important, finding concerns the degree of democracy within
the organisations themselves: for, if they declare their support for democracy
but at the same time do not practise a democratic organisational culture, this
might raise suspicions regarding their true nature and their ability to support
democracy.53 Furthermore, according to Putnam, ‘civil society’ organisations
tend to instil among their members cooperative norms and motivate them to
this effect. As a matter of fact, he calls these associations ‘schools in democ-
racy’.54 According to the statements made by some of their representatives who
participated in the survey, the ‘pro-democratic civil society’ in Israel does in fact
tend to adhere to democratic principles with regard to all aspects of organisa-
tional culture: 95 per cent of representatives reported that management is
closely attentive to the needs of their members; 97.5 per cent reported that their
members do not hesitate to express opinions that conflict with those held 
by the leadership. Nearly 79 per cent claimed that there was no one person or
group in their organisation who or which asserted a dominant role in terms of
decision-making.
Although it would be naive to assume that these associations are free of oli-
garchic tendencies, the high percentages of organisational democracy reported
nevertheless give strong indication that one is speaking of a group which not
only assembles under the banner of democracy but practises democratic proce-
dures ‘at home’.
Of the findings so far presented it can be concluded that, internally, organi-
sations of the ‘pro-democratic civil society’ generally tend towards heterogene-
ity, that is, members from different population sectors take part in their activities
and, as a result, in effect they serve as a bridge among the various segments of
society. With regard to intra-organisational practices, it appears that from the
high per centage of those reporting substantial leadership openness to members
regarding the transmission of information and decision-making processes, one
is speaking of organisational apparatuses distinguished by a very low pyramid
structure. In other words, there is a very short distance between rank-and-file
members and directorship, thereby allowing for greater access to democratic
decision-making procedures.
Organisations and their external environment
There is wide agreement among scholars in the field that in order to promote
the democratic process, organisations of the ‘civil society’ must enjoy autonomy
in relation to the State.55 In accordance with Yishai’s approach, this analysis will
try to show that in addition to independence of state bodies, the autonomy of
associations in the ‘civil society’ must demonstrate independence in respect of
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political parties in close proximity to the State.56 However, an organisation’s
autonomy in relation to its surrounding environment does not include its auton-
omy in relation to other civil society organisations. In order to realise its goals,
the ‘pro-democratic civil society’ needs to develop a ‘cohesion’ among associa-
tions which make up the ‘society’ so that it can broaden its contact with society,
on the one hand, and increase its access to the State, on the other.57 So it is nec-
essary to try to determine the extent of organisational autonomy in relation to
the State and the political parties, and, at the same time, evaluate the degree of
internal ‘cohesion’ among organisations of the ‘pro-democratic civil society’.
organisational autonomy
One of the most significant obstacles in the path of the ‘pro-democratic civil
society’ in Israel – as already discussed at length – relates to the repeated efforts
at inclusion by the State and the tendency of groups, in return, to welcome state
initiatives. As noted, one of the most convenient and effective instruments at the
disposal of a state interested in containing the ‘civil society’ is economic lever-
age. Broadly speaking, the majority of organisations active in the civil sphere
are caught up in a constant search for donors or financial resources which will
enable them to pursue their activities. The state, on the other hand, commands
great resources, thus providing it with the means to lure organisations and
include them under its wings. Therefore, to what degree do associations of the
‘pro-democratic civil society’ in Israel, in 2001, enjoy economic autonomy from
the State? The answer to this question is not unequivocal; but, in general, an
optimistic forecast can be made for these groups. Nearly half (45.5 per cent)
reported that they do not receive economic support from any governmental
office, local authority or quasi-governmental body. Another encouraging figure
reflecting on most of the organisations is that 58.4 per cent reported that more
than half of their revenues stem from various non-governmental funds (e.g. the
New Israel Fund and the Jewish Agency) or contributions, while 22.1 per cent
indicated that more than 90 per cent of their budget relies on these sources. 
On the other hand, only 10.4 per cent claimed that more than half of their
annual budget relies on governmental sources, and of these only 2.6 per cent
reported that their entire budget derives from state or state-affiliated authorities.
However, the most significant finding in this regard emerges from an analysis of
the relationship between the year of establishment and the inclination of its
directorship – as they themselves reported – to depend on non-governmental
sources of revenue.58 The correlation (r = 0.331, p = 0.003) demonstrates a sig-
nificant and substantial relationship between the two, leading to the probable
conclusion that the newer the organisation, the greater the likelihood that it will
choose to refrain from close ties with the State. This finding was reinforced
during the course of face-to-face interviews with some of the directors. From
their responses, it may be concluded that newer organisations have internalised
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the lessons of their predecessors about to the snares involved in the State’s
‘embrace’ and henceforth elected an economic course that was autonomous as
possible.
In view of the above, it can be concluded that only a minority of ‘pro-
democratic civil society’ organisations in Israel can in truth be called an
‘appendage’ of the State. These place the means for their very existence in the
hands of the State by foregoing the recruitment of resources from other sources.
A larger circle of associations combines both governmental and other revenues,
while the decisive majority, and especially those more recently founded, rely on
external (support funds) and internal (membership dues) sources of income.
The conclusion to be drawn from the above is that notwithstanding its past suc-
cesses in absorbing the ‘civil society’ and also numerous pro-democracy associ-
ations, the State’s grasp does in fact gradually slacken. This leads to the potential
increase of the ‘pro-democratic’ associations’ contribution to the strengthening
of the ‘immunised’ foundations of the ‘defending democracy’.
ties  with political parties
A further indication of the ‘pro-democratic civil society’s’ growing autonomy is
found in the weak ties these organisations have with political parties. Granted,
the research literature tends to wrestle with the question whether political
parties themselves are not part of the ‘civil society’. Still, in this period of the
‘cartel party’, particularly with regard to the Israeli ‘party-state’, it seems more
probable that the parties’ relation to the State is much stronger than their affin-
ity to society and therefore, as far as the ‘civil society’ is concerned, a lack of
dependence on political parties would be preferable.59 Indeed, 97.4 per cent of
the surveyed groups declared that they never worked for a political party. Over
97 per cent reported that there was no political partisan involvement in organi-
sational activities. Slightly more than 96 per cent stated that they were not
engaged in any type of cooperation with political parties, while 70.5 per cent
reported there was no affinity between their own goals and the aims of any one
of the parties. This last finding, which is relatively low, does not necessarily imply
the existence of any type of association between them and the parties, but is
more likely an indication that an ideational resemblance exists among some of
the organisations and some political parties.
The degree of cohesion in the ‘pro-democratic civil society’
While organisational abstention from ties with the State and with political
parties appears to be a factor contributing to their activities and potential in 
supporting democracy, at the same time, higher levels of cooperation among
organisations themselves may in fact increase the potential impact of the 
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‘pro-democratic civil society’ and, by the same token, help contribute to the 
process of the ‘immunisation’ of the democracy. Having said that, only 33.3 
per cent reported cooperation with other groups, when approaching decision-
makers. Only 22.4 per cent collaborate with other civil society organisations in
public action such as demonstrations, and only 22.1 per cent engage in joint
information campaigns for the public at large. These findings, which clearly indi-
cate low levels of cooperation, can be explained by the fact that many organi-
sations perceive the empowerment of democracy in this country in different
ways while, in addition, both their targets and their strategies of action may be
diverse. These facts limit their ability to work together. Still, it appears that the
tendency to collaborate increases when organisations confront the State. This
finding can be explained by the assumption, perhaps made by the members
themselves, that in order to take full advantage of their potential effectiveness
and pressure, it is most profitable to approach authorities in joint forces. And,
indeed, survey results confirm this last assumption. An examination of the 
correlation between the index of cooperation among organisations and the
index of accessibility to decision-makers generated a significant and high figure 
(r = 0.445, p = 0.00160). That is to say, as the degree of cooperation among
organisations increases, their level of access to the State improves as well. This
finding is further corroborated by the positive and significant relationship
between the index of accessibility and the degree of government response to
their demands (r = 0.255, p = 0.027). This means that high levels of coopera-
tion among them were also found to be in high correlation with the State acced-
ing to their demands.
A summary of the findings concerning organisations’ activities and their
environment shows that there is an impressive development of organisational
autonomy in respect of both State institutions as well as the political parties
closely enmeshed with those institutions. Autonomy in relation to the State is
twice as important, in particular regarding pro-democracy associations operat-
ing against the non-liberal State. The more they are able to maintain their dis-
tance from the State, their ability to be critical of it increases without fear of
reprisal. This is true for organisations whose target is society and who wish to
introduce citizens to values different from those inculcated by the State. In par-
ticular, it applies to those whose goal is to constrain State activities. For associa-
tions of this sort to perform their role effectively, freedom from State controls is
a necessary condition.
As for the low levels of cohesion among pro-democratic organisations, 
this can be an indication of the local nature of most associations. They are 
relatively small groups whose limited resources prevent them from searching for
potential associates aspiring to similar goals. However, the correlations pre-
sented above demonstrate that, at least in terms of their activities vis-à-vis the
State and despite the obstacle just noted, if they do in fact manage to increase
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levels of cooperation among themselves, they will be of greater assistance in the
advancement of the goals of the ‘pro-democratic civil society’.
Organisational achievements
The evaluation of the degree to which organizations fulfil their goals and, 
moreover, of their ability to help the ‘defending democracy’ move in a more
‘immunised’ direction is a complex task due to the nature of the dependent 
variable and the existence of numerous intervening variables which are liable
to obscure the picture. Of course, it is possible to rely on statements made by 
the organisations’ directors while attempting to assess the outcomes of their
labours, as I did in the first part of the chapter. However, to obtain a clearer
picture, it was decided to adopt additional indices which might at least provide
corresponding indications of success. Therefore, the survey included an open
question in which representatives were asked to estimate the degree of organi-
sational success in reaching the goals they had originally set for themselves. The
answers to this question indicate that the majority (more than 80 per cent), and
in particular those whose main target of activities was society, tended to be 
satisfied with their degree of success in furthering their goals, although, as in
the in-depth interviews, the bulk of respondents noted that there was still a long
way to go before they could say that they had realised those goals. The target 
of their actions, Israeli society, also revealed relatively high levels of satisfac-
tion about the activities of these organisations. This item is confirmed by the
outcome of the survey, which included a representative sample of the adult
Jewish population in Israel. The majority of subjects, 68.7 per cent, expressed
high levels of satisfaction with pro-democratic voluntary activities which strug-
gled to reinforce the promulgation of democratic values and which also made
an effort to bridge the gaps dividing the various sectors of Israeli society. Fur-
thermore, 17.5 per cent of respondents reported that they themselves were
taking part (at the time of the interview), or had done, in activities fronted by
organisation of this type. The composite of these findings proves that the Israeli
public welcomes activities of civil society type I. The reason for the considerable
show of support is, in my opinion, that these organisations by their very exis-
tence emphasise the importance of bringing people together and of providing
an education in values, and as a result have acquired a more positive public
image.
In terms of their activities vis-à-vis the State, organisations also report 
significant gains. Success, in this case, was measured according to the degree 
of organisational access to policy-makers and the extent to which the latter
responded to their demands.61 In terms of accessibility, 52.5 per cent of repre-
sentatives reported that they appeared at least once a year before one of the
Knesset committees. As for contacts made with representatives of the executive
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authority, 85.7 per cent reported having met in the course of the previous year
with a high-ranking governmental official: 59.7 per cent met with a director-
general or vice-director-general of a governmental office; 62.7 per cent met with
a governmental minister; and 15.7 per cent with the prime minister himself.
These findings demonstrate a relative openness on the part of the State and its
various authorities towards organisations of the ‘pro-democratic civil society’.
But is this openness a type of lip-service or does it in fact reflect a willingness of
the State to in fact meet the demands of these associations? The answer to that
question is quite surprising, for 71.8 per cent of organisational officials reported
that State authorities generally acceded to their demands and only 28.2 per cent
reported a more indifferent response.
From the findings so far presented, a rather optimistic picture emerges
which implies that both Israeli society and governmental elites display con-
siderable tolerance to activities of the ‘pro-democratic civil society’ and in fact
reveal a noticeable inclination to be of some assistance to them. However, the
survey we conducted also produced one finding that may temper these opti-
mistic results and is liable to raise doubt over the Israeli public’s apparent whole-
hearted willingness to move in the direction of the ‘immunisation’ side of the
continuum. This finding is an indication of the public’s attitude to organisations
attempting to constrain the State’s heavy-handedness in its response to extrem-
ists and in particular its attitude to the Association for Civil Rights. About 
52 per cent of the respondents stated that actions taken by associations such 
as ACRI, the aim of which is to constrain the State’s response to extremism, 
pose a threat to state security. A prudent look at the data reveals that despite the
apolitical character of ACRI and the many instances in which it laboured to
defend the civil rights of radical right-wing activists, the political affiliation 
of the individual survey respondent influences his/her attitude to ACRI. Re-
spondents who defined themselves as inclining toward the extreme right-wing,
right-wing or centre of the political spectrum, displayed a greater degree of
hostility toward ACRI’s activities (57.7, 61.1 and 51.2 per cent, respectively) 
in comparison with left-wing and extreme left-wing supporters (37.3 and 
11.1 per cent, respectively).62 Notwithstanding the political significance of this
finding, it also underscores results presented in earlier chapters demonstrating
that in Jewish Israeli society there is still a longing for a hard-line security estab-
lishment which is not obliged to adhere to liberal values and would be able 
to respond to political extremism as its sees fit. The most prominent finding, 
in my view, has to do with the fact that, ironically, a noteworthy per centage 
of respondents who described themselves as pro-left-wing and extreme left-wing
expressed reservations regarding ACRI activities. This finding is further evidence
of the weakness of the liberal component in Israeli society and its willingness 
to proceed only hesitatingly in the direction of the ‘immunised’ road to 
democracy.
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Conclusions
In the first part of this chapter, it was suggested that the ‘pro-democratic civil
society’ and its activities have significant potential in moving the ‘defending
democracy’ from the ‘militant’ pole to the ‘immunised’ pole of the continuum.
Despite the considerable difficulty in determining a causal relationship between
the activities of the ‘civil society’ and the ‘immunising’ process of the ‘defend-
ing democracy’ in Israel, the findings presented here have important implica-
tions for this assumption. However, before discussing these results, a summary
of the conclusions drawn from the findings is presented.
First and foremost, over the last few decades it has become evident that 
a group of organisations which can be called the ‘pro-democratic civil society’
has flourished in the State of Israel, and the rate of growth of these organisa-
tions is gradually increasing. A classification of this population of associations
according to their targets and a review of their activities reveal that the decisive
majority of these organisations work with their sights set on Israeli society, and
their goals include an effort to bridge between the various sectors of the popu-
lation and so strengthen the democratic foundations of society. A smaller group
of organisations directs its work at the State in the attempt to constrain gov-
ernmental responses to extremism and political violence within the accepted
limits of the ‘rule of law’ in a democratic society. Finally, the smallest group,
actually a single organisation, defines the ‘uncivil society’ as the principal object
of its operations, which consist in raising the alarm about anti-democratic
groups and working in opposition to them.
Still, the bare existence of the ‘pro-democratic civil society’ in Israel does
not yet indicate whether it is capable of moving the ‘defending democracy’ from
the ‘militant’ to the ‘immunised’ end of the continuum. Therefore, two ques-
tions were included in the survey to investigate the extent of this capability. The
first question aimed to assess the degree of organisational autonomy in relation
to the State and the effects of this autonomy on the civil society’s potential
‘immunising’ capability. The second question was an elaboration of the first, and
attempted to include, among the factors contributing to its ‘immunising’ poten-
tial, additional elements concerning the internal dimensions of organisations
and the relations of organisations with their environment.
In order to reach conclusions that would help answer these questions, 
an additional – evolutionary – perspective appeared necessary because, as
explained above, the State of Israel has for many years persistently acted to 
constrict the autonomy of certain bodies not within its custodial reach. It also
carried out a similar policy with regard to organisations of the ‘pro-democratic
civil society’. However, contrary to expectations, the group of associations that
actively questioned state policy was not the group to suffer from the State’s ‘bear
hug’, which was reserved for the group whose goal was the assimilation of
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democratic values by Israeli society. Yet, a (diachronic) look to the future seems
to imply some weakening of the State’s strength. As figure 4.2 illustrates, the
number of organisations populating the ‘pro-democratic civil society’ is signifi-
cantly increasing. The more recently established organisations mentioned above
are operating in a more favourable environment than had their predecessors. In
the first place, this is because of the widening possibilities of financial backing
provided by extra-state organisations. Second, newer groups have internalised
the lessons of the past, and thus assume an attitude of ‘respect and suspicion’
towards the State while maintaining as great a distance as possible from the long
arms of its ‘paternal embrace’. Therefore, in answer to the first question, I would
tender the view that the degree of autonomy of these organisations appears to
be growing, thus improving the prospects of establishing a ‘pro-democratic civil
society’ in the State of Israel.
The second question raised above asked whether, in addition to their
increasing autonomy, organisations also enjoyed conditions conducive to their
development and which have an effect on the nature of the Israeli ‘defending
democracy’. The answer to this question is, in the main, positive. The survey
shows that with regard to their internal characteristics, Israeli associations
conform to the theoretical conditions posed by Putnam in respect of the ‘civil
society’. In the case of Israel, one is speaking – in socio-demographic terms – of
a highly heterogeneous group and of organisations which adhere as much as
possible to a democratic and egalitarian framework. As for their relation to the
external environment, aside from their growing independence of the State, they
also enjoy autonomy from political parties, a fact which reinforces the view that
the ‘pro-democratic civil society’ has indeed chosen the path of self-sufficiency.
But, this state of affairs also gives rise to the question: can one be speaking of
too much autonomy? According to the results of our study, there is limited coop-
eration amongst organisations, a fact which may potentially weaken their pres-
ence and diminish their accomplishments. Indeed, figures indicate that high
levels of collaboration are found to be correlated with high levels of accessibil-
ity to the State and its institutions, and there is no reason not to suppose that
these concerted efforts will also be effective vis-à-vis society. Therefore, it seems
that if the ‘pro-democratic civil society’ continues to maintain its autonomy
from the State and state agencies and at the same time improves levels of cohe-
sion among its various organisations, this may very well lead to a growth of its
effective potential.
Yet, after the relatively optimistic appraisals of the civil society’s potential
impact on the ‘defending democracy’ in Israel, a number of reservations of not
insignificant merit deserve attention. First and foremost, the ‘pro-democratic
civil society’ in Israel consists of a limited number of organisations which, when
classified according to the targets of their organisational activities, present us
with a clearly unbalanced picture. A prominent example of this disproportion-
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ate profile concerns the single organisation whose object is the ‘uncivil society’.
As noted above, the reasons for the dearth in this category are numerous and
complex, whereas the number of extremist groups is not small and the job of
dealing with this sector remains entirely in the hands of the State, which is pre-
disposed to ‘militant’-like counteractive strategies, often substantially straying
from the narrow confines of the idea of the ‘rule of law’ in a democratic society.
This weak spot is liable to hamper the progression of the ‘defending democracy’
in the direction of the ‘immunised’ pole of the continuum.
Another principal issue, related to the emergence of the ‘pro-democratic
civil society’ in Israel, was articulated in the results of the public opinion survey.
Despite the support professed by the adult Jewish population for the ‘pro-
democratic civil society’, it appears that this approval is somewhat reserved and
limited to those organisations dealing in educational and strictly humanitarian
causes while, in the same breath, the public expresses considerable disaffection
toward those groups which attempt to constrain the heavy-handedness of state
security. These findings are similar to other attitudes evidenced by the survey
which demonstrate that liberal democratic principles are not exactly at the top
of the agenda of the Jewish public in Israel. This is particularly true when those
principles clash with concerns related to state security or the country’s Jewish
nature.
A final point of reservation warranting attention derives from the integra-
tion of findings from chapter 3 with those of the present chapter. The expan-
sion potential of the ‘pro-democratic civil society’ is contingent upon the
evolution of a new generation of citizens who find democracy and its values
dear to its heart. One of the principal ways of establishing such a generation,
according to those engaged in the field of citizenship education, is via the 
education system. Results from a survey we conducted at Israeli high schools
demonstrate that the mobilising potential of the ‘civil society’ among adolescent
students from state-run schools is not substantial. As was described at length in
chapter 3, despite receiving civics lessons at school, graduates of the Israeli edu-
cation system are not characterised by high levels of support for liberal democ-
ratic values. This finding was even more pronounced among adolescents from
the group that did not study civics. It is moreover pertinent to note here that for
pupils in the Haredi–independent and national–religious education systems, the
democratic component of their education is altogether marginal. The conclu-
sion is that in the absence of further reformation of the study curricula in the
country, a dark shadow will continue to hover over the prospects of establish-
ing a ‘pro-democratic civil society’ in Israel.
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The ‘defending democracy’: 
from the ‘militant’ 
to an ‘immunised’ route?
This  chapter has three principal objectives. First, on the basis of thefindings of the first four chapters, it will provide a synopsis of the Israeliresponse to Jewish extremism and political violence. This will extend from
the early days of the State’s existence until the beginning of the new 
millennium, with an emphasis on current developments. Such a historical per-
spective will enable us to assess the degree of success of the Israeli ‘defending
democracy’ in moving from the ‘militant’ pole to the ‘immunised’ pole 
on the continuum of the policy of response. An attempt is made to find the
‘golden path’, that is, a middle way which reconciles between the state’s duty of
and right to self-protection in the face of its adversaries, on the one hand, and
avoidance of a descent into counteractive strategies deviating from democrati-
cally legal and moral frameworks, on the other. Then, in the second part of the
chapter, the Israeli response is viewed in a comparative perspective with policies
of other democracies, specifically, the United States and Germany. Drawing 
a comparison with these countries will help clarify conclusions arising from 
previous chapters. It will also help answer the question: to what degree are 
these conclusions applicable to the response policies of other democracies?
Finally, the theoretical issues deriving from this research are presented and
several questions which remain unanswered and deserve further discussion are
addressed.
The ‘defending democracy’ in Israel: developments and challenges
In the Introduction to this book, I described the frustration I experienced in the
wake of the murder of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. This feeling was evoked by
the thought that in the final decade of the twentieth century, the State of Israel
had been subject to defeat on two fronts. State authorities had failed both in their
fight against political extremism and in their efforts to keep the struggle against
extremists within the boundaries of the ‘rule of law’ in a democratic country.
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Over the years, there have been many and varied threats to the country’s
democracy. However, it would seem that there has been a significant decrease
in the intensity of the State’s response to the manifestations of extremism (from
political parties, extra-parliamentary and violent organisations, etc.), since its
early days and up to the end of the twentieth century.
The foremost indication of the change in the State’s policy of response can
be seen in the new legal and judicial barriers stipulating delimited frames of
democratic tolerance, and the growing emphasis on political liberties. These
have replaced, in most cases, the administrative barriers the State used in its first
decades. Their primary objective was the restraint and suppression of extrem-
ists without consideration of the cost of such actions.
Chapter 1 demonstrated the changes in the Israeli response to extremist
parties and concluded with the optimistic assessment that, in terms of its gov-
ernmental institutions, the State of Israel has indeed travelled a long and sig-
nificant road. An extensive legal system has been created, intended to safeguard
democracy from extremist political parties and, at the same time, impose numer-
ous restrictions on authorities with the intention of ensuring the liberties and
rights of those same political parties. In fact, the analysis of the characteristics
of the response of the judicial and political systems in Israel toward extremist
parties reveals a minimal enforcement of restraining laws originally adopted by
the State. It demonstrates an earnest regard for the protection of democratic
rights on behalf of the legislature but even more so on behalf of representatives
of the judiciary’s authority.
An extensive examination of the policies of the Central Elections Commit-
tee and the Supreme Court of Justice over the years provides ample grounds for
the assertion that there is little danger of a substantive restriction of the bound-
aries of public discourse by the non-registration or disqualification of extremist
parties of different shades and colours. Apparently, after opening up public dis-
course in Israel to a wide diversity of opinion, the authorities are now trying to
contain this discourse within the acceptable limits of the law. For example,
Justice Mishael Heshin, chairman of the Central Elections Committee for the six-
teenth Knesset (scheduled for the year 2003), determined that an Arab list aspir-
ing to change Israel into a state for all its citizens does not negate the existence
of the State of Israel as a Jewish state.1 Of course, one may dispute the judge’s
conclusions. However, they are still in fact an indication of the judiciary’s incli-
nation to preserve the broad boundaries of public discourse in Israel and its
intent to ensure representation in the legislature for as many sectors of the 
population as possible. These developments undoubtedly contribute to the
‘immunisation’ of the Israeli democracy.
It would seem, then, that in its policy towards extremist parties, Israel is 
at a relatively stable juncture. The profile presented in chapter 2 reviewed the
State’s response to extra-parliamentary and violent manifestations of political
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extremism. It stressed the dual nature of the State – torn between the inclina-
tion to anchor its response within the boundaries of the rule of law while main-
taining the protection of its security even at the expense of harming democracy.
As a result, steps taken by the State towards a more restrained policy of coun-
teractivity have been hesitant and often marked by stops and starts. An example
of the State’s adherence to a legal democratic framework can be found in the
substantial progress effected in the initiative to secure the Shabak’s status in law.
In the summer of 2001, the Shabak Bill was laid on the table of the Committee
for Foreign and Security Affairs and the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice
Committee in preparation for a second and third reading, and thus its final
passage into law. This law, even if flawed, has the potential to edge the State,
even if only a few steps, in the direction of the ‘immunised’ pole by the very fact
that, for the first time, the objective and powers of the Shabak, as well as the
means of accounting for its actions, will now be more clearly defined.2
Another step in the same direction can be detected in the Ministry of
Justice’s repeated efforts to address state policy regarding the ‘incitement to vio-
lence’ offence and confine it to a legal framework, thus replacing the Ordinance
for the Prevention of Terrorism and other widely used administrative measures.
In the summer of 2001, the Government submitted a bill on its own behalf
which stated that incitement to violence was a criminal offence. In the words of
the law’s proposal: ‘An individual who publicly appeals for an act of violence or
expresses support for such an act – whereupon the contents of the appeal or the
circumstances in which it was made public are liable, with great likelihood, to
bring about the implementation of such an act – will be sentenced to five years
in prison.’ The bill also mandates a sentence of one (unconditional) year of
prison for an individual who has upon his or her person publication matter of
a violent nature and who intends to distribute it. Although this draft law has
provisions which may restrict the boundaries of freedom of expression in this
country, it is still a noticeable improvement in relation to the current situation,
in which the Ordinance for the Prevention of Terrorism is enforced as a princi-
pal measure in the prosecution of incitement offences. The new law will create
a situation in which the prosecution of criminal incitement to violence will be
a protracted procedure and subject to severe scrutiny by the judiciary. In such
an event, there is greater probability that the courts of justice, where freedom
of thought and action have proven in recent years to be guiding principles, will
assign the law a narrow (more specific) interpretation and demand decisive
proof regarding the actuality of the offence, as stipulated by the law, before
declaring guilt. However, in order to invest this law with real authority, 
Kremnizer’s approach, endorsed by Professor Ze’ev Segal, must be adopted.
According to Kremnizer, concurrent with the passing of the said law, the
‘offence of sedition’ should be struck from the law books because it is too broad
and sweeping, and is liable to lead to the unreasonable limitation of the freedom
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of expression.3 Furthermore, if the State of Israel indeed seeks to anchor its
response in a legal framework which relies on a genuine notion of the rule of
law, then, in addition to the annulment of the sedition offence, the Ordinance
for the Prevention of Terrorism should also be limited. This should also apply to
a variety of administrative regulations at the State’s disposal which have always
empowered it to deal with extremist manifestations while significantly circum-
venting the criminal court system.
However, as past events have shown, when there is any type of policy shift
towards more liberal forms of response to violent and extremist phenomena,
often a change in security conditions, together with political considerations, can
ultimately lead to the suspension of the reformation process and may in fact cul-
minate in a reversal in policy. An example is the bill attempting to outlaw
support for terrorist organisations, which was raised for debate in June 2001 on
the basis of the continuing Palestinian uprising in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. 
A bill designed to restrict the freedom of expression of Arab Members of
Parliament who condone guerilla and terror forces operating in southern
Lebanon and in the areas of the Palestinian Authority similarly embodies a
genuine potential for restricting the freedom of expression of extremist Jews
who support movements defined as terror organisations, such as Kach or Kahane
Hai. Despite governmental reservations regarding this bill, if it nevertheless does
pass into law, it could push back freedom of expression for many years.4
The bill was hastily pushed before the Knesset in direct response to many of
the Jewish public’s gut reaction to Arab Members of Parliament who expressed
their identification with the Palestinians’ struggle. It gives an indication of the
main hindrance impeding the movement of the Israeli ‘defending democracy’
in a more immunised direction, a weakness that has received attention through-
out this book. This weakness is located the political–cultural infrastructure 
in Israel, which is still very far from the liberal democratic vision. A central
assumption outlined in the Introduction was that for the ‘defending democracy’
to make the transition from the ‘militant’ to the ‘immunised’ route, it would take
more than just a reduction in the intensity of the State’s response to extremism.
In order to arrive at the goal of ‘immunisation’, the scope of the response must
also be extended and the principal expression of this must be the strengthening
and fortifying of the democratic infrastructure of Israeli society. Until liberal
democratic ideas are internalised by the majority of the different walks of life in
Israeli society, the State will be goaded by its citizens and their representatives
to strike as forcefully as possible at those perceived to be its ‘enemies’, whatever
might be the price in terms of democracy.
However, this is neither the only nor the outstanding problem stemming
from the non-liberal socio-cultural infrastructure. This type of infrastructure
provides fertile ground for the germination and flourishing of extremist phe-
nomena and their consolidation into political alternatives liable to constitute a
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threat to the State. As noted above, when the State is subject to repeated threats
by society, it is more liable to toughen its response policy and to reintroduce mea-
sures whose admissibility in democratically governed countries is in doubt. Only
recently, we were witness to evidence of this phenomenon with the adoption of
severe and undemocratic counteractive measures against representatives 
from the right-wing camp in the months following the assassination of Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin.
The conclusion drawn from the analysis in chapters 3 and 4 submits that
policy-makers in Israel, in the context of the struggle against extremism, seek
to constrain the activities of state institutions and keep them within democra-
tic boundaries which are as distinct as possible. They then attempt to refrain
from using severe measures capable of undermining the polity’s ethical foun-
dations, but have not been successful so far in offering a preventative and
‘immunised’ treatment in terms of the social underpinnings of the phenome-
non of extremism. In consequence, a situation fraught with paradox has
evolved. In the past, the scope of the response was fairly circumspect, as 
state authorities concentrated their efforts on dealing only with the symptoms
of the phenomenon while disregarding their perpetrators. More recently, there
has indeed been significant moderation in the intensity of the response toward
the symptoms, thus making it easier for the State to maintain its democratic
character. However, at the same time, the State has not invested in the empow-
erment of the democratic foundations of its citizenry, so that there has not been
an equally significant reduction in the intensity of the challenges faced by the
State.
Research results displayed in previous chapters indicate that the adult
Jewish population is far from presenting a sound democratic worldview. Still, the
findings of the survey conducted among adolescent students from Israeli high
schools show that among pupils who participated in civics lessons in their new
format there are signs of a tendency towards democratic values, compared to
their counterparts who did not take the course. This outcome implies that even
the limited efforts invested by the State in the inculcation of democracy have
yielded their first fruits. It can therefore be inferred that if the Kremnizer
Report’s recommendations are fully implemented, thus leading to the substan-
tial reinforcement of democracy in the State of Israel, there will be an improve-
ment in the prospects that the democratic foundations of the Israeli public will
be significantly strengthened.
The fly in the ointment, however, concerns the non-liberal constraints on
Israeli democracy involved in the processes of policy-making, which prevent
movement in the ‘immunised’ direction. Evidence of this was apparent in early
2001 when Limor Livnat, a seasoned conservative politician, was appointed
minister of education. One of Livnat’s first formal statements on taking up her
appointment was to the effect that she would permit independent religious 
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education systems to retain their pedagogical autonomy, that is, continue to
teach religious subject matter rooted in a nationalist orientation in the absence
of democratic checks and balances. In addition, she intended to adopt the
Shinhar Report and launch a revolution of values in the state-run schools with
the purpose of bolstering Jewish national identity among pupils. And, indeed,
in May 2001, a broad reform of high school study curricula was initiated. In
the context of this reform, the nationwide study programme was supplemented
with a new field called ‘The Heritage of Israel’ which included, inter alia, the
teaching of texts from the Talmud and the Torah and the introduction of pupils
to significant personages in the history of Zionism. Prima facie, there is nothing
wrong with this: democratic polities all over the world strive to inculcate their
national traditions among their pupils. Still and all, according to Minister
Livnat, the main goal of reform was ‘to build a common basis for all pupils of
Israel which will be grounded in Jewish, Zionist and nationalist values’.5 But
what about the other aspect of the Israeli union of Judaism and democracy, that
is, the delivery of instruction in democratic values? The minister’s decision on
this issue was unequivocal. Livnat declared that the recommendations of the
Kremnizer Report were not to be implemented at that stage other than in a trial
format and then only at a number of designated schools.6 In this fashion, the
Ministry of Education ended up with neither one thing nor the other. First, 
it rejected the implementation of the Kremnizer Report and frustrated the 
reformation of citizenship education. Second, the Shinhar Report, which was
intended to build up the inculcation of Israeli heritage in schools yet proposed
to do this in the context of a humanistic and pluralistic approach, was 
interpreted by the Ministry’s directors in such a way as to stress its ethno-
nationalist particularistic aspects.7
The odds that this education policy – which once again weakens the
prospects of instilling democratic values in Israeli society – will be significantly
contested by organisations of the ‘pro-democratic civil society’ are not promis-
ing, despite the accelerated growth of these institutions in recent decades and
the considerable efforts of their members to advance their goals. A number of
obstacles remain in place, making it difficult to pursue these aims: the number
of organisations nationwide engaged in the provision of instruction in democ-
ratic values is still limited, the resources at their disposal are in short supply and
their access to the education system is restricted. Therefore, it seems that, at least
for the near future, Israeli pupils and students are destined to undergo an
exhaustive and persistent socialisation in ethno-nationalistic values and at the
same time will receive only a partial and diluted socialisation in democratic and
humanistic principles.
From the above, it may be deduced that the State of Israel today is at a cross-
roads. While its policy of response to symptoms of political extremism and vio-
lence has renounced the ‘militant’ pole of the continuum and instead is making
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its way towards the ‘immunised’ pole, as regards the social underpinnings of
extremism the movement along the continuum is much slower, and at times
may even seem to be in the opposite direction. This predicament has raised
doubts over the continuation of the State’s restrained response to the agents of
extremism and, consequently, also over the system’s stability and the extent to
which it can nevertheless continue to exist as a democratic polity.
In this case, we find the Israeli ‘defending democracy’ faced with two prin-
cipal options. The first will be to return to ‘militant’ types of response. This path
will perhaps make it feasible for government elites to preserve governmental sta-
bility in a state of increasing social pressure, but it will also place the status of
Israel as a democracy in serious doubt. The second option is to move in the direc-
tion of the ‘immunised’ route. However, that alternative will be able to hold its
own only if the State and the ‘pro-democratic civil society’ are successful in
establishing a democratic political culture and are able to reduce the extremist
threats facing the State, thus minimising the incentives for exercising harsh
measures against expressions of extremism and violence.
I have to confess that any attempt, no matter how cautious, to forecast the
future of the ‘defending democracy’ in Israel leaves me in two minds. While my
heart is with the second alternative, that is, the ‘immunisation’ of the Israeli
democracy, a glance at social and political reality in the country reveals the not
unlikely prospect of movement in the direction of the ‘militant’ pole.
This evaluation is based first and foremost on ill winds which have been
blowing for many years now among different sectors of Israeli society. Some of
its main manifestations are hostility towards various groups, disdain for liberal
values and the rule of law, and a tendency to regard democracy as secondary
to nationalist and occasionally religious convictions. Over the course of time,
and in the absence of a proper substructure of checks and balances taught by
the education system, there has been a diffusion of these attitudes and they have
become a central aspect of Israeli political culture.
Assuming that things will not unexpectedly change, and taking account of
the fact that the paradoxes inherent to the Jewish democratic State do not seem
to be near solution, it is not easy to envisage the Israeli governmental system
and its various affiliates reaching an all-embracing decision to upset the status
quo and inculcate democratic values in the education system while paying
tribute to liberal ideas. Support for this prognosis comes from the fact that, in
spite of Israel’s encounter with Rabbi Kahane and his ideology, and notwith-
standing the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, the Ministry of
Education has still not undertaken any revolutionary policy changes towards
the assimilation of democratic values.
A feasible, albeit partial, resolution of the tension between the State’s aspi-
ration to preserve its Jewish national foundations and the need to empower its
democratic character is embedded in the ability of the State’s leadership to shrug
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off, once and for all, the perception of these two elements as a zero-sum game.
In other words, Jewish national and democratic values should not be viewed as
clashing and competing principles inevitably leading to the complete subordi-
nation of the democratic quality to the Jewish element. The other side of the
coin is that these principles may be treated as complementary and in fact 
presented side by side. Of course, this is not a flawless solution, for there are
undoubtedly several substantial points of conflict in the juxtaposition of Jewish
principles in their prevailing orthodox interpretation in Israel with the conven-
tional tenets of democracy. Yet, instead of the ostrich-like policy adopted by the
leaders of the education system over the years, which supports the view that
pupils should not be presented with issues that are controversial or a threat to
the national consensus, the future citizens of this country should in fact become
acquainted with the entire complex of circumstances pertaining to the existence
of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state, including both comple-
mentary and conflicting topics in respect of the dissent among religious beliefs,
ethno-nationalist ideas and the principles of democratic thought. The advan-
tage of this proposed solution over the current state of affairs is that it opens 
up the possibility of Israeli pupils grasping the complicated reality in which they
live and in fact of developing the discriminating tools needed to deal with this
situation.
However, a change in the nature of the Israeli pupil’s familiarity with politi-
cal and social reality in the country is not the only aspect which may help steer
the ‘defending democracy’ in the direction of the ‘immunised’ route. As noted
in chapter 4, the ‘pro-democratic civil society’ is a non-state-affiliated actor with
significant potential for strengthening the ‘defending democracy’: yet, in order
to capitalise on this latent potential, the ‘pro-democratic civil society’ in Israel
must be autonomous and free to act. At this point, we once again encounter the
non-liberal character of the Israeli democracy; however, this time, the obstacles
facing the centralist custodian State, which elsewhere was colourfully described
as embracing society in a ‘bear hug’, are not so formidable. As demonstrated in
many other spheres, and in particular the economic sphere, the State of Israel
has gradually eased its iron grip on many economic sectors and allowed other
forces to take its place. Therefore, with regard to the ‘civil society’, it seems 
that the State should continue the process of its liberation from the ‘statehood’
mentality and expand even further the range of social organisation activities.
Although, at first, the chances are that a number of organisations closely affili-
ated to the State will undergo difficulties, especially of a financial kind, as the
survey reported here shows, those not dependent on state economic support
would be able to find other sources of finance. At the same time, the autonomy
they enjoy enables them to fill an important role as a critic of the State, and that
may be of some benefit in moving the ‘defending democracy’ in the direction of
‘immunisation’.
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While such solutions are not perfect, it is my view that if and when the State
elects to adopt them, its prospects of moving slowly but surely toward the goal
of ‘immunisation’ will, in due course, improve instead of possibly drifting back
to the ‘militant’ pole of the spectrum.
The ‘defending democracy’ in comparative perspective
One of the major difficulties facing the social scientist in his/her attempt to
confirm an analytic model by means of a case study resides in the model’s sin-
gularity and the complications which may ensue when trying to draw conclu-
sions regarding the validity of certain assumptions without putting them to the
test of additional cases. Therefore, in the following paragraphs, the same model
of analysis of the ‘defending democracy’ will be used to compare the Israeli case
to other democracies subject to internal threats, specifically, the American and
German democracies. Of course, we are speaking of a very condensed attempt
to conduct a comparison employing this analytic framework; however, the
product of this effort may afford insight as to the model’s inherent potential.
The choice of the United States and Germany democracies with which to
compare the Israeli case study is not random. Although these are countries with
profound historical, cultural and political distinctiveness, a comparison among
them will serve the purpose because these countries have all experienced the
varied phenomena of extremism and political violence in past decades and all
were compelled to contend with the ‘paradox of the defending democracy’. 
Nevertheless, it is important to be aware of an important structural difference
whose impact is central in regard to the methods of operation utilised by ‘defend-
ing democracies’. Unlike the United States and Germany, Israel has never
adopted a constitution. The absence of constitutional specifications, as elabo-
rated in chapters 1 and 2, has had a decisive impact as reflected in the many
changes and improvisations in the Israeli policy of response toward both politi-
cal parties and extra-parliamentary extremist organisations.
There are essential differences between the American and German concep-
tions of the polity’s protection. While the American constitution puts forward
the freedoms of the individual, the German constitution, while recognising 
the importance of such liberties, emphasises the importance of a stable demo-
cratic system of governance and thus provides authorities with more ‘space’ in
their attempts to defend the state. In effect, German concern that history might
repeat itself is so great that, according to clause 79 (3) of the constitution 
(the ‘perpetuity clause’), clauses 1 (civil rights) and 20 (the democratic nature
of the country) may not be amended under any circumstances.8 Furthermore,
the German constitution refers to domestic emergency situations and grants
authorities permission to deal with them in a more decisive manner than other
constitutions allow.9
RJE5  8/15/02  11:22 AM  Page 179
Jewish extremism and violence
180
In order to make the most of the comparison between the three cases, I will
examine them from the perspective of the same two levels of analysis on which
this book is based. The first level is institutional, implying the respective coun-
tries’ institutional responses to political parties, extremist organisations and
incidents of violence and terror. The second level concerns the social sphere or,
more explicitly, the State’s attempt to establish democratic foundations in society
and the status of the ‘pro-democratic civil society’.
Political parties
From the institutional level of analysis, I look first at the paths chosen by the
different states in response to extremist parties. However, before discussing the
administrative and legal barriers imposed by democracies on extremist parties,
another latent structural barrier, i.e. the electoral system – discussed in chapter
1 – should be clarified. The electoral system was not intended to block extrem-
ist parties from gaining representation. However, different electoral systems or
the levels of their threshold of representation may become crucial variables in
explaining the success or failure of these parties.10 Therefore, when considering
electoral and party system variables, it should be noted that the United States,
with its strong two-party system, and Germany, with its 5 per cent representa-
tion threshold, enjoy considerable structural protection from extremist elements
in their parliaments. Israel, as mentioned earlier, with its low representation
threshold (1.5 per cent), enjoys no such protection.
Despite the almost insuperable barriers facing small parties in the United
States, a National Socialist Party (NSPA) was established and succeeded in
reaching the forefront of public debate in April 1977 while attempting to stage
a march in Skokie, Illinois. The Skokie affair has major importance in this dis-
cussion since it signified the United States’ judiciary’s attitude as to the type of
restriction that should be imposed on extremist parties. Following extended judi-
cial discussion, in January 1978 the Illinois Supreme Court, in a – decision,
ruled in favour of the Nazi march:
The main argument was the content neutrality rule, according to which, political
speech shall not be abridged because of its content, even if that content is verbally
abusive. Speech can be restricted only when it interferes in a physical way with other
legitimate activities; when it is thrust upon a captive audience, or when it directly
incites to immediate harmful conduct. Otherwise, no matter what the content of the
speech, the intention of the speaker, and the impact of the speech on non-captive
listeners, the speech is protected under the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution.11
With this ruling, the Court reinforced the United States’ constitutional commit-
ment to a most extended liberal approach. This ruling was extremely important
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in the light of the far less liberal approach of American authorities in the 1940s
and 1950s, especially towards the Communist Party.
The liberal United States’ approach toward the NSPA might be explained by
two variables. The first, socio-historical explanation is the American tradition of
sanctifying the freedom of the individual. The other variable is more practical –
the fact that, due to structural barriers, the NSPA stood no real chance of
becoming an influential political actor. Yet other far-right organisations did in
fact make their way into the legislature and gained access to policy-making pro-
cedures, mainly through the Republican Party.12 Despite the limited success of
David Duke and other extremist leaders of the right, American authorities have
never had to confront the dramatic emergence of such forces and hence has not
adopted any special measures to deal with the phenomenon.
Though structural and social conditions in Israel and Germany themselves
are hardly similar, the two countries differ dramatically from the United States
in two major senses. First, both countries have variants of the multi-party
system, and, second, both have adopted legislation aimed at preventing the rep-
resentation of extreme parties in their parliaments.
As noted in Chapter 1, clause 21 of the German Basic Law, from 8 May
1949, sets very strict standards as to the kinds of political parties that are enti-
tled to take part in elections to the legislature. For example, the law demands
that the internal organisation of parties conforms to democratic principles.
Moreover, political parties which, by reason of their aims or the behaviour of
their adherents, seek to malign or abolish free democratic basic order or endan-
ger the existence of the Federal Republic of Germany, shall be declared uncon-
stitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court.13 Israel’s section 7A of Basic
Law: The Knesset (1958), discussed elsewhere in length, sets similar barriers for
extremist parties.14
The test of reality reveals that although German and, especially, Israeli law
invests the State with the authority to disqualify parties, in recent decades 
they have nevertheless both chosen to do so on rare occasions. In post-war
Germany, only two parties have been banned according to clause 21: the 
Communist Party (KDP) and the Nazi Party’s successor, the Socialist Reich Party
(SRP) (both were disqualified in the 1950s). According to the Constitutional
Court’s ruling, the SRP was considered an unconstitutional party. It did not
exhibit a commitment to civil rights, the rule of law, pluralism, and equality of
opportunity for all political actors. Consequently, the court ruled that such a
party had no place in the political arena and ordered it to be dismantled and
stripped of all of its assets.15
In Israel, similarly, only two extreme right-wing parties have been disquali-
fied, Kahane’s Kach Party and its splinter party, Kahane Hai. Both were banned
on grounds of being anti-democratic and racist.
Despite these exceptional disqualification procedures carried out by
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Germany and Israel, the two countries have demonstrated a rather high com-
mitment to liberal values. In the years following these disqualifications, extreme
right-wing parties surfaced in both countries. In Germany there was the NPD
(Nationaldemokratisch Partei Deutschland), established in 1964, the DVU (Dutsche
Volksunion), established in 1971, and the REP (Die Republikaner), incepted in
1983. The authorities, on the one hand, and the political parties, on the other,
committed themselves to several ground rules. While the State was not so quick
in implementing disqualification, the parties were very careful with their lan-
guage concerning issues such as liberal democracy and foreigners.16 It was only
in the summer of 2000 that Germany finally decided to initiate a process of dis-
qualification against the NPD in consequence to its plan to instigate a racist rev-
olution. In contrast to Israel, the disqualification process for a political party in
Germany takes a considerable time and involves executive, parliamentary and
judicial authorities. This protracted process is more likely to guarantee that 
the constitutional rights of the party in question will not be undermined.17
However, although the formal procedure of disqualification in Israel takes less
time, the Israeli Supreme Court, as mentioned earlier, has set highly detailed
guidelines for the disqualification process, thus constituting a safeguard which
helps ensure structural commitment to liberal values.
An interesting fact, one that puts the Israeli attitude towards extremist
parties in a light perhaps even more liberal than that of Germany, involves the
decision of the State of Israel to refrain from monitoring parties represented in
the Knesset. In Germany, on the other hand, extremist parties, especially those
of a far-right nature, although not disqualified, are not allowed to act freely. The
Republikaner, for example, was defined by the BfVS (Federal Bureau for the 
Protection of the Constitution) as a radical party hostile to the constitution. In
consequence, authorities limited the freedoms of the party and its members,
although they were not de facto proscribed parties.18 The same thing happened
in the case of the NPD, even prior to the initiation of the disqualification process.
Announcement published on the NPD’s website, the following complaint was
issued:
Like his predecessor as NPD chairman, Gunter Deckert Voight is being hounded by
the German government because of his political views. He is currently the subject
of police investigation for alleged ‘defamation of the state and its symbols’, which is
a criminal offence under the current German regime. Voight made a statement at
the NPD party congress on May 1, 1996, where he compared German democracy
with the Communist system in the former German Democratic Republic in its sup-
pression of nationalist political activity across Germany: ‘We live once again in a
police state in which we have no right of freedom of speech . . . Those who crimi-
nalise people for voicing their opinions are themselves criminals’.19
As mentioned earlier, Israel’s policy is to concede the liberties of questionable
parties as long as they are not disqualified from participating in elections or
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declared entirely illegal. However, once a party is banned or, as in the case of
Kach and Kahane Hai, even declared a terrorist organisation, liberal considera-
tions become almost irrelevant.
It may be concluded that United States’ policy towards extremist parties also
is almost irrelevant due to the structural barriers imposed upon small parties.
Yet, even in cases where such parties were active, the authorities’ attitude
towards them tended to be very liberal and thus conformed to the ‘immunised
route’. In Germany and Israel, the need to defend the polity from subversive ele-
ments was considered urgent enough that in both countries extremist parties
have been disqualified in accordance with constitutional and legal arrange-
ments.20 Over the years, the disqualification measure has been employed only
rarely. Therefore, Israeli as well as German policies on extremist parties may be
characterised as approaching the ‘immunised’ route.
Subversive organisations and violent movements
As in Israel, in comparison to their efforts to deal with political parties, the
United States and Germany found it more difficult to keep their struggle against
extra-parliamentary movements – including violent ones – within democratic
boundaries. This is due to the simple fact that not all social movements aspire
to parliamentary representation and are therefore not bound by the rules of the
electoral game. Moreover, social movements which enjoy a lax organisational
structure do not have to be officially registered; at the same time they are free
to act within the social sphere and may also have the capacity to impress them-
selves upon the political arena.
The activity of such movements is a pivotal element of United States’ 
political culture and is widely protected by the First Amendment to the 
Constitution. As mentioned in chapter 4, as early as the beginning of the nine-
teenth century, so prominent were these movements that Alexis de Tocqueville
praised the high levels of decentralised communal organisation and freedom of
association.21 From that time onwards, although such associations in their
‘uncivil’ form would present serious challenges to the authorities, their impor-
tant role in American democracy made it almost impossible to restrict their
actions.
These political and cultural contexts led American authorities to adhere to
a narrow interpretation of ‘the criminal justice model’ in their response to
violent political acts.22 Smith’s description of the steps taken against several
extremist movements in the 1980s confirms this view. These measures had
proved effective in countering terrorism,23 and at the same time did not cross
liberal boundaries. Even the anti-terrorist legislation passed in the wake of the
Oklahoma City bombing did not seem to exceed the limitations of the liberal
version of the ‘criminal justice model’, especially following the appraisal of its
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constitutionality by the Supreme Court.24 The notion that United States’ policy
complies with the narrow ‘criminal justice model’ was reinforced, once again,
by the words of the director of the FBI himself in the summary report for the
years 1993–98: ‘In the past five years, I have established core values for all FBI
employees: Obedience to the constitution, respect for the dignity of all protected
by the FBI, compassion, fairness, and total integrity.’25 Even the reform adopted
in late 1999, aimed at according the FBI wider authority in its response to 
terrorism, did not seem to effect a radical change in agency activities. Accord-
ing to Deputy Director Robert M. Bryant, the new policy will not change the
FBI’s long tradition of respect for civil rights.26 The tragedy of the 11 Septem-
ber 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon may
indeed lead to a change in United States’ counter-terrorist policy. However, on
the basis of President Bush’s declaration as well as the reactions of the directors
of the various security agencies, it seems that, despite their genuine intention
to effectively eliminate terrorism, US policy-makers and security officials are
generally reluctant to sacrifice basic democratic liberties in the course of this
struggle, at least in the domestic arena.
Germany, like Israel, provides a very different example of counter-
extremist policies. Since the late 1960s Germany, like Israel, has presented its
own version of the ‘extended criminal justice model’27 and, inevitably, has
attracted much criticism as a result. Although, according to Finn, this model of
response has always been constrained by the constitution and thus has been
committed to civil rights,28 Loewenstein argues that this policy was ‘probably
among the most repressive anti-terrorist legislation in existence in a liberal
democracy’.29 Such criticism was generated as a result of the emergency regu-
lations of 1968 which gave the Federal Government extended authority to fight
terrorism within the states of the German Republic. These regulations also gave
extra powers to the Federal Criminal Police Office as well as the BfVS. Left-wing
terrorist attacks, which beleaguered Germany in the years 1974–78, led to the
adoption of even more rigid legislation against subversive and terrorist acts.
These new regulations included the Penal Code 88a, according to which a crime
against the constitution may result in three years’ imprisonment. This law was
subject to severe criticism and was thus made void in 1981. Further expansion
of the ‘criminal justice model’ may be found in amendments 129 and 129a to
the Penal Code, the purpose of which was to impose stricter limitations on
attempts to form terrorist organisations. Moreover, the German Government
adopted the ‘Radicals’ Decree’ policy, which sanctioned restrictions on radical
political activists. This regulation excluded many Germans from employment in
the public sector and many others had to face unpleasant interrogations.30
These policies, although legally better defined than those in Israel, reflect a
similar tendency of the German State to give priority to security issues even at
the price of undermining civil rights.
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Over time, the extended model of response in Germany has undergone
several liberal reforms31 in a process similar to the Israeli attempts to effect a
departure from its ‘extended criminal justice model’. Events of the 1980s and
1990s demonstrated that although Germany still had at its disposal various
means to cope with politically motivated violence, it tended to avoid extensive
use of them. For example, during the 1990s, only fifteen radical organisations
were declared illegal, while the actual number of far-right movements in 1999
stood at 134.32 In recent years, German policy on violent right-wing bodies has
become more resolute, yet, according to police officials as well as the BfVS, it is
strictly bound by legal as well as liberal boundaries.33 Indeed, contrary to Israeli
security forces and especially the Shabak, the modus operandi of the German BfVS
as well as the special police forces is more in conformance with liberal values.
These forces are subject to strict parliamentary, judicial and public review and
therefore try to deal with the problems of extremism and violence by employ-
ing less severe tactics. For example, the BfVS, which is in charge of gathering
intelligence on extremist movements, is prohibited from acting against these ele-
ments. For that reason, besides gathering information, the organisation issues
reports on extreme right-wing activities. These reports are then distributed both
to decision-makers and to the general public. The aim of publishing such intel-
ligence information is to raise public awareness about the risks originating from
the far right and the expansion of its movements. Furthermore, special police
forces – established for the purpose of contending with the neo-Nazi scene – are
trained to use non-violent measures with violent crowds. In fact, one of the most
important tasks of these forces is to educate, i.e. to try, by means of persuasion,
to prevent radical youths from committing violent crimes.
To conclude: in the past, both Germany and Israel tended to put security
considerations at the forefront of their counter-violent activities, and as a result
were subject to criticism for violations of liberal rights. While in recent years
both countries have attempted to limit their response to extremism to more
democratically acceptable policies, it seems that Germany is more in accord with
the ‘immunised route’ than Israel. The United States, on the other hand, has for
a long time been inclined towards the narrow interpretation of the ‘criminal
justice model’ and thus complies much more closely with the liberal conception.
Civics education
As for the social level of analysis, the role of civics education in these three
democracies is compared, and then an attempt is made to assess the role of the
‘pro-democratic civil society’ in helping defend those democracies.
Most democracies acknowledge the need for socialising their future citizens
in conformity with the rules of the democratic game. However, for many years,
civics education in the United States and Germany has remained fairly 
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comparable to the Israeli programme (i.e. an emphasis mainly on the structures
and functions of governmental institutions). Yet, in the last few decades, the cur-
ricula of civics education in many liberal democracies, including the United 
States and Germany, have expanded the role of civic studies and shifted the
emphasis from structures and procedures to democratic and liberal values.34
Moreover, ministries of education in many German states and especially in the
former states of East Germany (GDR) are opening the doors of the education
system to ‘civil society’ organisations which work to promote tolerance and
democracy.35
One of the most active institutions of the civil society in providing educa-
tion in tolerance, particularly in East Germany, is the RAA (regional centres 
for inter-cultural understanding, education and schools). This was established
in 1992 primarily in the wake of an increase in xenophobic incidents and early
indications of a wave of violence against foreigners in the ex-Communist 
parts of the country. Under the patronage of the Federal Government, the 
RAA opened ten offices in the state of Brandenburg and provided assistance for
similar initiatives in other states formerly part of East Germany.36 Its principal
goal is to promote inter-cultural understanding and to prevent, or at least
reduce, xenophobia and violence aimed at foreigners. The main part of its 
operations focuses on designing study programmes on the subjects of democ-
racy and tolerance and administering them in kindergartens, schools and youth
clubs. Organisation members are also engaged in adult education and in fact
have expanded their range of activities to providing assistance to refugees 
and immigrants. According to RAA representatives, the majority of schools in
Brandenburg receive with open arms organisations of the ‘pro-democratic civil
society’ and governmental involvement on this issue, while the demand for
extra-curricular programmes in this vein are on the increase.37
The rapid development of the field of civics education in the former East
Germany corresponds with Frazer’s assertion that in order to complete the
democratisation of countries from the former Eastern Bloc, the new govern-
ments of these states have adopted study programmes designed to help young
and senior citizens alike deal with a political system based on values previously
unknown to them.
Yet, in order to better understand the growing emphasis on ‘civics educa-
tion’ in established liberal democracies, it should be stressed that political apathy,
low electoral turnouts and declining levels of social and political participation
in recent decades and, at the same time, an increase in manifestations of racist,
sectarian, authoritarian and anti-humanitarian values, have alarmed many
countries in Western Europe and North America, thus sparking a renewed 
interest in civics education.38
In the former East Germany, the liberal variant of civics education has
become a central factor in processes of democratisation. The United States and
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Germany also have instituted comprehensive civics education programmes with
an emphasis on liberal and humanistic values aimed at encouraging the public
to be a part of the political procedure. However, in the attempt to contend with
phenomena stemming from political extremism and xenophobia, Israel has yet
to devise a clear-cut policy on this matter.
As explained in chapter 3, the reason why civics education policy in Israel
remains ambiguous is not so much that its social structure is sufficiently ‘immu-
nised’ as to render education of this genre unnecessary as that the State’s 
political and ideological structures make it difficult for leaders to choose a 
specific policy and then to pursue it.
Civil society
Regarding the ‘pro-democratic civil society’s’ role in assisting the State move
towards the ‘immunised’ model, as already noted, many civil society organisa-
tions are engaged in promoting tolerance and consequently have assumed a role
in the ‘immunisation’ process of the Israeli society. These activities make it far
harder for extremist political leaders and activists to mobilise wide support from
the population. Moreover, an active ‘pro-democratic civil society’ may also help
limit the State’s response to democratically acceptable boundaries. In both the
German and the United States’ experience, examples may be found of dynamic
civil activity in reaction to challenges of an extremist nature. Following the
success of the DVU in the Sachsen-Anhalt elections in April 1998, the German
post office workers’ union asked the Federal Government to find ways to prevent
the delivery of racist mail by the German postal system. This step was taken prior
to the national elections of September 1998 and reflected concern that the DVU
would enter the national Parliament. Prior to the 1998 elections, many parlia-
mentary members were approached by the organisation of Christian churches
in Germany and were asked to refrain from using xenophobic rhetoric during
their election campaigning. Moreover, both the employers’ (DGB) and the
employees’ (UVB) unions in Berlin urged their members not to vote for extreme
right-wing parties. They also asked them to act openly to stem the rising tide of
violence against foreigners.39
Similarly, the American tradition of a strong civil society finds its expres-
sion in the struggle against racism and extremism. Such civil society activity
comes in all shapes and sizes, beginning with grassroots activities in the local
community and ending with the activities of established interest groups. For
example, when in New Town, Pennsylvania, violent far-right activists broke a
window only because a Hanukkah Menorah stood behind it, the local community
stepped into action and a Menorah was placed in almost every house in the
neighbourhood. A similar example may be found in the neo-Nazi graffiti attack
in Washington, DC. When newspapers wrote that the city did not have enough
RJE5  8/15/02  11:22 AM  Page 187
Jewish extremism and violence
188
resources to deal with these defacements, local communities decided to take on
the task and wiped clean all the wall writings themselves.40 Similar events took
place following the September 2001 terrorist attack. Due to the fear that 
American Muslims would be attacked by angry militants, local communities all
over the country became engaged in projects aimed at promoting religious and
ethnic tolerance.
Yet, in accordance with a longstanding tradition, the most active members
in American civil society are the more institutionalised organisations, especially
the interest groups. Among the most prominent groups acting against racism,
xenophobia and hate crimes are the Anti-Defamation League, the American
Jewish Committee, the Simon Wiesenthal Centre, and many others represent-
ing minorities. In such cases, the groups themselves attempt to strengthen 
the ties between society and the local state by initiating joint activities. In 1998,
the ADL cooperated with the state of New Jersey in proposing prizes for those
who exposed racist graffiti perpetrators. In 1999, the same organisation, this
time in conjunction with the New York Police Department, published a hand-
book for designed to help members of the community respond to racist vio-
lence.41 These organisations do not restrict themselves to local activities, but also
aim at the legislative level. The ‘hate crimes’ laws, adopted by many states in the
US, are a direct consequence of the ADL’s efforts to find a way to fight racist and
xenophobic crimes within constitutional boundaries, followed by a concentrated
effort of the organisation to establish lobbies to support such legislation.42
As described at length in chapter 4, the ‘pro-democratic civil society’ in
Israel is still in its developmental stage and its influence is significantly less pro-
nounced as compared to organisations of the ‘civil society’ in the United States
and Germany. Particularly in recent years, it seems that a political window of
opportunity has gradually opened, enabling these associations to flourish and
take their place as a significant factor in the protection of Israeli democracy.
However, as noted before, the State must help create the conditions needed to
facilitate their development; and, as Yishai states: ‘Society itself needs to over-
come its polarising trends as well as the tendencies of individuals to assemble
together and work in small frameworks which serve individualistic interests
instead of the interest of society as a whole.’43
To conclude this comparative analysis: placing the three countries on the
continuum leading from the ‘militant’ to the ‘immunised route’ will readily
establish the United States as the country closest to the ideal type of the ‘immu-
nised defending democracy’. Although not a country entirely free of extremist
phenomena and political violence, the political culture of the USA gives an
impression of considerable commitment to liberal and democratic values. 
Furthermore, the ‘pro-democratic civil society’, which has proved to be a cor-
nerstone of United States’ political life, is largely successful in responding effec-
tively to the challenges of extremism. A review of that country’s response to
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these challenges, whether in the form of political parties or other types of organ-
isation, shows evidence of great restraint and commitment to the ‘rule of the
law’ and liberal democratic values. Even after the events of September 2001, the
odds are presumably low that American democracy will fall victim to the agents
of political extremism or that its liberal democratic foundations will be under-
mined in the effort to defend itself in the face of those threats.
Germany also is positioned closer to the ‘immunised’ model than is Israel,
although a distinction must be made between West Germany, where democracy
has been able to take root in the decades following the Second World War, and
its neighbouring countries, which were subject to Communist rule and are 
still engaged in the processes of democratisation. Quite unlike the American
instance where democratic and liberal values have played a central part in the
political culture, for many German citizens who had lived under Communist
rule these are unfamiliar values. Therefore, both federal and local governments,
together with the notable participation of ‘civil society’ organisations, are striv-
ing to fashion anew a democratic political culture by means of the processes of
political socialisation. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the exceptional history
of the German Republic, the Holocaust and related issues such as tolerance and
pluralism have become central topics in its education system. From a young age,
children in Germany learn the advantages of democracy, as well as the poten-
tially disastrous consequences should the basis of democracy be challenged 
or ignored. In terms of Germany’s institutional response to the challenges of
extremism, there is now a marked inclination toward liberalisation in com-
parison to earlier decades. Despite the fact that today, especially in the eastern
parts of the country, a significant threat consisting of right-wing extremism and
skinhead street violence is making its presence felt, the security forces, which
closely follow these events, still refrain, in most cases, from crossing conven-
tional democratic boundaries in their response. In fact, the German constitu-
tion, which sanctifies the preservation of the polity’s stability – even at the
expense of the liberties of extremists – prevents the German State from a facile
crossing of democratically accepted boundaries in its struggle against extrem-
ists. Proof of this is in the drawn out and obstacle-laden process through which
state authorities have to go in order to disqualify a political party.
The Israeli case has already been discussed were in detail, and therefore only
one conclusion, relevant to the present comparison with the other two cases,
remains to be briefly outlined. In Israel, there is a disparity between its progress
toward the ‘immunised’ pole in its response to extremist political parties (and
also, to a certain degree, to violent movements), on the one hand, and the weak-
ness of its democratic political culture, which includes the State’s difficulty or
perhaps reluctance to partake in the shaping of this political culture, on the
other. In the first decades of its existence, Israel acted swiftly and decisively when
faced with any factor perceived by its leadership as a threat to either the Jewish
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or the democratic nature of the State. After undergoing processes of institu-
tionalisation, and having become an established fact in the Middle East, the
intensity of its response to the challenge of extremist Jewish elements has 
gradually decreased. The credit for this turn of policy goes to the increasing 
commitment to democratic values of ruling elites and their fear of forfeiting
public legitimacy by responding with too heavy a hand to the representatives of
one of the groups constituting the polarised Israeli society. However, this novel
approach will founder unless there is significant change in the empowerment of
the democratic underpinnings of Israeli society. The various chapters of this
book present evidence of the significant incongruity that exists between the
Israeli policy of response to extremist manifestations, such as political parties or
violent movements, and its long-term policy of attempting to inculcate democ-
ratic values. This gap between the State’s response to extremists and its teleo-
logical struggle with the phenomenon of extremism has been attributed, in the
main, to the non-liberal character of Israeli democracy and, more specifically,
to the tension between Jewish-nationalist and democratic features included in
the formula of the Jewish and democratic State which find expression in the
political system and in policy-making processes. Furthermore, the fact that
Israel can still be called a centralist state in relation to other democracies pre-
vents it from providing a wider range of action for those bodies in the social
sphere whose goal is to strike at the sources of extremism. Therefore, in com-
parison to the United States – and to Germany – Israel is to be found more dis-
tanced from the ‘immunised’ point of the continuum, and perhaps it is possible
to see the Israeli democracy as having the greatest potential to be affected by the
phenomenon of political extremism or by its response to it.
Conclusions
What, therefore, are the theoretical conclusions to be drawn from this study?
And which questions are still left unanswered?
At the beginning of the book, I discussed the terms, ‘militant democracy’
and ‘defending democracy’ as defined and used by both scholars and policy-
makers. The upshot of this discussion was that these are terms of considerable
ambiguity and ambivalence which ultimately rely on one basic assumption: to
wit, a democracy has the right to defend itself from its adversaries. And, in the
light of the events of the twentieth century, ‘militant democracy’ and ‘defend-
ing democracy’ are terms that apply, generally speaking in the context of anti-
democratic political parties. Yet a closer look at the challenges facing democratic
systems of governance at the beginning of the third millennium reveals a more
intricate picture. This is primarily due to the fact that not only do certain polit-
ical parties pose a danger to the stability of these systems but, today, radical or
revolutionary extra-parliamentary movements and terrorist organisations con-
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stitute a threat. Furthermore, the formal nature of the definitions of ‘militant
democracy’ and ‘defending democracy’ principally stresses the judicial means
at the disposal of state institutions in their struggle with anti-democratic chal-
lenges. This limits discourse to the paradoxes generated by the need of democ-
ratic polities to defend themselves and which, in their very efforts to do so, are
liable to undermine the ethical foundations on which they are structured.
Accordingly, and in the attempt to address the complex of challenges facing
the self-defending democratic polity, I proposed to expand the notion of the
‘defending democracy’ beyond the conventional definitions of the construct,
mainly by supplementing the formal–institutional perspective with a social 
perspective. The rationale for this expansion was that simply investigating the
measures employed by states in their efforts to deal with defiant elements 
seemed inadequate when those elements were already immanent. Alternatively,
the ‘defending democracy’ should be perceived as a more comprehensive term
which involves the complex of actions effected in the political and social spheres
designed to reinforce the democratic bases of society and to reduce the mobilis-
ing potential of extremist parties and movements. Furthermore, including the
social perspective in this analysis introduces the potential for a more penetrat-
ing scrutiny of the ‘defending democracy paradox’ and possible means for its
resolution. For, as noted above, one of our fundamental assumptions is that as
society enjoys a more stable democratic social sub-structure, the intensity of the
extremist threat aimed at the state is reduced and, as a result, the inclination of
state authorities to cross democratically acceptable boundaries in the context of
their struggle against provocative elements is also weakened. In order to facili-
tate the use of the concept of the ‘defending democracy’ for analytical purposes,
two ideal types were proposed – the ‘militant’ and the ‘immunised’ route. These
concepts are structured on both institutional and social components and in
effect form a continuum. Presenting these types imparts to the notion of the
‘defending democracy’ a dynamic aspect and enables the examination of the
change in the nature of a certain country’s confrontation with extremist phe-
nomena over a period of time, and in fact provides the means for comparison
among several countries.
In conclusion, the two principal goals achieved in this book are the expan-
sion and elucidation of the characteristics of the ‘defending democracy’, and
the devising of an analytic continuum which provides for the positioning of
different countries’ responses somewhere between the two ideal types. Yet, in
order to pursue and develop the above model into a comprehensive theoretical
framework, both research questions and fields of research should be developed
further. In this fashion, for example, the study of the Israeli case has shown that
the intensity of extremist threats is not the only determinant which shapes the
nature of the state’s response, but that other factors, including those related to
its political culture, institutional structure, social issues and various political
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considerations, have parts to play. A comprehensive comparative study can
provide a more detailed answer and perhaps an interesting explanatory model
for the various factors impacting on the features of the state’s response and can
additionally put to the test the assumption that the overriding factor in a state’s
counteractive policy is the extent and degree of the hostile threats it faces.
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